State v. Williams

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Tawanda
Williams, Appellant.

Appeal From Horry County

Larry B. Hyman, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-558

Submitted December 1, 2011 – Filed
December 9, 2011

Withdrawn, Substituted, and Refiled April
18, 2012  

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W.
Elliott, and Assistant  Attorney General Christina J. Catoe, all of Columbia;
and Solicitor J. Gregory Hembree, of Conway, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Tawanda Williams appeals her conviction
for distribution of cocaine.  Williams argues the trial court erred in denying
her motion for a continuance.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. McKennedy, 348 S.C. 270, 280, 559 S.E.2d 850, 855 (2002) (holding a trial
court's denial of a motion for a continuance "will not be disturbed absent
a clear abuse of discretion" (quoting State v. Williams, 321 S.C.
455, 459, 469 S.E.2d 49, 51 (1996))); id. at 280, 559 S.E.2d at 855 ("This
[c]ourt has repeatedly upheld denials of motions for continuances where there
is no showing that any other evidence on behalf of the defendant could have
been introduced, or that any other points could have been raised, if more time
had been granted to prepare for trial."); Rule 7(a), SCRCrimP (providing a
trial court may only grant a continuance upon "written request by
counsel"); Rule 7(b), SCRCrimP ("No motion
for continuance of trial shall be granted on account of the absence of a
witness without the oath of the party, his counsel, or agent to the following
effect: the testimony of the witness is material to the support of the action
or defense of the party moving; the motion is not intended for delay, but is
made solely because he cannot go safely to trial without such testimony; and
has made use of due diligence to procure the testimony of the witness or of
such other circumstances as will satisfy the court that his motion is not
intended for delay.");Rule 7(b)(2), SCRCrimP
(requiring the moving party to set forth under oath what "fact or facts he
believes the witness if present would testify to and the grounds for such
belief"); see State v. Richardson, 253 S.C. 468, 473-74, 171
S.E.2d 717, 719 (1969) (supporting the proposition that the Confrontation
Clause is not implicated merely because the State did not call the informant to
testify); id. ("[T]he State is not required to place upon the stand
every witness who has knowledge of material facts connected with the crime
charged."); id. at 474, 171 S.E.2d at 720 (holding the rules of
evidence "do not require that all witnesses who may be present when the
offense was committed, or who may be supposed to possess information respecting
it, should be produced").

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and
THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument
pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.