Earl Hewlette v. Paula Hewlette

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Earl D. Hewlette, Respondent.

v.

Paula Dezzutti Hewlette, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2022-001093

Appeal From Berkeley County
Jack A. Landis, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-411
Submitted November 1, 2024 – Filed December 4, 2024

AFFIRMED

Michael W. Sautter, of Query Sautter & Associates,
LLC, and Alexander Woods Tesoriero, of The Law
Office of Alexander Woods LLC, both of Charleston, for
Appellant.

Jeremy E. Bowers, of Barnwell Whaley Patterson &
Helms, LLC, of Charleston; and Mark O. Andrews, of
Andrews Law Firm, LLC, of Mt. Pleasant, both for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Paula Dezzutti Hewlette (Wife) appeals the family court's orders
denying her motion to vacate or modify the arbitration awards and her motion to
reconsider. On appeal, Wife argues the family court erred in (1) denying Wife's
motions, (2) failing to find the arbitration was a manifest disregard of the law, and
(3) finding the family court had subject matter jurisdiction to award attorney's fees
to Earl D. Hewlette (Husband). We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the family court did not err in finding Wife failed to show the
arbitrator demonstrated evident bias because she did not present evidence from
which a reasonable person would conclude the arbitrator was partial to Husband.
See Stone v. Thompson, 428 S.C. 79, 91, 833 S.E.2d 266, 272 (2019) ("Appellate
courts review family court matters de novo, with the exceptions of evidentiary and
procedural rulings."); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-130(a)(2) (2005) (explaining an
arbitration award shall be vacated where "[t]here was evident partiality by an
arbitrator appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or
misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party"); Crouch Const. Co. v. Causey, 405
S.C. 155, 168, 747 S.E.2d 482, 489 (2013) ("[T]he approach that best comports
with the language of section 15-48-130(a)(2) is that which requires the party
seeking vacatur to 'demonstrate that a reasonable person would have to conclude
that an arbitrator was partial to the other party to the arbitration.'" (quoting ANR
Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of North Carolina, 173 F.3d 493, 500 (4th Cir. 1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted))). Wife claimed that the arbitrator breached her
duty to disclose because the arbitrator's firm was involved in valuing the stock of a
company where Husband formerly worked; however, this allegation was merely
speculative because Wife failed to show the arbitrator's individual involvement in
that transaction. See id. at 169, 747 S.E.2d at 489 ("When considering each factor,
the court should determine whether the asserted bias is 'direct, definite and capable
of demonstration rather than remote, uncertain or speculative' and whether the facts
are sufficient to indicate 'improper motives on the part of the arbitrator.'" (quoting
ANR Coal Co., 173 F.3d at 500)).

We further hold the family court did not err in making findings of fact or
conclusions of law because it was required to do so under Rule 52 of the South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. See Stone, 428 S.C. at 91, 833 S.E.2d at 272
("Appellate courts review family court matters de novo, with the exceptions of
evidentiary and procedural rulings."); Rule 52, SCRCP ("In all actions tried upon
the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be
entered pursuant to Rule 58 [of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure].").
Additionally, the family court's findings were in response to the allegations in
Wife's motion, and constituted the foundation for the court's ultimate confirmation
of the arbitration awards. See Kosciusko v. Parham, 428 S.C. 481, 501, 836 S.E.2d
362, 372 (Ct. App. 2019) ("[T]he family court may 1) modify or correct an award
only under section 15-48-140; 2) vacate the award under section 15-48-130; or 3)
vacate the award under the non-statutory ground of 'manifest disregard or perverse
misconstruction of the law.'" (quoting Swentor v. Swentor, 336 S.C. 472, 485-86,
520 S.E.2d 330, 338 (Ct. App. 1999))); Swentor, 336 S.C. at 486, 520 S.E.2d at
338 ("Otherwise, the family court must confirm the arbitration award.").

2. We hold the family court did not err in finding the arbitrator did not commit a
manifest disregard of the law because the language used by the arbitrator did not
prevent the family court from reviewing and ultimately confirming the arbitration
awards, as it was permitted to do. See Stone, 428 S.C. at 91, 833 S.E.2d at 272
("Appellate courts review family court matters de novo, with the exceptions of
evidentiary and procedural rulings."); Kosciusko, 428 S.C. at 501, 836 S.E.2d at
372 ("[T]he family court may 1) modify or correct an award only under section
15-48-140; 2) vacate the award under section 15-48-130; or 3) vacate the award
under the non-statutory ground of 'manifest disregard or perverse misconstruction
of the law.'" (quoting Swentor, 336 S.C. at 485-86, 520 S.E.2d at 338)).

3. We hold the family court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction to grant
Husband attorney's fees. See Stone, 428 S.C. at 91, 833 S.E.2d at 272 ("Appellate
courts review family court matters de novo, with the exceptions of evidentiary and
procedural rulings."). Once Wife filed her motion to vacate or modify the
arbitration awards, the family court resumed jurisdiction of the case and the ability
to grant attorney's fees. See Mills v. William Clarke Jeep Eagle, Inc., 321 S.C.
150, 152, 467 S.E.2d 268, 269 (Ct .App. 1996) (finding the circuit court resumed
jurisdiction of the case after a party filed a motion to confirm); Main Corp. v.
Black, 357 S.C. 179, 181, 592 S.E.2d 300, 302 (2004) (finding the circuit court did
not resume jurisdiction because neither party moved to confirm, vacate, or modify
the arbitration award); Messer v. Messer, 359 S.C. 614, 632, 598 S.E.2d 310, 320
(Ct. App. 2004) ("The family court is authorized by statute to award attorney[']s
fees in conjunction with marital litigation."); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-3-530(A)(38)
(2010) (explaining the family court has the exclusive jurisdiction to assess
attorney's fees "for or against a party to an action brought in or subject to the
jurisdiction of the family court"). Further, we hold the family court considered the
requisite factors in awarding Husband attorney's fees. See Messer, 359 S.C. at
632-33, 598 S.E.2d at 320 ("In determining the amount of attorney[']s fees to
award, the court should consider the nature, extent, and difficulty of the case, the
time necessarily devoted to the case, counsel[']s professional standing, the
contingency of compensation, the beneficial results obtained, and the customary
legal fees for similar services.").

AFFIRMED. 1

THOMAS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.