State v. Gilliard

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Matthew W.
Gilliard, III, #2, Appellant.

Appeal From Greenville County

G. Edward Welmaker, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-565

Submitted October 1, 2008 – Filed October
13, 2008

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Senior
Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, all of Columbia; and Solicitor
Robert Mills Ariail, of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Matthew
W. Gilliard, III, appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of assault and
battery with intent to kill, first-degree burglary, possession of a weapon
during the commission of a violent crime, and possession of cocaine.  Gilliard
argues the trial court erred by denying his motions to (1) quash his grand jury
indictment and (2) reinstruct the jury regarding reasonable doubt.  We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the
following authorities:

1. Regarding
Gilliard’s motion to quash the indictments: State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 102-03, 610 S.E.2d 494, 500 (2005) (“If
the objection is timely made, the circuit court should judge the sufficiency of
the indictment by determining whether (1) the offense is stated with sufficient
certainty and particularity to enable the court to know what judgment to
pronounce, and the defendant to know what he is called upon to answer and whether he may plead an
acquittal or conviction thereon; and (2) whether it apprises the defendant of
the elements of the offense that is intended to be charged.”); Rule 1101(d)(2),
SCRE (stating the Rules of Evidence are not applicable to grand jury proceedings).

2. Regarding
Gilliard’s motion to reinstruct the jury regarding reasonable doubt: Brightman
v. State, 336 S.C. 348, 520 S.E.2d 614 (1999) (finding a King instruction,
which provided that if a jury has reasonable doubt between lesser and greater
offenses, it must resolve that doubt in the defendant’s favor, is no longer
necessary now that the modern reasonable doubt charge instructs the jury to
resolve doubts in favor of the defendant); Brown v. Stewart, 348 S.C.
33, 53, 557 S.E.2d 676, 686 (Ct. App. 2001) (“It is not error to refuse a request to charge
when the substance of the request is included in the general instructions.”); State
v. Barksdale, 311 S.C. 210, 216, 428 S.E.2d 498, 502 (Ct. App. 1993) (“When
a jury requests an additional charge, it is sufficient for the court to charge only those matters necessary
to answer the jury’s request.”). 

AFFIRMED.[1]

SHORT, THOMAS, and PIEPER, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.