Martin v. Michelin

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Lisa Martin, Employee, Respondent,

v.

Michelin North America, Inc., Employer, and Arch Insurance
Company, Carrier, Appellants.

Worker's Compensation Commission

Appeal from the Appellate Panel

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-452

Submitted October 1, 2011 – Filed October
11, 2011

AFFIRMED

Matthew C. Robertson, of Columbia, for
Appellants.

Ann McCrowey Mickle, of Rock Hill, and Stephen
B. Samuels, of Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Michelin North America, Inc. and Arch Insurance
Company (collectively Employer) appeal the order of the Appellate Panel of the
South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (Appellate Panel) that found
Lisa Martin sustained compensable injuries arising from repetitive trauma to
her shoulders while working for Employer.  Employer argues the Appellate Panel
erred in (1) finding Martin's claim was not barred by the statute of
limitations and (2) failing to make sufficient factual findings in its order
concerning Employer's statute of limitations claim.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and
the following authorities:

1. As to whether substantial evidence supports the Appellate Panel's
factual finding that February 25, 2008, was the date the statute of limitations
began to run: S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-40 (Supp.
2010) (providing claims for a repetitive trauma injury are barred if not filed
"within two years after the employee knew or should have known that his
injury is compensable but no more than seven years after the last date of
injurious exposure"); Murphy v. Owens Corning, 393 S.C. 77, 82-83,
710 S.E.2d 454, 457 (Ct. App. 2011) (providing this court reviews the Appellate
Panel's factual findings concerning the statute of limitations under the
substantial evidence standard of review); Mauldin v. Dyna-Color/Jack Rabbit, 308 S.C. 18, 21-22, 416 S.E.2d 639, 640-41 (1992) (finding employee's
claim was not barred by the statute of limitations even though she filed her
workers' compensation claim more than two years following her initial injury
because the statute of limitations did not begin to run until employee
discovered she had a compensable injury).

2. As to whether the Appellate Panel made sufficient factual findings in
its order: S.C. Code Ann. § 42-17-40(A) (Supp. 2010) (requiring the Appellate
Panel's order to include "a statement of the findings of fact, rulings of
law, and other matters pertinent to the questions at issue"); Brayboy
v. Clark Heating Co., 306 S.C. 56, 58-59, 409 S.E.2d 767, 768 (1991)
(declaring the Appellate Panel's findings of fact must be sufficiently detailed
to enable the reviewing court to determine whether the law has been properly
applied to those findings and whether the findings are supported by the evidence)
(citing Able Commc'ns, Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 290 S.C. 409, 411,
351 S.E.2d 151, 152 (1986)).

AFFIRMED.

SHORT, WILLIAMS, and GEATHERS, JJ.,
concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.