Burwell v. Ponderosa, Inc.

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Jeremy Scott
Burwell, Appellant,

v.

Ponderosa, Inc.
d/b/a Pirate Land Campground, Employer, and The Hartford, Carrier, Respondents.

Appeal From Horry County

 J. Michael Baxley, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2008-UP-608

Submitted November 3, 2008 – Filed
November 6, 2008

AFFIRMED

C. Daniel Vega, of Columbia, for Appellant.

John McIntyre Tolar and Weston Adams, III, both of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Jeremy Scott
Burwell appeals the circuit court’s order denying coverage because he failed to
provide his employer, Pirate Land Campground (Employer), with timely notice of
the injuries he sustained.  Specifically, he argues the circuit court erred in
affirming the Appellate Panel’s order because 1) Employer had notice in fact of
his injuries; 2) Burwell provided a reasonable excuse for failing to give
notice; and 3) Employer was not prejudiced from the late notice.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities. 

1.  As to the
question of whether the Appellate Panel erred in finding Burwell failed to
provide timely notice:  S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-20 (A) (Supp. 2007) (requiring injured
employees give notice to employers of an accident “unless it can be shown that
the employer . . . had knowledge of the accident . . . .”); S.C. Code Ann.
§42-15-20 (B) (Supp. 2007) (“[N]o compensation shall be payable unless such
notice is given within ninety days after the occurrence of the accident . . .
.”); Lizee v. S.C. Dept. of Mental Health, 367 S.C. 122, 127, 623 S.E.2d
860, 863 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding the claimant bears the burden of proving
compliance with the statutory notice requirements); Rogers v. Kunja Knitting
Mills, Inc., 312 S.C. 377, 380, 440 S.E.2d 401, 403 (Ct. App. 1994) (“The
final determination of witness credibility and the weight to be accorded
evidence is reserved to the [Appellate Panel] and it is not the task of the
[appellate] court to weigh the evidence as found by the [Appellate Panel].”).

2.  As to whether
the Appellate Panel erred in finding Burwell did not provide a reasonable
excuse for failing to provide notice:          S.C. Code Ann. §42-15-20 (B)
(Supp. 2007) (asserting unless injured employees give notice within ninety days
of the accident “no compensation shall be payable . . . unless reasonable
excuse is made to the satisfaction of the [Appellate Panel] for not giving
timely notice, and the [Appellate Panel] is satisfied that the employer has not
been prejudiced thereby”). 

3.  As to whether
the Appellate Panel erred in finding Employer was prejudiced:  Gray v. Laurens Mills, 231 S.C. 488, 492, 99 S.E.2d 36, 38
(1957) (“[L]ack of prejudice does not justify compensation unless the
requirement of reasonable excuse is also satisfied.”); see also Ringer v. Graham, 286 S.C.
14, 20, 331 S.E.2d 373, 377 (Ct. App. 1985) (determining discussion of
remaining issues was unnecessary after reversing a directed verdict). 

AFFIRMED.

ANDERSON, HUFF, and
THOMAS, JJ., concur.