Bill R. Sharpe v. Rocky Rutherford

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Bill R. Sharpe and Angela Sharpe, Respondents,

v.

Rocky Rutherford, Legacy Equipment, Inc., and G.A.
West and Company, Inc., Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000060

Appeal From Richland County
Jean Hoefer Toal, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-415
Submitted October 1, 2024 – Filed December 11, 2024

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Phillip Florence, Jr. and Everett Augustus Kendall, II,
both of Murphy & Grantland, PA, of Columbia, for
Appellants.

Gary Walton Popwell, Jr., of Lee Eadon Isgett &
Popwell, of Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: This comparative negligence case stems from a collision between
a pickup truck and an eighteen-wheeler at the intersection of South Beltline
Boulevard and Bluff Road in Columbia. The circuit court granted summary
judgment on liability, finding there was no genuine dispute that the driver of the
eighteen-wheeler was responsible for the collision. We respectfully disagree with
the finding that there are no genuine issues of material fact. For that reason, we
reverse.

"An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment under the same standard
applied by the trial court pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP." Lanham v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of S.C., Inc., 349 S.C. 356, 361, 563 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2002). South
Carolina courts no longer apply the "mere scintilla" standard when reviewing
motions for summary judgment. Kitchen Planners, LLC v. Friedman, 440 S.C. 456,
463, 892 S.E.2d 297, 301 (2023). Instead, "summary judgment is proper when 'there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.'" Baughman v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 306 S.C. 101,
114–15, 410 S.E.2d 537, 545 (1991) (alteration in original) (quoting Rule 56(c),
SCRCP).

To prove negligence, a plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant owed a duty of care to
the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached that duty through a negligent act or
omission; (3) the breach resulted in damages to the plaintiff; and (4) those damages
proximately resulted from the breach. Thomasko v. Poole, 349 S.C. 7, 11, 561
S.E.2d 597, 599 (2002) (citing Bloom v. Ravoira, 339 S.C. 417, 529 S.E.2d 710
(2000)). The law bars recovery if the plaintiff's negligence exceeds fifty percent of
the comparative fault. Id. (citing Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 399
S.E.2d 783 (1991)). "It is only in the 'rare' instance—when the evidence generates
only a single inference—that summary judgment is proper in a comparative
negligence action." Abdelgheny v. Moody, 432 S.C. 346, 350, 852 S.E.2d 225, 227
(Ct. App. 2020) (citing Bloom, 339 S.C. at 424–25, 529 S.E.2d at 714).

As drivers in South Carolina, both parties here had respective duties they were
obligated to uphold. Rocky Rutherford, the driver of the eighteen-wheeler, was
required to yield to oncoming traffic when making his left turn onto South Beltline.
See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2320 (2018); see also Warren v. Watkins Motor Lines,
242 S.C. 331, 340, 130 S.E.2d 896, 901 (1963) ("A motorist . . . must yield the right
of way to vehicles approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard.").
Bill Sharpe, the driver of the pickup truck, was obligated to "keep a reasonable
lookout to avoid hazards on the [roadway]," even if he had the right-of-way. See
Thomasko, 349 S.C. at 12, 561 S.E.2d at 598.

Sharpe's main argument on appeal is that Rutherford presented no evidence, other
than his own deposition testimony, suggesting that Sharpe was comparatively
negligent in causing this accident. This is a strong argument, and we considered
whether Rutherford's testimony—the only evidence he relies on in opposing
summary judgment—was enough to withstand Sharpe's summary judgment motion.
See, e.g., Kitchen Planners, 440 S.C. at 464, 892 S.E.2d at 302 (stating the
nonmoving party failed to "provide a meaningful factual basis on which a factfinder
could [find in that party's favor]"). Still, we conclude summary judgment was
improper here for at least two reasons.

First, "[s]ummary judgment is not appropriate where further inquiry into the facts of
the case is desirable" to adjudicate a case as a matter of law. Middleborough
Horizontal Prop. Regime Council of Co-Owners v. Montedison S.p.A., 320 S.C. 470,
479, 465 S.E.2d 765, 771 (Ct. App. 1995). As outlined below, the scant evidence in
the record presents a classic case of conflicting witness testimony and raises
colorable questions of comparative negligence.

Rutherford claimed that he waited for traffic to clear before beginning his left turn
and said Sharpe "came out of nowhere." Rutherford stated that at that point, the
collision was unavoidable. Rutherford believed Sharpe's speed "had to have been
pretty excessive" based on how hard the collision shook his truck. Rutherford's
account requires an inference that Sharpe was driving at such a significant speed that
he was not visible when Rutherford initiated his turn but came fast enough to strike
Rutherford's vehicle before Rutherford could complete the turn. His account also
requires the inference that Sharpe was not properly looking out before entering the
intersection.

Sharpe asserted that he was driving at or under the speed limit when he arrived at
the intersection and saw Rutherford stopped in the turn lane. Sharpe said that
Rutherford did not start his turn until after Sharpe arrived at or had already begun
driving through the intersection. Sharpe said that he did not have time to avoid the
collision because Rutherford turned in front of him so quickly. This account requires
an inference that Rutherford's vehicle—an eighteen-wheeler, which, according to
Sharpe, was stationary when Sharpe entered the intersection—accelerated, crossed
over multiple traffic lanes, and ended up directly in front of and perpendicular to
Sharpe's oncoming vehicle within a few seconds.

There is also a direct conflict as to how far along Rutherford was in his turn when
the collision occurred. Sharpe said he hit the "tail end" of Rutherford's truck and
"the front of the trailer [Rutherford] was toting." This would suggest that Rutherford
was decently far along in his turn at the time of the collision. Rutherford stated that
Sharpe hit the front tire and front bumper on Rutherford's passenger side, which
would indicate the opposite. The only photographic evidence before us captures the
damage to Sharpe's vehicle but does not show the point of impact on Rutherford's
eighteen-wheeler.

We read the conflicting deposition testimonies as pointing to opposing inferences
about how the accident occurred and which party is at fault. We emphasize that we
make no determination as to the weight of either party's testimony. See David v.
McLeod Reg'l Med. Ctr., 367 S.C. 242, 250, 626 S.E.2d 1, 5 (2006) ("A court
considering summary judgment neither makes factual determinations nor considers
the merits of competing testimony . . . ."); cf. Abdelgheny, 432 S.C. at 349–50, 852
S.E.2d at 227 ("[T]he court's duty at [the summary judgment] stage is to presume
the credibility of the evidence."). Instead, we have summarized the testimony only
to illustrate why summary judgment was inappropriate. See Standard Fire Co. v.
Marine Contracting & Towing Co., 301 S.C. 418, 422, 392 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1990)
("All inferences from facts in the record must be viewed in the light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment."); id. ("The grant of
summary judgment is appropriate only if it is clear that no genuine issue of material
fact exists, that inquiry into the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the
law, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").

The second reason we find summary judgment should not have been granted is that
questions of comparative negligence are typically left for the factfinder. See
Abdelgheny, 432 S.C. at 350, 852 S.E.2d at 228 ("It is only in the 'rare' instance—
when the evidence generates only a single inference—that summary judgment is
proper in a comparative negligence action." (emphases added) (citing Bloom, 339
S.C. at 424–25, 529 S.E.2d at 714)); see also, e.g., Thomasko, 349 S.C. at 13–14,
561 S.E.2d at 600 (finding comparative negligence, specifically in terms of whether
a driver kept a proper lookout, to be an issue for the jury when "[s]everal inferences
could be drawn from the facts, including finding [the defendant or plaintiff] could
have failed to keep a proper lookout"); Wilson v. Marshall, 260 S.C. 271, 276, 195
S.E.2d 610, 612 (1973) (reversing a direct verdict and remanding for a new trial
when the appellate court concluded the evidence was susceptible to a reasonable
inference that the plaintiff failed "to exercise due care in keeping a proper lookout
and driving at an appropriately reduced speed under the circumstances," even though
the evidence left little doubt that the defendant was the primary cause of the
collision).

We decline to address any remaining issues based on the dispositive nature of the
grounds outlined above. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335
S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling it unnecessary for an appellate
court to address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).

Accordingly, the circuit court's order is

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 1

THOMAS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.