State v. Tinsley

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

James Douglas Tinsley, Appellant.

Appeal From Oconee County

J.C. Buddy Nicholson Jr., Circuit Court
Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-321  

Submitted May 1, 2012 – Filed May 30, 2012

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Tristan M. Shaffer, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley
W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General David Spencer, all of Columbia; and Solicitor
Christina T. Adams, of Anderson, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  James
Douglas Tinsley appeals his convictions of possession of a stolen vehicle and
two counts of receiving stolen goods, arguing the circuit court erred in
denying his motion for a directed verdict because evidence was presented he
participated in the actual theft of the stolen property.  We affirm.[1]

An appellate court reviews
the denial of a directed verdict by viewing the evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the State.  State v. Weston,
367 S.C. 279, 292, 625 S.E.2d 641, 648 (2006).  "If there is any direct
evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending to prove
the guilt of the accused, [an appellate court] must find the case was properly
submitted to the jury."  Id. at 292-93, 625 S.E.2d at 648.  The
circuit court may not consider the weight of the evidence.  Id. at 292,
625 S.E.2d at 648.

The offenses of receiving
stolen goods and receiving, possessing, concealing, selling, or disposing of a
stolen vehicle closely mirror each other.  S.C. Code Ann. § 16-13-180 (Supp.
2011); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-21-80 (Supp. 2011).  The elements of both statutes
are met if the State can show the defendant had possession of the stolen
property and knowledge the property was stolen.  § 16-13-180(A); § 16-21-80.  Both
possession and knowledge can be proven by circumstantial evidence.  State v.
Ballenger, 322 S.C. 196, 199-200, 470 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1996); State v.
Williams, 350 S.C. 172, 175 n.5, 564 S.E.2d 688, 690 n.5 (Ct. App. 2002).

South Carolina courts have
consistently held that a defendant cannot be convicted of both the theft of the
property and the separate and distinct offense of receiving the stolen
property.  State v. Hamilton, 172 S.C. 453, 455, 174 S.E. 396, 396
(1934) (recognizing that a defendant can be charged with both offenses but can
only be convicted of one); see also State v. McNeil, 314 S.C.
473, 475, 445 S.E.2d 461, 462 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the offense of
possession of a stolen vehicle is not a lesser-included offense of grand
larceny).  The question of which offense the defendant is guilty of, however,
is for the jury to decide if the facts are in dispute.  Hamilton, 172
S.C. at 455, 174 S.E. at 396 ("While one may be charged in an indictment
with both of these crimes, he cannot be convicted of both.").

We find the circuit court
properly denied Tinsley's motion for a directed verdict.  The fact that the
property was stolen was not in dispute, and Tinsley, who sold the property
substantially under market value, possessed bills of sale falsely indicating he
was a buyer of the stolen property.  Moreover, his codefendant testified
Tinsley participated in the scheme, arranged storage units, and knew the
property was stolen.  Although Tinsley denied knowing the property was stolen when
he took the witness stand, his strategy evidently was to produce evidence of
his participation in the larcenies during the State's case-in-chief to preclude
conviction of the charged offenses.  His cross-examination of his codefendant,
however, merely created a factual dispute in light of the State's election only
to prove Tinsley was knowingly in possession of the stolen property.  Thus, in
a light most favorable to the State, both direct and substantial circumstantial
evidence support the State's theory, and the circuit court properly submitted
the charges to the jury.  Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is

AFFIRMED.

PIEPER, KONDUROS, and
GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.