Jill Maliszweski v. Margaret Yeager

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Jill Maliszewski, Appellant,

v.

Margaret Yeager, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000132

Appeal From Colleton County
Brooks P. Goldsmith, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-148
Submitted March 1, 2025 – Filed April 30, 2025

AFFIRMED

Jeffrey Wayne Buncher, Jr., of Uricchio Howe Krell
Jacobson Toporek Theos & Keith, PA, of Charleston, for
Appellant.

Ernest Mitchell Griffith, of Griffith Freeman & Liipfert,
LLC, of Beaufort; Taylor Kathleen Goffer, of Gordon &
Rees LLP, of Charleston; and Jeffrey Michael Crudup
and Michelle N. Endemann, both of Charleston; all for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Jill Maliszewski appeals the circuit court's denial of her motion
for a new trial after the jury rendered a $0.00 verdict in a negligence case
Maliszewski filed against Margaret Yeager. On appeal, Maliszewski argues the
verdict was inadequate and inconsistent when defense counsel argued that she was
entitled to some damages, and the sole blank on the verdict form was for entry of
damages. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

Initially, we hold Maliszewski waived her argument regarding an inconsistent
verdict by failing to challenge the verdict prior to discharge of the jury. See
Dykema v. Carolina Emergency Physicians, P.C., 348 S.C. 549, 552-53, 560
S.E.2d 894, 894-96 (2002) (stating a party's failure to object to an inconsistent
verdict "prior to discharge of the jury results in a waiver of the right to challenge
the verdict").

We also hold Maliszewski abandoned any potential arguments regarding a new
trial pursuant to (1) the thirteenth juror doctrine and (2) a new trial nisi additur,
because she merely cited case law describing both theories in the standard of
review section in her appellate brief, and failed to establish an argument under
either theory in accordance with applicable law; further, she requested only a new
trial as relief. See Fields v. Melrose Ltd. P'ship, 312 S.C. 102, 106, 439 S.E.2d
283, 285 (Ct. App. 1993) ("An issue raised on appeal but not argued in the brief is
deemed abandoned and will not be considered by the appellate court.").

Finally, we hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial
absolute. See RRR, Inc. v. Toggas, 378 S.C. 174, 182, 662 S.E.2d 438, 442 (Ct.
App. 2008) ("The grant or denial of new trial motions rests within the discretion of
the circuit court and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless its findings
are wholly unsupported by the evidence or the conclusions reached are controlled
by error of law."). Although Maliszewski argues the verdict was "grossly
inadequate," she failed to show the verdict was a "result of . . . improper motives."
See Vinson v. Hartley, 324 S.C. 389, 404, 477 S.E.2d 715, 723 (1996) (stating a
party is entitled to a new trial absolute if "the amount of the verdict is grossly
inadequate . . . and clearly indicates the figure reached was the result of passion,
caprice, prejudice, partiality, corruption or some other improper motives"
(emphasis added)).

AFFIRMED. 1

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
KONDUROS, MCDONALD, and VINSON, JJ., concur.