Russell Crawford v. Raymond Babich

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Russell Crawford, Appellant,

v.

Raymond Babich, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000622

Appeal From Charleston County
R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-229
Submitted June 1, 2025 – Filed July 9, 2025

AFFIRMED

Russell Crawford, of North Charleston, pro se.

William B. Jung, of William B. Jung, Esq., LLC, of Mt.
Pleasant, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Russell Crawford appeals the circuit court's order denying his
appeal from the magistrate court's grant of summary judgment to Raymond Babich
in his eviction action against Crawford. On appeal, Crawford argues the circuit
court erred in denying his appeal because (1) the termination of his
month-to-month tenancy was invalid under the Manufactured Home Park Tenancy
Act (MHPTA), 1 and (2) Crawford established a defense against the eviction by
showing that Babich violated the good faith requirement of the MHPTA. We
affirm the circuit court's order denying Crawford's appeal pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.

We hold the circuit court did not err in denying Crawford's appeal. See Vacation
Time of Hilton Head Island, Inc. v. Kiwi Corp., 280 S.C. 232, 233, 312 S.E.2d 20,
21 (Ct. App. 1984) (stating that in reviewing "ejectment proceedings first heard in
[m]agistrate's [c]ourt . . . [the court of appeals] is without jurisdiction to reverse the
findings of fact of the [c]ircuit [c]ourt if there is any supporting evidence.");
Bowers v. Thomas, 373 S.C. 240, 245, 644 S.E.2d 751, 753 (Ct. App. 2007)
(recognizing the appellate court "retains de novo review of whether the facts show
the circuit court's affirmance was controlled or affected by errors of law").

Crawford's argument that the MHPTA prohibits the eviction of manufactured
home park lot tenants based on the expiration of a month-to-month lease
contradicts the legislative intent underlying the MHPTA; therefore, the circuit
court did not err in denying Crawford's appeal. See Kiriakides v. United Artists
Commc'ns, Inc., 312 S.C. 271, 275, 440 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1994) ("All rules of
statutory construction are subservient to the one that the legislative intent must
prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language
must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the statute.");
§ 27-47-20(B)(2) ("The underlying purposes and policies of [the MHPTA] are
to . . . provide for the rights and obligations of manufactured home owners and
manufactured home park owners and clarify the law governing the renting or
leasing of residential lots in a [mobile] home park . . . ."); § 27-47-110 (stating the
MHPTA "applies to, regulates, and determines the rights, obligations, and
remedies under a rental agreement for a residential manufactured home park
lot . . . ."); § 27-47-20(A) ("[The MPHTA] must be construed liberally and applied
to promote its underlying purposes and policies."); § 27-47-110 ("The provisions
of the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act [RLTA 2] . . . shall apply to tenancies in
manufactured home parks if such application is not inconsistent with or contrary to
the provisions of [the MHPTA]."); § 27-40-770(b) (RLTA provision stating "[t]he
landlord or the tenant may terminate a month-to-month tenancy by a written notice
given to the other at least thirty days before the termination date specified in the
notice"); § 27-40-40 ("[The RLTA] being a general chapter intended as a unified
coverage of its subject matter, no part of it is to be construed as impliedly repealed

1
See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 27-47-10 to -620 (2007 & Supp. 2024).
2
See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 27-40-10 to -940 (2007 & Supp. 2024).
by subsequent legislation if that construction can reasonably be avoided."); Hodges
v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 88, 533 S.E.2d 578, 583 (2000) ("Statutes dealing with the
same subject matter must be reconciled, if possible, so as to render both
operative.").

We hold that to the extent Crawford argues he established a defense against the
eviction proceedings by demonstrating evidence of Babich's bad-faith actions, his
argument is unpreserved for review because he failed to raise this argument to the
magistrate. See Elam v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 23, 602 S.E.2d 772,
779-80 (2004) ("Issues and arguments are preserved for appellate review only
when they are raised to and ruled on by the [circuit] court."). Further, we hold that
to the extent Crawford argues the circuit court erred in finding that an absolute bar
to eviction was not an appropriate remedy for any bad-faith actions under the
MHPTA, the circuit court's finding was not erroneous. Compare § 27-47-220
(MHPTA provision imposing a duty of good faith in actions taken as condition
precedent to exercise of rights and/or remedies under the MHPTA), with
§ 27-40-910(a) (RLTA provision prohibiting retaliation against specified actions
via rent increase).

AFFIRMED. 3

WILLIAMS, C.J., and GEATHERS and TURNER, JJ., concur.

3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.