Veronie v. 303 Associates

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

J.N. Veronie
and Laura K. Veronie, Appellants,

v.

303 Associates,
LLC and Lowcountry Real Estate, Respondents.

Appeal from Beaufort County

Carmen T. Mullen, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-044

Heard December 5, 2011 – Filed January 25,
2012   

REVERSED AND REMANDED

James H. Moss, Moss, Kuhn & Fleming,
P.A., of Beaufort, for Appellants.

David W. Overstreet and Douglas W.
Mackelcan, both of Charleston, and Ralph E. Tupper of Beaufort, for
Respondents.

PER CURIAM:  J.N. and Laura K. Veronie (the Veronies)
brought this action against 303 Associates, LLC (303) for breach of contract and
Lowcountry Real Estate (Lowcountry) for breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
and negligence.  On appeal, the Veronies argue the circuit court erred in
granting summary judgment to 303 before the completion of discovery. 
Additionally, the Veronies contend the circuit court erred in granting
Lowcountry's Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, motion to dismiss.  We reverse and remand.

1. We hold
the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment before the Veronies had a
full and fair opportunity to complete discovery.   Here, the deposition of Susan
Markham, who represented to the Veronies that the contract in question had been
signed by 303, was scheduled to occur two weeks following the summary judgment hearing. 
Additionally, at the time of the hearing, Lowcountry had not responded to the
Veronies' discovery request to produce the contract.  Therefore, the circuit
court's grant of summary judgment two and one-half months after the Veronies
filed their complaint was premature.  See Doe v. Batson, 345 S.C.
316, 321, 548 S.E.2d 854, 857 (2001) (internal citation omitted) ("Summary
judgment is a drastic remedy, which should be cautiously invoked so that no
person will be improperly deprived of a trial of the disputed factual
issues."); Baughman v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 306 S.C. 101, 112,
410 S.E.2d 537, 543 (1991) ("[S]ummary judgment must not be granted until
the opposing party has had a full and fair opportunity to complete
discovery.").

2. We hold
the circuit court erred in dismissing the Veronies' complaint on the ground
that it failed to allege the existence of a valid contract.  Viewing the
factual allegations in the complaint, and inferences from them, in the light
most favorable to the Veronies, we find they pled sufficient facts which could
entitle them to relief. See Overcash v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co., 
364 S.C. 569, 572, 614 S.E.2d 619, 620 (2005) ("[P]leadings in a case
should be construed liberally and the Court must presume all well pled facts to
be true so that substantial justice is done between the parties."); Stiles
v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 300, 457 S.E.2d 601, 602-03 (1995) ("A Rule
12(b)(6) motion may not sustained if facts alleged and inferences reasonably
deducible therefrom would entitle the plaintiff to any relief on any theory of
the case."); HHHunt Corp. v. Town of Lexington, 389 S.C. 623, 632,
699 S.E.2d 699, 703 (Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted) ("[A]
judgment on the pleadings is considered to be a drastic procedure by our
courts.  The complaint should not be dismissed merely because the court doubts
the plaintiff will prevail in the action.").

REVERSED.

SHORT, WILLIAMS, AND
GEATHERS, JJ., concur.