Tomlin v. SCDPPP

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

George Tomlin, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department
of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, Respondent.

Appeal from the Administrative Law Court

Deborah Brooks Durden, Administrative Law
Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-332

Submitted May 1, 2012 – Filed May 30, 2012

VACATED AND REMANDED

George Tomlin, pro se.

Teresa A. Knox, J. Benjamin Aplin, and
Tommy Evans, Jr., all of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  George Tomlin appeals the Administrative
Law Court's (ALC) order affirming the Department of Probation, Parole and
Pardon Services's (the Department) decision denying him parole.  He argues the
ALC erred in finding (1) the code section permitting the Department to conduct
parole hearings via video conferencing is not a violation of the ex post facto
clause of the United States and South Carolina Constitutions; (2) the
Department's criteria for parole consideration did not violate Tomlin's due
process and equal protection rights and did not constitute a violation of the
ex post facto clause; (3) Tomlin's claim that he should have been eligible for
parole at an earlier date was moot; and (4) no due process rights were implicated
by the Department's criteria for parole eligibility. 

Because all of Tomlin's
issues stem from a routine denial of parole, we vacate[1] the order of the ALC pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and remand with
instructions to dismiss the appeal in accordance with the following
authorities:  S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(D) (Supp. 2011) (providing the ALC
"shall not hear . . . an appeal involving the denial of parole to a
potentially eligible inmate by the Department"); Compton v. S.C. Dep't
of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 385 S.C. 476, 479, 685 S.E.2d 175,
177 (2009) (holding an order denying parole and stating consideration of all
statutory and Department criteria is sufficient to avoid deeming an inmate
effectively ineligible for parole). 

VACATED AND REMANDED.

PIEPER, KONDUROS, and
GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.