U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Johnson D. Koola

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

U.S. Bank Trust, N.A., as Trustee for LSF10 Master
Participation Trust, Respondent,

v.

Johnson D. Koola, First Citizens Bank and Trust
Company, Inc. f/k/a First Citizens Bank and Trust
Company of South Carolina, and Cambridge Lakes
Condominium Homeowners Association, Inc. f/k/a
Cambridge Lakes Horizontal Property Regime,
Defendants,

Of whom Johnson D. Koola is the Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000819

Appeal From Charleston County
Mikell R. Scarborough, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-185
Submitted May 1, 2025 – Filed June 11, 2025

AFFIRMED

Johnson D. Koola, of Mount Pleasant, pro se.

Henry Guyton Murrell, of Scott and Corley, P.A., Kevin
Ted Brown, of Brock & Scott, PLLC, and Allison Earlin
Heffernan, all of Columbia; and Nicole Margaret Arcodia
and Jessica O'Brien Peretz, both of McGuireWoods LLP,
of Charlotte, North Carolina; all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Johnson D. Koola appeals the master-in-equity's (1) grant of
summary judgment to U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. (USBNA) in its foreclosure action
against Koola, and (2) denial of Koola's motion for homestead exemption in
foreclosure. On appeal, Koola argues the master erred in granting USBNA
summary judgment when (1) USBNA lacked standing in foreclosure, and res
judicata did not preclude Koola from challenging USBNA's standing; (2) the
master improperly relied upon a 2019 bankruptcy court order to determine whether
USBNA had proper standing; and (3) the master fraudulently altered a 2018
bankruptcy court order in favor of USBNA. Additionally, Koola argues the master
erred in finding his motion for homestead exemption was inapplicable in
foreclosure. We affirm the master's summary judgment order and order denying
homestead exemption pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold the master did not err in granting USBNA summary judgment. See Bank
of Am., N.A. v. Draper, 405 S.C. 214, 219, 746 S.E.2d 478, 480 (Ct. App. 2013)
("When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, [the appellate] court
applies the same standard that governs the [circuit] court under Rule 56(c) [of the
South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure]; summary judgment is proper when there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law."). First, as to Koola's argument that USBNA lacked
standing and res judicata was not applicable, we hold the master's ruling that
judicial estoppel barred Koola from arguing that USBNA lacked standing is the
law of the case, and that the two-issue rule precludes our consideration of Koola's
standing argument. See Jones v. Lott, 387 S.C. 339, 346, 692 S.E.2d 900, 903
(2010), abrogated on other grounds by Repko v. County of Georgetown, 424 S.C.
494, 818 S.E.2d 743 (2018) ("Under the two[-]issue rule, where a decision is based
on more than one ground, the appellate court will affirm unless the appellant
appeals all grounds because the unappealed ground will become the law of the
case."); compare Plum Creek Dev. Co. v. City of Conway, 334 S.C. 30, 34, 512
S.E.2d 106, 109 (1999) ("Res judicata bars subsequent actions by the same parties
when the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that was the
subject of a prior action between those parties."), with Hayne Fed. Credit Union v.
Bailey, 327 S.C. 242, 251, 489 S.E.2d 472, 477 (1997) ("Judicial estoppel
precludes a party from adopting a position in conflict with one earlier taken in the
same or related litigation."). Second, we hold the master did not err in relying
upon a January 15, 2019 bankruptcy court order in deciding USBNA had standing
in foreclosure. See Bank of Am., N.A., 405 S.C. at 219, 746 S.E.2d at 480 ("When
reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, [the appellate] court applies
the same standard that governs the [circuit] court under Rule 56(c) [of the South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure]; summary judgment is proper when there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law."); Venture Eng'g, Inc. v. Tishman Const. Corp. of S.C., 360 S.C.
156, 163, 600 S.E.2d 547, 550 (Ct. App. 2004) ("When a bankruptcy court's order
is erroneous, it is correctable only through the federal court and, under the
circumstances, the [circuit] court and [the appellate] court are required to accept
the bankruptcy court's order as it was rendered and entered."). Third, we hold
Koola's argument that the master erred by "fraudulently alter[ing]" a September 28,
2018 bankruptcy court order is unpreserved for review because Koola failed to
raise this argument to the master. See Elam v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 9,
23, 602 S.E.2d 772, 779-80 (2004) ("Issues and arguments are preserved for
appellate review only when they are raised to and ruled on by the lower court.").

To any remaining extent that Koola argues the master erred in granting USBNA
summary judgment due to lack of either personal jurisdiction or subject matter
jurisdiction, we hold the master had proper jurisdiction over the foreclosure. See
Fassett v. Evans, 364 S.C. 42, 47, 610 S.E.2d 841, 843 (Ct. App. 2005) ("It is the
plaintiff[']s burden to show that the court has personal jurisdiction over the
defendant."); State v. Dudley, 354 S.C. 514, 542, 581 S.E.2d 171, 186 (Ct. App.
2003) ("A defendant may waive any complaints he may have regarding personal
jurisdiction by failing to object to the lack of personal jurisdiction and by
appearing to defend his case."); Seels v. Smalls, 437 S.C. 167, 172, 877 S.E.2d 351,
353 (2022) ("The question of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law."
(quoting Byrd v. McDonald, 417 S.C. 474, 478, 790 S.E.2d 200, 202 (Ct. App.
2016))); id. at 172, 877 S.E.2d at 354 ("Questions of law involving subject matter
jurisdiction . . . are reviewed de novo . . . ."); Bardoon Props., NV v. Eidolon
Corp., 326 S.C. 166, 169, 485 S.E.2d 371, 372 (1997) ("Subject matter jurisdiction
refers to the court's power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which
the proceedings in question belong."); Rule 71, SCRCP (providing for the master's
jurisdiction over foreclosure proceedings, judgments, and sales).

We also hold the master did not err in denying Koola's motion for homestead
exemption. See Univ. of S. California v. Moran, 365 S.C. 270, 274, 617 S.E.2d
135, 137 (Ct. App. 2005) ("An issue regarding statutory interpretation is a question
of law."); Town of Summerville v. City of N. Charleston, 378 S.C. 107, 110, 662
S.E.2d 40, 41 (2008) ("[The appellate c]ourt reviews questions of law de novo.").
Initially, to the extent Koola argues (1) a homestead waiver provision in the
mortgage was unenforceable, (2) denial of the homestead motion violated the
South Carolina constitution, or (3) the master erred in failing to cite applicable
state law, we hold these arguments are unpreserved for review because Koola
failed to raise these arguments to the master. See Elam, 361 S.C. at 23, 602 S.E.2d
at 779-80 ("Issues and arguments are preserved for appellate review only when
they are raised to and ruled on by the lower court.").

We hold Koola's argument that homestead exemption under section
15-41-30(A)(1)(a) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2024) was applicable in his
foreclosure contradicts the legislative intent underlying the statute; therefore, the
master did not err in finding section 15-41-30(A)(1)(a) inapplicable in Koola's
foreclosure. See Mitchell v. City of Greenville, 411 S.C. 632, 634, 770 S.E.2d 391,
392 (2015) ("The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and
effectuate the legislative intent whenever possible."). Foreclosure on mortgage
liens and execution of judgment liens are two distinct actions governed by separate
statutes. Compare S.C. Code Ann. §§ 29-3-610 to -800 (2007 & Supp. 2024)
(describing foreclosure on mortgage liens), with S.C. Code Ann. §§ 15-35-160
to -960 (2005 & Supp. 2024) (describing execution of judgment liens); compare
S.C. Code Ann. § 29-3-630 (2007) (equating a mortgage with an "instrument in
writing intended as security for a debt, conferring a power upon the mortgagee or
creditor to sell the mortgaged . . . property"), with S.C. Code Ann. § 15-35-180
(2005) ("When a judgment requires the payment of money or the delivery of real
or personal property it may be enforced in those respects by execution as provided
in [Title 15]."), and S.C. Code Ann. § 15-39-10 (2005) (providing three methods of
judicial execution—against a "judgment debtor['s]" property, his person, or "for the
delivery of the possession of real or personal property"—together "deemed the
process of the court" (emphasis added)).

AFFIRMED. 1

THOMAS, HEWITT, and CURTIS, JJ., concur.

1
Koola filed a motion requesting oral argument. We deny his request because oral
argument would not aid in resolving the issues on appeal, which are either
unpreserved or without merit. See Rule 215, SCACR ("The appellate court may
decide any case without oral argument if it determines that oral argument would
not aid the court in resolving the issues."). Therefore, we decide this case without
oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.