State v. Ronzell Bilah Olds

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Ronzell Bilah Olds, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000336

Appeal From Charleston County
Jennifer B. McCoy, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-338
Submitted September 1, 2025 – Filed October 8, 2025

AFFIRMED

Senior Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Deputy Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both
of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Ronzell Bilah Olds appeals his convictions for armed robbery
and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, as well as
concurrent sentences of twenty years' imprisonment for armed robbery and five
years' imprisonment for possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent
crime. On appeal, Olds argues the circuit court erred in failing to grant his motions
to dismiss for pre-indictment delay and violation of his right to a speedy trial. We
affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the circuit court did not err in denying Olds's motions to dismiss based
on pre-indictment delay. See State v. Lee, 360 S.C. 530, 537-38, 602 S.E.2d 113,
117 (Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing the "[circuit court's] decision regarding
pre-indictment delay [is] a mixed question of law and fact and will only be
reversed if clearly erroneous," aff'd, 375 S.C. 394, 653 S.E.2d 259 (2007)). Olds
failed to establish that the unavailability of potential witnesses resulted in
substantial actual prejudice; therefore, he failed to establish that his defense was
meaningfully impaired to the extent the outcome of his case would have been
different. See Lee, 375 S.C. at 397, 653 S.E.2d at 260 (acknowledging "when
pre-indictment delay is alleged to have violated a defendant's due process rights,"
appellate courts will first consider whether the defendant has established "the delay
caused substantial actual prejudice to his right to a fair trial"); State v. Brazell, 325
S.C. 65, 73, 480 S.E.2d 64, 69 (1997) (indicating that to prove substantial
prejudice, a defendant must show that "he was meaningfully impaired in his ability
to defend against the [S]tate's charges to such an extent that the disposition of the
criminal proceeding was likely [affected]" (quoting Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d
900, 907 (4th Cir. 1996))). Although Olds identified witnesses he would have
called to testify at trial, we find he failed to establish "with specificity" what their
testimony would have been. See id. (indicating when the prejudice asserted is that
a witness is unavailable, the defendant must "identify the witness he would have
called" and "demonstrate, with specificity, the expected content of that witness'
testimony"). We further find Olds failed to establish he made any attempt to locate
two of the witnesses he identified. See id. (indicating that when the prejudice
asserted is that a witness is unavailable, the defendant must "establish that he made
serious attempts to locate the witness"). Finally, we find Olds failed to establish
that he could not obtain his desired testimony from another source.1 See id.
(indicating that when the prejudice asserted is that a witness is unavailable, the
defendant must "show that the information the witness would have provided was
not available from other sources").

1
Because we hold Olds failed to prove substantial prejudice, we do not address the
justification for the State's delay. See Brazell, 325 S.C. at 74, 480 S.E.2d at 69
("Because [the appellant] failed to carry his burden of proving actual substantial
prejudice, we need not consider the State's justification for the delay.").
2. We hold the circuit court abused its discretion by determining that the length of
delay was not sufficient to trigger an analysis of the Barker v. Wingo2 factors. See
State v. Hunsberger, 418 S.C. 335, 342, 794 S.E.2d 368, 372 (2016) ("The trial
court's ruling on a motion for speedy trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard."); id. at 342, 794 S.E.2d at 371-72 ("An abuse of discretion occurs when
the court's decision is based on an error of law or upon factual findings that are
without evidentiary support."). We find the four-year delay between Olds's
January 2018 arrest and March 2022 trial was sufficiently lengthy to trigger a
speedy trial analysis. See id. at 342-43, 794 S.E.2d at 371-72 ("To trigger a speedy
trial analysis, the accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial
has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from 'presumptively prejudicial'
delay . . . ." (quoting Doggett v. U.S., 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992))); State v. Waites,
270 S.C. 104, 108, 240 S.E.2d 651, 653 (1978) (finding a two-year four-month
"delay between arrest and preliminary hearing [was] disturbing" and "sufficient to
trigger" review of the remaining factors).

Nevertheless, we hold Olds's right to a speedy trial was not violated. See
Hunsberger, 418 S.C. at 343, 794 S.E.2d at 372 ("Once the accused has met this
initial burden, a court must look to four factors, among the totality of the
circumstances . . . ."); id. ("These factors are: (1) length of delay; (2) the reason for
the delay; (3) the accused's assertion of his right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether
the delay prejudiced the accused."); id. ("A speedy trial claim must be 'analyzed in
terms of the circumstances of each case, balancing the conduct of the prosecution
and the defense.'" (quoting State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 549, 647 S.E.2d 144,
155 (2008))). First, we hold the reasons provided by the State for the delay, while
varied, weigh only slightly against the State. See Langford, 400 S.C. at 443, 735
S.E.2d at 483 ("A deliberate attempt by the State to delay the trial as a means of
impairing the accused's ability to defend himself 'should be weighted heavily
against the government.'" (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531)); id. ("Neutral reasons,
which could include overcrowded dockets or negligence, are 'weighted less
heavily' but still count against the State because it bears the ultimate responsibility
for these circumstances." (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531)). We find the
approximately one-and-a-half-year delay attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic
should not be held against either party because this delay was the result of a global
pandemic over which neither party had control. See Waites, 270 S.C. at 108, 240
S.E.2d at 653 ("In order to establish the denial of a speedy trial, it must be

2
407 U.S. 514 (1972) (identifying the four factors necessary for a speedy trial
analysis as "[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of
his right, and prejudice to the defendant").
demonstrated the delay was attributable to the State."). Regarding the portion of
delay prior to the COVID-19 pandemic that the State asserted was due to good
faith plea negotiations, trial preparation, and a continuance, to which neither party
objected, we find Olds failed to meet his burden to show that this portion of the
delay was the result of the State's "willful neglect." See State v. Smith, 307 S.C.
376, 411-12, 415 S.E.2d 409, 411-12 (Ct. App. 1992) (indicating the burden is on
the defendant to show that "delay was due to the neglect and willfulness of the
State's prosecution"). As to the period of post-pandemic delay the State attributed
to assignment of the case to a new assistant solicitor and the "post-pandemic
condition of the docket," we find these reasons for delay "weigh[] less heavily"
against the State. Additionally, we find the delay between the planned January
2022 trial and the March 2022 trial due to the State's failure to indict Olds weighs
less heavily against the State because there is no indication on appeal that this
delay was deliberate or willful. See Langford, 400 S.C. at 443, 735 S.E.2d at 483
("Neutral reasons, which could include overcrowded dockets or negligence, are
'weighted less heavily' but still count against the State because it bears the ultimate
responsibility for these circumstances." (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531)).

Second, we hold Olds sufficiently asserted his right to a speedy trial, a factor
weighing in his favor. Although Olds first asserted his right to a speedy trial in
May 2020, twenty-eight months after his arrest, he did so through a motion to
dismiss and long before his March 2022 trial. See Reaves, 414 S.C. at 130, 777
S.E.2d at 219 ("The third factor—assertion of the right—recognizes that while a
criminal defendant has no responsibility to bring himself to trial, the extent to
which he exercises his right to a speedy trial is significant.").

Finally, we hold Olds failed to establish either actual or presumptive prejudice.
Although actual prejudice is not required for a speedy trial violation, we find Olds
failed to establish actual prejudice based upon witness unavailability. See
Hunsberger, 418 S.C. at 351, 794 S.E.2d at 376 ("Actual prejudice occurs when
the trial delay has weakened the accused's ability to raise specific defenses, elicit
specific testimony, or produce specific items of evidence."); State v. Evans, 386
S.C. 418, 423-24, 688 S.E.2d 583, 586-87 (Ct. App. 2009) (affirming the trial
court's ruling that although the appellant lost four witnesses during a twelve-year
delay, there was no "neglectful delay prejudicial to the defense" in light of the
reasons for delay being transfer of the case, suppression of the defendant's
statement, the appeals process, the election of a new solicitor, and in light of the
uncertainty surrounding at least one of the witnesses' testimony). We hold Olds
failed to establish this court should presume prejudice because although his trial
was delayed for just over four years, which is at least three times the length of
delay necessary to trigger the speedy trial analysis, the delay was the result of
either neutral factors or those weighing only slightly against the State and was not
due to inexcusable oversights or intentional conduct by the State. See Hunsberger,
418 S.C. at 351, 794 S.E.2d at 376 ("[A]n accused can assert actual prejudice or
presumptive prejudice as the result of the State's violation of his right to a speedy
trial."); Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657-58 (comparing the portion of the delay
attributable to the prosecution's negligence to the threshold necessary to trigger a
speedy trial claim for analyzing presumptive prejudice); id. ("[N]egligence
unaccompanied by particularized trial prejudice must have lasted longer than
negligence demonstrably causing such prejudice."); id. at 658 (stating that even if
the length of delay is sufficiently long to presume prejudice, a defendant may still
be precluded from relief if the presumption of prejudice has been extenuated or has
been "persuasively rebutted").

AFFIRMED.3

WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.