Charleston County DSS v. Christina H.

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Charleston
County Department of Social Services, Respondent,

          v.

Christina H., Father
1, and Father 2, Defendants,

Of Whom Christina H.
is the Appellant.

In the
interests of M.H. and J.B., minor children under the age of 18.

Appeal From Charleston County

Frances P. Segars-Andrews, Family Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.   2009-UP-398

Submitted July 1, 2009 – Filed August 4,
2009

AFFIRMED

Deidre Shelton McCool and Erin E. Richardson, both of Charleston,
for Appellant.

John Corbitt Hinson, III, of North Charleston, for Respondent.

D. Peters Wilborn, Jr., of Charleston, Guardian Ad Litem for M.H.

Wendy Lee Wilkie, of Mt. Pleasant, Guardian Ad Litem for J.B.

PER CURIAM: Christina
H. (Mother) appeals from the family court’s order terminating her parental
rights (TPR) to her minor children, M.H. and J.B.  Mother argues the family
court erred in finding DSS established, by clear and convincing evidence, that:
(1) Mother satisfied a statutory ground for TPR, and (2) TPR was in the best
interest of M.H. and J.B.  We disagree.

1.  We affirm
the family court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence established that M.H.
and J.B. were outside the home of either parent for six months, and during that
time, Mother's failure to visit them was "willful." See S.C.
Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2008) (stating the family court may order TPR upon
finding a statutory ground is established and also finding TPR is in the best
interest of the children); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570(3) (Supp. 2008)
(explaining a statutory ground for TPR is established when "the child has
lived outside the home of either parent for a period of six months, and during
that time the parent has wil[l]fully failed to visit the child.  The court may
attach little or no weight to incidental visitations . . . .").

2.  Furthermore, despite Mother’s arguments to
the contrary, we find DSS proved by clear
and convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the
best interests of M.H. and J.B.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2620 (Supp.
2008) (explaining when the child's interests and the parental rights conflict,
the child’s interests shall prevail); Charleston County Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
v. King, 369 S.C. 96, 105, 631 S.E.2d 239, 244 (2006) (“When reviewing the
family court decision, appellate courts may make their own conclusions of
whether DSS proved by clear and convincing evidence that parental rights should
be terminated.”); Charleston County
Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Jackson, 368 S.C. 87, 95, 627 S.E.2d 765, 770 (Ct. App. 2006)
(stating despite the appellate court’s broad scope of review, it should not
necessarily disregard the findings of the family court, which was in a better
position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and to assign weight to
their testimony); S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C. 129, 133,
538 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ct. App. 2000) (declaring the best interests of the children
are the paramount consideration in a TPR case).

3.  Mother contends the family
court erred by failing to consider
due process violations that occurred before the family court ordered Mother to comply
with the terms of the 2006 Placement Plan.   We
find this argument to be without merit.  See Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR
(stating the appellate court "need not address a point which is manifestly
without merit").

4.  Finally,
Mother contends section 63-7-2570(8) of the South Carolina Code is
unconstitutional because this ground for TPR is unrelated to "parental
unfitness."  Because only one statutory ground is needed to affirm the
family court's termination of Mother's parental rights, and clear and
convincing evidence supports TPR based on Mother's willful failure to visit, an
analysis of this constitutional question is not necessary to the resolution of
the case.  See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Seegars, 367 S.C.
623, 633, 627 S.E.2d 718, 723 (2006) (quoting Fairway Ford, Inc. v. County
of Greenville, 324 S.C. 84, 86, 476 S.E.2d 490, 491 (1996) (“[I]t is this
Court's firm policy to decline to rule on constitutional
issues unless such a ruling is required.”).

Accordingly,
the family court order terminating Mother’s parental rights to M.H. and J.B. is  

AFFIRMED.[1]

HEARN, C.J., KONDUROS, J. and CURETON, A.J., concur.

[1]We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.