SCDSS v. Calvin J.

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina
Department of Social Services, Respondent,

v.

Tonya H.,
Calvin J., John Doe, and Calvin D. J. DOB: 7/18/99, Defendants,

Of Whom Calvin
J. is the Appellant.[1]

Appeal from Greenville County

 R. Kinard Johnson, Jr., Family Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2008-UP-072

Submitted January 2, 2008 – Filed January
24, 2008   

AFFIRMED

William M. Wilson, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Deborah  Murdock, of Mauldin, for Respondent.

Robert A. Clark, of Greenville, for the Guardian Ad Litem.

PER CURIAM:  This
is a termination of parental rights (TPR) action.  The family court granted a
petition filed by the South Carolina Department of Social Services (SCDSS) to
terminate the parental rights of Calvin
J. (Father) to his minor child Calvin D. J. (Child).  Father appeals pursuant
to Ex Parte Cauthen, 291 S.C. 465, 354 S.E.2d 381 (1987).  We affirm.[2] 

The family court
terminated Father’s parental rights to Child on the grounds that (1) Child has
lived outside Father’s home for a period of at least six months and Father has
willfully failed to support Child or make a material contribution to Child’s
care as required by S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-1572(4) (Supp. 2006), (2) Child has
lived outside Father’s home for at least six months and Father has willfully
failed to visit Child pursuant to id. § 20-7-1572(3), (3) Father has
failed to remedy the conditions which caused the removal of Child as required
by id. § 20-7-1572(2), and (4) Child has been in foster care for fifteen
of the most recent twenty-two months as provided in id. § 20-7-1572(8). 
The family court further found it was in Child’s best interest that TPR be
granted.

Child
lived with Father from the time of his birth in 1999 until Father was
incarcerated in 2004.  Father was released, but was thereafter reincarcerated
on several occasions, causing Child to be taken into foster care.  Father also
had an ongoing substance abuse problem.  At the time this case was decided,
Child had been in foster care for two and a half years and had a family who
wished to adopt him.  Based on all reports, Child was thriving in his new
environment.  Father opposes this action to terminate his parental rights,
however, arguing he has made efforts to support and visit Child, and he has
formed a bond with Child.

We have carefully reviewed this record and we are not
unsympathetic to Father, especially in light of evidence that he formed a bond
with Child.  We do recognize the policy in the South Carolina Code of Laws for
reunification as stated in S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-20(D) (1985),[3] but we also know the countervailing
best interest of the minor child must always remain paramount.  See Dep’t
of Soc. Servs. v. Phillips, 365 S.C.
572, 576, 618 S.E.2d 922, 923-24 (Ct. App. 2005) (stating in TPR cases,
the best interest of the child is the paramount and controlling consideration).

After weighing these competing, yet vital, considerations, we are
firmly persuaded the family court judge made the correct decision to terminate
Father’s parental rights in this unfortunate and difficult case.  We concur
with the family court judge’s decision based on Father’s recidivist tendencies,
apparently stemming from his inability to deal with his drug addiction. During
the varying times between his multiple incarcerations, Father demonstrated some
effort to act as a parent.  Conversely, there were times when Father did not
act as a parent.  In fact, there were months where he did not pay any support
or visit his son.  Thus, we conclude termination of Father’s parental rights is
in Child’s best interest so that Child will have a stable home environment.  Cf. Phillips, 365 S.C. at 579-80, 582, 618 S.E.2d at 925, 927 (recognizing
that, while Phillips showed some progress in her treatment plan, she fell short
of actually remedying the conditions that caused the child’s removal, namely
ending her drug use, continuing counseling, and finding employment, and thus
concluding that termination of Phillips’s parental rights was in the best
interests of the children).

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the family court is,
therefore,

AFFIRMED.

HEARN, C.J., and KITTREDGE and THOMAS, JJ., concur.

[1]  The record in this matter is sealed.

[2]  We decide this case without oral argument pursuant
to Rule 215, SCACR. 

[3]  Section 20-7-20(D) provides in relevant part:  “It
is the policy of this State to reunite the child with his family in a timely
manner, whether or not the child has been placed in the care of the State
voluntarily.”  Id.