Evans v. Dubard, Inc.

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Jason Evans, Respondent,

v.

Dubard, Inc.,
and Selective Insurance Company, Appellants.

Appeal From Chesterfield County

Paul M. Burch, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2009-UP-260 

Submitted May 1, 2009 – Filed June 1, 2009

AFFIRMED

Michael
W. Burkett, of Columbia, for Appellants.

William
P. Hatfield, of Florence, for Respondent. 

PER CURIAM:  Jason
Evans suffered two injuries to his right knee and was awarded workers'
compensation benefits for both injuries.  Dubard, Inc., and Selective Insurance
Company appeal the award of benefits for the second injury, arguing the circuit
court erred in finding the second injury was causally related to the first
injury and in finding Evans had not reached maximum medical improvement (MMI)
from the first injury when he suffered the second injury.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:  S.C. Code Ann.
§ 1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2008) (prohibiting the court from "substitut[ing] its
judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact"); Baxter v. Martin Bros., Inc., 368 S.C. 510,
513, 630 S.E.2d 42, 43 (2006) (limiting appellate review of workers'
compensation decisions to ascertaining "whether the circuit court properly
determined whether the [A]ppellate [P]anel's findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence in the record and whether the [P]anel's decision is
affected by an error of law"); Aristizabal v. I. J. Woodside-Div. of
Dan River, Inc., 268 S.C. 366, 370, 234 S.E.2d 21, 23 (1977) (holding a
causal relationship can be established if the injury and disability can be
reasonably connected by the lay mind); S.C. Second Injury Fund v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 353 S.C. 117, 122, 576 S.E.2d 199, 202 (Ct. App. 2003) ("'Substantial
evidence' is evidence which, considering the entire record, would allow
reasonable minds to arrive at the same conclusion reached by the administrative
agency."); Etheredge v. Monsanto Co., 349 S.C. 451, 454-55, 562
S.E.2d 679, 681 (Ct. App. 2002) (stating the Appellate Panel is the
ultimate fact finder in workers' compensation cases, is not bound by the single
commissioner's findings of fact, and makes the final determination of witness
credibility and the weight to be accorded evidence); Nettles v. Spartanburg Sch. Dist. No. 7, 341 S.C. 580, 592, 535 S.E.2d 146, 152 (Ct. App.
2000) (holding when there is conflicting medical evidence, the findings of fact
of the Appellate Panel are conclusive); Corbin v. Kohler Co., 351 S.C.
613, 618, 571 S.E.2d 92, 95 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Muir v. C.R. Bard,
Inc., 336 S.C. 266, 282, 519 S.E.2d 583, 591 (Ct. App. 1999)) ("'[T]he
possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency's findings from being supported by substantial
evidence.'"); Mullinax v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 318 S.C. 431,
436, 458 S.E.2d 76, 79 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing Whitfield v. Daniel
Constr. Co., 226 S.C. 37, 83 S.E.2d 460 (1954)) ("[N]atural
consequences flowing from a compensable injury, absent an independent
intervening cause, are compensable.").

We
need not reach the issue of whether Evans had reached MMI from his first injury
at the time of his second injury because Appellants concede MMI is not in
dispute if this court affirms the circuit court on the issue of causation. 

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, PIEPER,
and GEATHERS, JJ., concur. 

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.