Wedgewood Condominium Association v. Centex Homes (3)

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Wedgewood Condominium Association, Appellant,

v.

Centex Homes, a Nevada General Partnership; Balfour
Beatty Construction, LLC as Successor by Merger to
Centex Construction Company, Inc., and Centex
Construction, LLC; Crescent Engineering, Inc.,
Defendants,

Of which Centex Homes, a Nevada General Partnership;
Balfour Beatty Construction, LLC as Successor by
Merger to Centex Construction Company, Inc., and
Centex Construction, LLC, are the Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2023-001150

Appeal From Horry County
Carmen T. Mullen, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-324
Heard June 10, 2025 – Filed September 24, 2025

AFFIRMED

Gene McCain Connell, Jr. and Lawrence Sidney Connor,
IV, both of Kelaher Connell & Connor, PC, of Surfside
Beach; and Stacy L. Stanley, of Stanley Law Firm, LLC,
of Little River, for Appellant.

Thomas C. Hildebrand, Jr. and William Green
DesChamps, IV, both of Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein,
LLP, of Charleston; Katon Edwards Dawson, Jr., of
Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, of Columbia;
Jeffrey A. Turner and Stephanie A. Douglas, both of
Bush Seyferth, PLLC, of Troy, Michigan; and Paul
Nicholas Nybo, of Hudson Lambert Parrott, LLC, of
Charleston; all for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Wedgewood Condominium Association (Wedgewood) appeals
the circuit court's grant of Centex Homes's, Balfour Beatty Construction, LLC's,
and Centex Construction, LLC's (collectively, Centex's) motion to deposit funds
with the court pursuant to Rule 67 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
in satisfaction of a $6.75 million jury verdict against them. We affirm.

1. As to Wedgewood's argument the circuit court erred in granting Centex's
motion because section 34-31-20 of the South Carolina Code (2020) conflicts with
Rule 67, SCRCP, we find no error.1 See S.C. Dep't of Transp., 369 S.C. at 153,
631 S.E.2d at 535 ("The granting of leave to deposit money with the court pursuant
to Rule 67, SCRCP[,] is a matter within the discretion of the trial court and will not
be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion."); id. ("An abuse of discretion
occurs when the ruling is based on an error of law or a factual conclusion without
evidentiary support."); Rule 67, SCRCP ("In an action in which any part of the

1
We recognize Rule 67 does not stop the accrual of postjudgment interest on cases
with a governing contractual interest provision or in eminent domain proceedings.
See Renaissance Enters., Inc. v. Ocean Resorts, Inc., 334 S.C. 324, 326-27, 513
S.E.2d 617, 618-19 (1999) (holding "a deposit into court pursuant to Rule 67 does
not stop the accrual of interest provided by contract." (emphasis added); S.C. Dep't
of Transp. v. First Carolina Corp. of S.C., 369 S.C. 150, 155, 631 S.E.2d 533, 536
(2006) (holding the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the deposit of
funds pursuant to Rule 67 because the Eminent Domain Procedure Act explicitly
required postjudgment interest for a condemnation judgment and specifically
provided that in the event of a conflict, it prevailed over the rules of civil
procedure).
relief sought is a judgment for a sum of money . . . , a party, upon notice to every
other party, and by leave of court, may deposit with the court all or any part of
such sum or thing . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 34-31-20(B) ("A money decree or
judgment of a court enrolled or entered must draw interest according to law. The
legal rate of interest is equal to the prime rate as listed in the first edition of the
Wall Street Journal published for each calendar year for which the damages are
awarded, plus four percentage points, compounded annually."); Russo v. Sutton,
317 S.C. 441, 444, 454 S.E.2d 895, 896 (1995) (holding "a judgment debtor's
deposit of funds into court [pursuant to Rule 67] pending his own appeal prevents
further accrual of interest"); Small v. Pioneer Mach., Inc., 330 S.C. 62, 64-65, 496
S.E.2d 884, 885 (Ct. App. 1998) (affirming the circuit court's grant of a motion to
deposit $500,000 based on a damages award pursuant to Rule 67 when the
defendant had complied with the requirements of Rule 67 and noting that the
"judgment debtor's deposit of funds into the court pending his own appeal prevents
further accrual of interest on the judgment"); Duval v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 339
S.C. 616, 620, 529 S.E.2d 566, 568-69 (Ct. App. 2000) (affirming the trial court's
allowing a judgment debtor to avoid postjudgment interest by depositing the
amount of the judgment with the court and stating it was bound by the clear
precedent in Russo); Zurich Am. Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Palmetto Cont. Servs., Inc., 434
S.C. 104, 110, 862 S.E.2d 714, 717 (Ct. App. 2021) (noting that when our state
rule is substantially the same as the federal rule, the court can analyze federal case
law interpreting the federal rule when deciding issues related to our state rule);
Renaissance Enters., Inc., 334 S.C. at 327, 513 S.E.2d at 619 ("Rule 67 is
substantially the same as the federal rule allowing a deposit into court.");
Zelaya/Cap. lnt'l Judgment, LLC v. Zelaya, 769 F.3d 1296, 1303 (11th Cir. 2014)
("The federal courts . . . have overwhelmingly held that post[-]judgment statutory
interest stops accruing once the disputed funds are deposited into the court's
registry."); Russo, 317 S.C. at 443, 454 S.E.2d at 896 (explaining the cessation of
postjudgment interest under Rule 67 "encourages the debtor to pay the judgment
and assures the judgment creditor the funds will be available at the conclusion of
the appeal").

2. As to Wedgewood's remaining arguments, we find these issues either
unpreserved or abandoned. Regarding both its contention that the circuit court
abused its discretion in granting Centex's motion because Centex has a high net
worth and its assertion and that Rule 67 is inapplicable when a defendant contests
liability, we find these arguments unpreserved. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330
S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("[A]n issue cannot be raised for the first
time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be
preserved for appellate review."); Byrd ex rel. Julia B. v. McLeod Physician
Assocs. II, 427 S.C. 407, 418, 831 S.E.2d 152, 157 (Ct. App. 2019) ("Furthermore,
'a party cannot argue one ground at trial then another ground on appeal[.]'"
(quoting State v. McCray, 332 S.C. 536, 542, 506 S.E.2d 301, 303 (1998))).
Regarding Wedgewood's claim the circuit court erred in granting Centex's motion
because it resulted in Centex getting an interest-free appeal, we find this issue
abandoned. See R & G Constr., Inc. v. Lowcountry Reg'l Transp. Auth., 343 S.C.
424, 437, 540 S.E.2d 113, 120 (Ct. App. 2000) ("An issue is deemed abandoned if
the argument in the brief is only conclusory."); Med. Univ. of S.C. v. Arnaud, 360
S.C. 615, 620, 602 S.E.2d 747, 750 (2004) (noting issues are deemed abandoned
when the arguments on those issues are conclusory).

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS, MCDONALD, and VINSON, JJ., concur.