State v. Romero

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Israel Romero, Appellant.

Appeal From Greenville County

D. Garrison Hill, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2011-UP-137

Submitted February 1, 2011 – Filed April
5, 2011   

AFFIRMED

Israel Romero, pro se, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W.
Elliott, and Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, all of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Israel Romero appeals his conviction for
the unauthorized practice of law, arguing (1) the trial court erred in denying
his directed verdict motion and failing to apply the ex post facto rule, the
statutory construction rule, and the preemption rule; (2) the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (3) his conviction violated double
jeopardy; and (4) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1.  As to Romero's directed
verdict motion: State v. Zeigler, 364 S.C. 94, 103, 610 S.E.2d 859, 863
(Ct. App. 2005) ("The appellate court may reverse the trial judge's denial
of a motion for a directed verdict only if there is no evidence to support the
judge's ruling.") (citation omitted); id. at 102, 610 S.E.2d at 863
("If there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial
evidence reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, an appellate
court must find the case was properly submitted to the jury.") (citation
omitted); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 40-5-310 (2001) ("No person may
either practice law or solicit the legal cause of another person or entity in
this State unless he is enrolled as a member of the South Carolina Bar pursuant
to applicable court rules, or otherwise authorized to perform prescribed legal
activities by action of the Supreme Court of South Carolina. The type of
conduct that is the subject of any charge filed pursuant to this section must
have been defined as the unauthorized practice of law by the Supreme Court of
South Carolina prior to any charge being filed."); State v. McLauren,
349 S.C. 488, 497-98, 563 S.E.2d 346, 350-51 (Ct. App. 2002) ("The
generally understood definition of the practice of law embraces the preparation
of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, and
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before
judges and courts. . . . [T]he
practice of law . . . include[s] the preparation and filing of legal
documents involving the giving of advice, consultation, explanation, or
recommendations on matters of law.") (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

2.  As to Romero's subject
matter jurisdiction argument: State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 101, 610
S.E.2d 494, 499 (2005) ("Circuit courts obviously have subject matter
jurisdiction to try criminal matters.").

3.  As to Romero's remaining
issues: State v. Turner, 373 S.C. 121, 126 n.1, 644 S.E.2d 693, 696 n.1 (2007)
(noting an issue not raised to or ruled upon by the trial court is not
preserved for review); see also State v. Owens, 378 S.C. 636,
638, 664 S.E.2d 80, 81 (2008) (holding the preservation rules apply to
arguments regarding constitutional violations).

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., and THOMAS and
KONDUROS, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.