State v. Fernando Saenz-Montes

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent

v.

Fernando
Saenz-Montes, Appellant.

Appeal From Oconee County

 Howard P. King, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-548

Submitted October 1, 2008 – Filed October
9, 2008  

AFFIRMED

Beattie B. Ashmore, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant
Attorney General Harold M. Coombs, Jr. all of Columbia; Solicitor Christina T.
Adams, of Anderson, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Fernando Saenz-Montes appeals
his conviction and sentence for trafficking in cocaine, arguing the trial court
erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of a
vehicle he was driving because the dog sniff did not reveal drugs were in the
vehicle and the detention following the traffic stop violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. 
As to whether the dog sniff revealed drugs were in the vehicle:  State v.
Wise, 359 S.C. 14, 21, 596 S.E.2d 475, 478 (2004) (stating the admission or
exclusion of evidence is a matter addressed to the trial court’s sound
discretion); State v. Douglas, 367 S.C. 498, 509, 626 S.E.2d 59,
65 (Ct. App. 2006) (explaining defects in the amount and quality of the
expert’s education or experience go to the weight to be accorded the expert’s
testimony and not to its admissibility).

2.  As to whether
the detention following the traffic stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights: Whren
v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996) (“Temporary detention of
individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even
if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of
‘persons’ within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment].”); Florida v.
Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (explaining an investigative detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop and the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its
underlying justification); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 n.6
(1977) (holding when police lawfully detain a motor vehicle for a traffic
violation, they may order the driver to exit the vehicle without violating
Fourth Amendment proscriptions on unreasonable searches and seizures); State
v. Brockman, 339 S.C. 57, 66, 528 S.E.2d 661, 666 (2000) (articulating the any
evidence standard of review to apply to Fourth Amendment search and seizure
cases); State v. Pichardo, 367 S.C. 84, 99, 623 S.E.2d 840, 848 (Ct.
App. 2005) (explaining  Fourth Amendment jurisprudence provides lengthening the
detention for further questioning once the initial traffic stop is completed is
permissible in two situations: (1) the officer may detain the driver for
questioning unrelated to the initial stop if he or she has an objectively
reasonable and articulable suspicion illegal activity has occurred or is occurring;
and (2) further questioning unrelated to the initial stop is permissible if the
initial detention has become a consensual encounter); State v. Williams,
351 S.C. 591, 597-98, 571 S.E.2d 703, 707 (Ct. App. 2002) (stating when
probable cause exists to believe a traffic violation has occurred, the decision
to stop the automobile is reasonable per se); State v. Butler, 343 S.C.
198, 201, 539 S.E.2d 414, 416 (Ct. App. 2000) (stating the Fourth Amendment
guarantees a person the right to be secure from unreasonable searches and
seizures).

AFFIRMED.

ANDERSON,
WILLAIMS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.