Carroll v. Johnson

CourtListener 10154261Scctapp11 oct. 2011

Texte intégral

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Leila Miriam
Carroll, Appellant,

v.

Travis Oliver
Johnson and Alan Travis Johnson d/b/a Sonrise Planters, Respondents.

Appeal From Horry County

 Steven H. John, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-438

Submitted October 1, 2011 – Filed October
11, 2011

AFFIRMED

Leila Miriam Carroll, pro se, of Waxhaw.

John M. Leiter, of Myrtle Beach, for
Respondents. 

PER CURIAM: Leila
Miriam Carroll appeals the trial court's dismissal of her claims for waste and fraud against
Alan Johnson and Travis Oliver Johnson, arguing the trial court (1) violated
her due process rights by considering the
Johnsons' standing argument and (2) erred in finding Carroll lacked standing.   We
affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1.  As to whether the
trial court violated Carroll's due
process rights by considering the Johnsons' standing argument: Wilder
Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497
S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial
[court] to be preserved for appellate review.").

2.  As to whether the trial court
erred in finding Carroll lacked standing to bring the waste and fraud causes of
action: S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-703(a) (Supp. 2010) ("A personal
representative has a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent .
. . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-715(20) (2009) ("[A] personal representative,
acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested persons, may properly . . .
prosecute or defend claims, or proceedings in any jurisdiction for the
protection of the estate . . . ."); Powell ex rel. Kelley v. Bank of Am., 379
S.C. 437, 444, 665 S.E.2d 237, 241 (Ct. App. 2008) ("Standing refers
to a party's right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or
right. It concerns an individual's sufficient interest in the outcome of the litigation
to warrant consideration of [the person's] position by a court.") (citations and quotation marks omitted); id. at
445, 665 S.E.2d at 241 ("One must be a real party in interest, i.e., a party
who has a real, material, or substantial interest in the subject matter of the
action, as opposed to one who has only a nominal or technical interest in the
action."); id. at 444,
665 S.E.2d at 241 (providing standing is comprised of three elements:  (1)
plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"; (2) a causal connection exists between the injury
and the conduct complained of;  and (3) it is likely the injury will be "redressed
by a favorable decision"); Judy v. Judy, 393 S.C. 160, __ , 712
S.E.2d 408, 411 (2011) ("At common law, waste
is any permanent injury to lands, houses, gardens, trees, or other corporeal
hereditaments done or permitted by the tenant of an
estate less than a fee to the prejudice of him in
reversion or remainder. Waste may
be committed by acts or omissions which tend to the lasting destruction,
deterioration, or material alteration of the freehold and the improvements
thereto or which diminish the permanent value of the inheritance.")
(citations and quotation marks omitted).

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.

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