State v. Pringle

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Donovan Raheam
Pringle, Appellant.

Appeal From Georgetown County

Benjamin H. Culbertson, Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-303

Submitted April 2, 2012 – Filed May 16,
2012   

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Elizabeth A.
Franklin-Best, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W.
Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Christina J. Catoe,
all of Columbia; and Solicitor J. Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Donovan
Raheam Pringle appeals his convictions of armed robbery and possession of a
weapon during the commission of a violent crime.  He argues the trial court
erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict because the State's evidence
amounted only to a mere suspicion he was involved in the armed robbery.  Because Pringle's cousin stated to the
police he committed the robbery with Pringle and his statement was corroborated
by circumstantial evidence, we affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Weston,
367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006) ("When
ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the trial court is concerned with
the existence or nonexistence of evidence, not its weight."); id. at 292-93, 625 S.E.2d at 648 (stating an appellate court views the evidence and
all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State when
reviewing a denial of a directed verdict and must find
the case was properly submitted to the jury if any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence
reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused); State v.
Crawford, 362 S.C. 627, 634, 608 S.E.2d 886, 889-90 (Ct. App. 2005) ("[T]estimony
of prior inconsistent statements may be used as substantive evidence when the
declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross examination."
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. Needs, 333
S.C. 134, 144, 508 S.E.2d 857, 862 (1998) ("[T]he jury is the judge of
which contradictory statement of the witness is the truth." (quotation
marks and citation omitted)); State v. Pitts, 256 S.C. 420, 426, 182
S.E.2d 738, 741 (1971) ("The weight to be attached to the testimony of an
accomplice is for the jury alone who must consider it in view of the other
evidence and reach their conclusion on the view of the whole case.").

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., HUFF and SHORT,
JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument
pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.