State v. Justin T. Anderson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Appellant,

v.

Justin T. Anderson, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000943

Appeal From York County
Eugene C. Griffith, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-242
Submitted April 1, 2025 – Filed July 16, 2025

AFFIRMED

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing,
both of Columbia; and Solicitor Kevin Scott Brackett, of
York, all for Appellant.

Leland B. Greeley, of Rock Hill, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: This appeal arises from the circuit court's grant of immunity to
Justin T. Anderson. On appeal, the State argues the circuit court committed error
by granting immunity to Anderson pursuant to the South Carolina Protection of
Persons and Property Act (The Act)1 because (1) the circuit court granted
immunity without making an actual determination on whether the "without fault
for the difficulty" element of self-defense had been established as required; (2)
Anderson was at fault for the difficulty because the language he used provoked the
physical altercation; (3) Anderson did not reasonably need to use deadly force
against his unarmed victim at the time he did; and (4) the circuit court erroneously
concluded Anderson was only legally required to establish two of the four self-
defense elements to be entitled to immunity. We affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"Circuit courts utilize pretrial hearings to determine whether a defendant is entitled
to immunity under the Act, employing a preponderance of the evidence standard."
State v. Cervantes-Pavon, 426 S.C. 442, 449, 827 S.E.2d 564, 567 (2019).
Appellate courts "review[] an immunity determination for an abuse of discretion."
Id. "An abuse of discretion occurs when the [circuit] court's ruling is based on an
error of law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without evidentiary
support." State v. Jones, 416 S.C. 283, 290, 786 S.E.2d 132, 136 (2016).

The Act provides immunity from prosecution for a person who has used deadly
force after a trial court determines the person was justified in using such force.

A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and
who is attacked in another place where he has a right to
be, including, but not limited to, his place of business,
has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his
ground and meet force with force, including deadly force,
if he reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent death
or great bodily injury to himself or another person or to
prevent the commission of a violent crime as defined in
Section 16-1-60.

1
The Act is informally known as the "Stand Your Ground Law" and was enacted
by the South Carolina General Assembly in 2006 to provide a person "is immune
from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of deadly force" in
circumstances that are permitted by the Act or by another provision of law. S.C.
Code Ann. § 16-11-450(A) (2015); State v. McCarty, 437 S.C. 355, 366, 878
S.E.2d 902, 908 (2022).
§ 16-11-440(C). The Act provides immunity for "[a]
person who uses deadly force as permitted by the
provisions of this article or another applicable provision
of law is justified in using deadly force and is immune
from criminal prosecution and civil action for the use of
deadly force . . . .

§ 16-11-450(A). "'[A]nother applicable provision of law' includes the common law
of self-defense." State v. Glenn, 429 S.C. 108, 117, 838 S.E.2d 491, 496 (2019).
The general four elements a defendant must meet to justify the use of deadly force
under the common law of self-defense are the following:

First, the defendant must be without fault in bringing on
the difficulty. Second, the defendant must have actually
believed he was in imminent danger of losing his life or
sustaining serious bodily injury, or he actually was in
such imminent danger. Third, if his defense is based
upon his belief of imminent danger, a reasonably prudent
man of ordinary firmness and courage would have
entertained the same belief. If the defendant actually was
in imminent danger, the circumstances were such as
would warrant a man of ordinary prudence, firmness[,]
and courage to strike the fatal blow in order to save
himself from serious bodily harm or losing his own life.
Fourth, the defendant had no other probable means of
avoiding the danger of losing his own life or sustaining
serious bodily injury than to act as he did in this
particular instance.

Id. at 116, 838 S.E.2d at 495.

LAW/ANALYSIS

Without Fault for the Difficulty Element2

The State argues the circuit court erred in granting immunity without making an
actual determination on whether the "without fault for the difficulty" element had
been established. Further, the State argues Anderson could not have been without

2
We have combined issues one and two.
fault for bringing on the difficulty because the language he used provoked the
altercation. We disagree. In State v. Brooks, our supreme court held that if a
proprietor, while exercising the right to eject a trespasser, is assaulted and
subjected to danger of losing life or suffering serious bodily harm, the proprietor
would be justified in using self-defense. 252 S.C. 504, 510, 167 S.E.2d 307, 310
(1969). If the proprietor is engaged in the legitimate exercise in good faith of the
right to eject, he or she would be without fault in bringing on the difficulty and
would not be required to retreat. Id. Similarly, in State v. Starnes, our supreme
court affirmed the circuit court's jury charge stating that if a proprietor, after
ordering a trespasser to leave, is assaulted and subjected to danger justifying self-
defense, and if the proprietor is acting in good faith to eject the trespasser, the
proprietor would be without fault in bringing on the difficulty and would not have
to retreat. 213 S.C. 304, 315, 49 S.E.2d 209, 213 (1948). Whether a proprietor
legitimately exercised the right to eject a trespasser in good faith can turn on the
language used during the interaction. State v. Wiggins, 330 S.C. 538, 546-47, 500
S.E.2d 489, 493-94 (1998).

Here, we find the circuit court did address the fault element of self-defense. The
circuit court found Anderson had the right to eject trespassers. Under the
subsection "Fault in Bringing on the Difficulty," the order first cites the language
relating to a business proprietor's right to eject trespassers in good faith. The court
acknowledges that language used during the interaction can lend itself to a
determination of whether the proprietor was acting in good faith. The judge,
acting as fact-finder, made a credibility finding that Victim was more exaggerated
and less credible than the others. Based upon these findings and the language in the
order, we hold the circuit court did not err.

Use of Deadly Force

The State argues Anderson did not reasonably need to use deadly force against
Victim. We disagree. The circuit court found Anderson established by a
preponderance of the evidence that he actually believed he was in imminent danger
of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury, or he actually was in such
imminent danger. It further found a reasonably prudent man of ordinary firmness
would believe the same and if such danger actually existed, the circumstances
warranted such a man to use deadly force to save himself. As fact-finder in an
immunity hearing, the court is in a unique position to consider all of the factors.
We hold the court properly determined Anderson actually believed he was in
danger because of the physical confrontation initiated by Victim, and did not err in
finding Anderson's use of deadly force was justified.

Establishment of the Elements
The State argues the circuit court erred when it found Anderson was only legally
required to establish two elements of self-defense. We disagree. The court found
Anderson, being in a place he had the right to be pursuant to section 16-11-440(C)
of the Act, and as a business proprietor with the right to eject trespassers, only had
to satisfy elements two and three of self-defense: that he actually believed he was
in imminent danger of losing his life or sustaining serious bodily injury, or he
actually was in such imminent danger; and that a reasonably prudent man of
ordinary firmness would have entertained that same belief. As to element one, the
fault element, the court properly established Anderson was a business proprietor
who, in good faith, exercised his right to eject a trespasser. Therefore, he was
without fault in bringing on the difficulty. As to the fear elements two and three,
the court, as fact-finder, found the testimony of the witnesses, Victim's initiation of
physical contact, and his repeated returns to his vehicle established Anderson's fear
and a reasonable man would have held the same belief. Based upon the foregoing
facts considered by the circuit court in its order, and its credibility findings, we
find Anderson had no other probable means of avoiding the danger than to act as
he did. We find the circuit court's order properly addressed each element of self-
defense and there was no abuse of discretion.

Based on the foregoing, the circuit court's grant of immunity is

AFFIRMED.3

THOMAS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.