First Citizens Bank v. Justin K. Spires

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

First Citizens Bank & Trust Company, Inc., Respondent,

v.

Estate of Justin K. Spires, Timothy J. Spires, Sr., South
Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon
Services and Warren B. Giese as Solicitor,

Of Whom the Estate of Justin K. Spires and Timothy J.
Spires, Sr. are the Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2021-001219

Appeal From Richland County
Joseph M. Strickland, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2025-UP-025
Submitted November 1, 2024 – Filed January 29, 2025

AFFIRMED

Shawn Micheal French, Sr., of The French Law Firm,
LLC, of Lexington, for Appellants.

Theodore von Keller, B. Lindsay Crawford, III, Baxter
Lindsay Crawford, IV, and Charley FitzSimons
MacInnis, all of Crawford & von Keller, LLC, of
Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: The Estate of Justin K. Spires and Timothy J. Spires Sr., appeal
the master-in-equity's order denying their motion for relief and to vacate the
foreclosure sale of real property (the Property). On appeal, they argue the
master-in-equity erred in (1) finding the master had personal jurisdiction over
Justin and Timothy Spires, (2) denying their motion for relief under Rule 60(b) of
the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, and (3) failing to find the foreclosure
sale was void. First Citizens Bank and Trust Company, Inc. (First Citizens) filed a
motion to dismiss, arguing the Estate of Justin Spires does not have legal standing
to pursue these claims and that Timothy no longer has standing due to him having
satisfied the deficiency judgment. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We deny First Citizens' motion to dismiss. See S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-703(c)
(2022) ("Except as to proceedings which do not survive the death of the decedent,
a personal representative of a decedent domiciled in this State at his death has the
same standing to sue and be sued in the courts of this State and the courts of any
other jurisdiction as his decedent had immediately prior to death."); Page v. Lewis,
203 S.C. 190, 193, 26 S.E.2d 569, 570 (1943) ("Under the rule of the common law,
the only causes of action that do not survive the death of either party, plaintiff or
defendant, are causes of action ex delicto."); Hughes on behalf of Est. of Hughes v.
Bank of Am. Nat'l Ass'n, 442 S.C. 113, 123, 898 S.E.2d 102, 107 (2024)
("Consequently, an action ex contractu—one based in contract—survived at
common law."); Page, 203 S.C. at 193, 26 S.E.2d at 570 (explaining states,
including South Carolina, have enacted statutes "in view of alleviating the
stringency of the common-law rule as to the survival of causes of action"); id.
("These statutes add to, but do not diminish the classes of causes of action which
survive at common law. The nature and substance of the cause of action, rather
than the form of the remedy, determine its ability to survive."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 15-5-90 (2005) ("Causes of action for and in respect to any and all injuries and
trespasses to and upon real estate and any and all injuries to the person or to
personal property shall survive both to and against the personal or real
representative, as the case may be, of a deceased person . . . , any law or rule to the
contrary notwithstanding."); Layne v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Loc. No. 382, 271
S.C. 346, 352, 247 S.E.2d 346, 349 (1978) ("Although there are certain exceptions,
it is the general rule that any cause of action which could have been brought by the
deceased in his lifetime survives to his representative under [section 15-5-90].");
Seels v. Smalls, 437 S.C. 167, 179, 877 S.E.2d 351, 357 (2022) ("[C]laims that are
purely personal in nature abate upon the death of a party, whereas claims that
primarily concern property interests do not—and a personal representative may,
therefore, be substituted on behalf of the decedent's estate—because such actions
can still achieve their primary purpose.").

2. We hold Appellants' claims are barred under section 15-39-870 of the South
Carolina Code (2005) because First Citizens was a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice. See I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 419, 526
S.E.2d 716, 723 (2000) ("[A] respondent . . . may raise on appeal any additional
reasons the appellate court should affirm the lower court's ruling, regardless of
whether those reasons have been presented to or ruled on by the lower court.");
§ 15-39-870 ("Upon the execution and delivery by the proper officer of the court of
a deed for any property sold at a judicial sale under a decree of a court of
competent jurisdiction the proceedings under which such sale is made shall be
deemed res judicata as to any and all bona fide purchasers for value without notice,
notwithstanding such sale may not subsequently be confirmed by the court.");
Cumbie v. Newberry, 251 S.C. 33, 37, 159 S.E.2d 915, 917 (1968) ("A purchaser
in good faith at a judicial sale is not affected by irregularities in the proceedings or
even error in the judgment, under which the sale is made . . . ."); Robinson v. Est.
of Harris, 378 S.C. 140, 146, 662 S.E.2d 420, 423 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding to be a
bona fide purchaser, a party must show "(1) actual payment of the purchase price
of the property, (2) acquisition of legal title to the property, or the best right to it,
and (3) a bona fide purchase, 'i.e., in good faith and with integrity of dealing,
without notice of a lien or defect'" (quoting Spence v. Spence, 368 S.C. 106, 117,
628 S.E.2d 869, 874-75 (2006))). First Citizens acquired legal title to the Property
after purchasing it in a foreclosure sale on January 6, 2021, and the
master-in-equity issued an order confirming the sale on January 14, 2021. Justin
and Timothy only filed affidavits asserting service was improper on May 17, 2021,
months after the foreclosure sale completed; accordingly, all elements of a bona
fide purchaser occurred before First Citizens had notice of a defect. See id. at 146,
662 S.E.2d at 423 ("[T]he bona fide purchaser must show all three conditions—
actual payment, acquiring of legal title, and bona fide purchase—occurred before
he had notice of a title defect or other adverse claim, lien, or interest in the
property." (quoting Spence, 368 S.C. at 117, 628 S.E.2d at 875)); id. at 146-47, 662
S.E.2d at 423-24 (upholding a foreclosure sale in which the appellant argued the
master lacked jurisdiction as he did not receive service because the affidavits
asserting defective service were not matters of record at the time of the foreclosure
sale); Buffalo Creek Invs., Inc. v. Pettus, 440 S.C. 111, 121-22, 889 S.E.2d 608,
613 (Ct. App. 2023) (reversing a special referee's decision not to afford protection
as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, holding the "claims of defective
service in the underlying foreclosure action" did not affect the status as a bona fide
purchaser). 1

AFFIRMED. 2

WILLIAMS, C.J., and MCDONALD and TURNER, JJ., concur.

1
Because we hold Appellants' claims are barred under section 15-39-870, we need
not address whether the master had personal jurisdiction over either Justin or
Timothy or whether the master erred in denying their motion for relief under Rule
60(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. See Futch v. McAllister
Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999)
(explaining an appellate court does not need to address remaining issues when its
resolution of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.