Williams v. Bozeman

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Willard M.
Williams, Jr., Appellant/Respondent,

v.

Charles C.
Bozeman, Robin C. Bozeman, d/b/a Robin Bozeman Trucking, Respondents/Appellants,

And Turkeesha
C. Minnifield and Dease Construction, Respondents.

Appeal From Georgetown County

 Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2009-UP-087

Heard December 11, 2008 – Filed February
12, 2009   

AFFIRMED

Jeffrey E. Johnson, of Conway, for Appellant/Respondent.

Glenn V. Ohanesian, J. Dwight Hudson, and Mary Anne Graham, all of
Myrtle Beach, for Respondents/Appellants.

G. Michael Smith, of Conway, for Respondent Dease Construction. 

Margaret Fanning Horn, of Charleston, for Respondent Minnifield.

PER CURIAM: Willard M. Williams along with Charles C. Bozeman (Bozeman) and
Robin C. Bozeman appeal the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Dease
Construction on their causes of action for negligent entrustment (Issue I).  Williams
also argues a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether Bozeman
was negligent because he presented evidence Bozeman was speeding and caused the
accident (Issue II).  We
affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: Issue
I: Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002)
(providing summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law); Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Passmore, 275 S.C. 618, 621, 274 S.E.2d 416,
418 (1981) ("The theory of negligent entrustment provides: 'the owner
or one in control of the vehicle and responsible for its use who is negligent
in entrusting it to another can be held liable for such negligent entrustment.'
"); Wineglass v. McMinn, 235 S.C. 537, 541,
112 S.E.2d 652, 654 (1960) (holding ample evidence established the
appellants' agent was negligent in leaving an inexperienced, fourteen-year-old
to attend to the truck with ignition key because the employee "should have
foreseen as a reasonable and probable consequence . . . the safety of others on
the street would be endangered by the boy's attempt to drive it"); Dennis by Evans v. Timmons, 313 S.C. 338, 341, 437 S.E.2d 138, 141 (Ct.
App. 1993) ("When a person has not furnished the instrumentality but through
negligence allowed access thereto to a child, the standard for imposing
liability upon the person is whether the person knew of the child's proclivity
or propensity for the specific dangerous activity which caused the harm.");
and Issue II: Coleman v. Shaw, 281 S.C. 107, 110, 314
S.E.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding violation of a statute is
negligence per se but once established, the court must still examine the
question of proximate cause); Rayfield v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 297 S.C.
95, 103-04, 374 S.E.2d 910, 915 (Ct. App. 1988) ("Negligence per se simply means the jury need not decide if the defendant acted as
would a reasonable man in the circumstances.  The statute fixes the standard of conduct required of the
defendant, leaving the jury merely to decide whether the defendant breached the
statute.  If he did, his failure to take due care is established as a matter of
law. The only issue then left for the jury to determine is the third element of
negligence, . . . whether the defendant's conduct proximately caused damage to
the plaintiff."); Blanding v. Hammell, 267 S.C. 352, 357, 228
S.E.2d 271, 272-73 (1976) (holding when "speed has not been a causative
factor, the court has focused on the inevitability of the accident, irrespective of the defendant's
speed, due to an unexpected entry of the plaintiff into the defendant's right
of way"); Odom v. Steigerwald, 260 S.C. 422, 428, 196 S.E.2d 635,
638 (1973) ("Assuming . . . the plaintiff was driving at an excessive rate
of speed and was negligent, we think, as a matter of law, that such was not a
contributing proximate cause. The real cause, the more immediate and efficient
cause, was the improper driving conduct of [the defendant].  By driving his car
directly into the path of plaintiff's vehicle when plaintiff was obviously so
close to the intersection, [the defendant] created a trap from which plaintiff
could not escape.").

AFFIRMED.

HEARN,
C.J., and SHORT and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.