State v. Bledsoe

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

James E.
Bledsoe, Appellant.

Appeal From Lexington County

R. Knox McMahon, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-407

Submitted August 15, 2011 - Filed August
29, 2011 

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Kathrine H. Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Appellant.

J. Benjamin Aplin, of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: James E. Bledsoe appeals the circuit
court's order finding Bledsoe violated the conditions of his community
supervision, revoking his community supervision, and ordering him to remain
under G.P.S. monitoring.  Bledsoe argues
the circuit court abused its discretion in revoking his community supervision
for unintentional violations and by ordering electronic monitoring for ten
years even though he only had 275 days remaining of community supervision.  We
affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: S.C. Code
Ann. § 23-3-540(D) (Supp. 2010) ("A person who is required to register
pursuant to this article for [second-degree criminal sexual conduct with a
minor], and who violates a term of . . . a community supervision program, may
be ordered by the court or agency with jurisdiction to be monitored by the
Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services with an active electronic
monitoring device."); § 23-3-540(H) (Supp. 2010) ("The person shall
be monitored by the Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services with an
active electronic monitoring device for the duration of the time the person is
required to remain on the sex offender registry pursuant to the provisions of
this article, unless the person is committed to the custody of the State. Ten
years from the date the person begins to be electronically monitored, the
person may petition the chief administrative judge of the general sessions
court for the county in which the person was ordered to be electronically
monitored for an order to be released from the electronic monitoring requirements
of this section."); State v. Garrard, 390 S.C. 146, 151, 700 S.E.2d
269, 272 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Both the decision of
whether an alleged violation was willful and the decision of whether to revoke
community supervision are discretionary. The [circuit] court will not be
reversed unless the appellant has shown an abuse of that discretion. Where
there is any evidence to support the court's factual findings, there is no
abuse of discretion.").

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., THOMAS and
KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.