Martin v. State

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Marcus Martin, Respondent,

v.

State of South Carolina, Petitioner.

Appeal From Anderson County

 John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-489

Heard October 19, 2011 – Filed November 2,
2011 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of Columbia, for Respondent.

Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General
John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott,
Assistant Attorney General A. West Lee, and Assistant Attorney General Kaelon
E. May, all of Columbia, for Appellant.

PER CURIAM: In this post-conviction relief (PCR) case, the State
appeals the PCR court's grant of PCR to Marcus Martin regarding his guilty plea
to a number of crimes.  We reverse and remand for an additional finding by the
PCR court.

Martin was indicted for one count of murder, two counts of armed
robbery, one count of assault and battery with intent to kill, one count of possession
of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime, and one count of
criminal conspiracy.  After jury voir dire, his counsel notified the plea court
that he agreed to plead guilty to all of the charges.  The plea court proceeded
with its colloquy, and it eventually accepted the plea as made knowingly and
voluntarily.  During the plea hearing, however, the plea court did not define
or explain the elements of the charges to Martin, and Martin's counsel did not
confirm to the plea court that he had done so. 

Martin subsequently applied for PCR, alleging his plea counsel was
ineffective because his plea was not knowing and voluntary.  At the PCR
hearing, Martin testified (1) he did not understand the elements of the crimes
he plead to and (2) his plea counsel did not explain those elements to him.  Despite
this allegation, plea counsel testified he explained the elements to Martin,
and in its order addressing Martin's application, the PCR court found plea
counsel's testimony credible.  However, the PCR court explicitly stated that it
must disregard that testimony because "[t]he record at the time of the
plea must comport with due process requirements.  The record cannot be propped
up at a later time."  The PCR court then found that during the plea
hearing the plea court did not explain the charges to Martin and Martin's
counsel did not confirm that he had done so.  Consequently, the PCR court held
the plea was not knowing and voluntary, and it granted PCR.  This appeal
followed.

The
State argues the PCR court erred in granting PCR because the PCR court
explicitly disregarded plea counsel's testimony that he explained the elements
of the crime to Martin even though the PCR court also found that testimony
credible.  We agree.

On appeal from PCR proceedings, this court
must affirm the findings and holdings of the PCR court unless the findings are
not supported by "any evidence of probative value" or the holdings are "controlled by an error of law."  Bailey v. State, 392 S.C. 422, 432, 709 S.E.2d 671,
676 (2011).  "A defendant who enters a plea on the advice of counsel may
only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of a plea by showing that
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
that" he was prejudiced by counsel's errors.  Rolen v. State, 384
S.C. 409, 413, 683 S.E.2d 471, 474 (2009).  In
determining whether plea counsel was ineffective for permitting the defendant to
plead guilty, the ultimate test is not the plea court's explanations or questions
or the plea counsel's answers; rather, the test is the extent of the defendant's
understanding revealed by the entire record, including
evidence admitted at the PCR hearing.  See Holden v. State, 393 S.C. 565, 572-74, 713
S.E.2d 611, 615-16 (2011); Rolen, 384 S.C. at 413, 683 S.E.2d  474.

Here, the PCR court failed to consider the
entire record.  It explicitly found credible plea counsel's testimony that he explained the elements of
the crimes to Martin.  Yet the PCR court ignored that testimony simply because it was not presented at the time of the plea.  Therefore, the PCR court's
decision is affected by an error of law. 

Despite plea counsel's testimony, Martin testified he
did not understand the elements of the charges against him, and the order
granting PCR did not make a finding as to whether Martin understood those
elements.  Therefore, we reverse and remand for a finding of whether Martin in
fact understood the elements of the crimes he plead to.  In making this
finding, the PCR court must consider the entire record.  If Martin did not
understand the elements, the PCR court must find whether this lack of
understanding prejudiced him.  If Martin did understand the elements, his plea was
knowing and voluntary and plea counsel was not ineffective for permitting the
plea.[1]

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

FEW, C.J., and THOMAS and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1] During oral argument, Martin conceded that the record reflected a sufficient factual basis for the plea, description of sentencing maximums and minimums, and explanation of the constitutional rights waived.