State v. Massey

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR. 

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Andre Maurice Massey, Appellant.

Appeal From Sumter County

George C. James, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-098

Submitted February 1, 2012 – Filed
February 22, 2012   

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant,
of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott,
and Assistant Attorney General Mark R. Farthing, all of Columbia; and Solicitor
Ernest A. Finney, III, of Sumter, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Andre
Maurice Massey appeals his convictions for armed robbery and possession of a
weapon during the commission of a violent crime, arguing the trial court erred
in: (1) denying Massey's suppression motion and motion for a mistrial based on
evidence obtained in violation of section 24-21-290 of the South Carolina Code
(2007), and (2) sentencing Massey to life without parole when the notice was
deficient because it did not include the words "without parole."  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and
the following authorities: 

1. As to whether the
trial court erred in denying Massey's motion to suppress and motion for a
mistrial:  S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-290 (2007) ("All information and data
obtained in the discharge of his official duty by a probation agent is
privileged information, is not receivable as evidence in a court, and may not
be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone other than the judge or others
entitled under this chapter to receive reports unless ordered by the court or
the director."); State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216,
220 (2006) ("The trial [court]'s factual findings on whether evidence
should be suppressed due to a Fourth Amendment violation are reviewed for clear
error."); State v. Stanley, 365 S.C. 24, 33, 615 S.E.2d 455,
460 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The decision to grant or deny a mistrial is
within the sound discretion of the trial [court]."); Hutto v. State, 387
S.C. 244, 250, 692 S.E.2d 196, 199 (2010) (holding that even if a disclosure is
made in violation of section 24-21-290, the exclusionary rule would not
apply to a statutory right).

2. As to whether the
trial court erred in sentencing Massey to life without parole when the notice
was deficient because it did not include the words "without parole":
S.C. Code Ann. § 17-25-45(H) (Supp. 2011) ("Where the solicitor is
required to seek or determines to seek sentencing of a defendant under this
section, written notice must be given by the solicitor to the defendant and
defendant's counsel not less than ten days before trial."); James v.
State, 372 S.C. 287, 294, 641 S.E.2d 899, 903 (2007) ("[S]o long as
the defendant and his counsel, at least ten days prior to trial, possess actual
notice of the State's intention to seek a sentence under South Carolina's
recidivist statute, the statute has been satisfied."); State v.
Burdette, 335 S.C. 34, 39-40, 515 S.E.2d 525, 528 (1999) ("Once the
indictment informs a defendant of the charges against him, section 17-25-45(H) only requires the solicitor to inform the defendant that the recidivist sentencing
statue will be applied upon conviction." (emphasis added)).

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS,
THOMAS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.