Tefft v. Tefft

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Ashley Tefft, Respondent,

   v.

Clarke M. Tefft, Appellant.

Appeal From Beaufort County

Gerald C. Smoak, Jr., Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.   2011-UP-096

Submitted March 1, 2011 – Filed March 10,
2011

AFFIRMED

O.W. Bannister, of Greenville, and Charles
Russ Keep, III, of Hilton Head, for Appellant.

Robert N. Rosen, of Charleston and
Alexandra DeJarnette Varner, of Mount Pleasant, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Clarke
M. Tefft (Husband) appeals the family court's September 4, 2008 order requiring
him to comply with a post-nuptial and reconciliation agreement, arguing the
family court erred in: (1) finding an earlier family court order approving the
reconciliation agreement was a final order; and (2) declaring its September 4,
2008 order to be a final order.  We affirm.[1]

1. We hold the family court did not err in finding the order
approving the reconciliation agreement was a final order.  "If a judgment
leaves some further act to be done by the court before the rights of the
parties are determined, the judgment is not final."  S.C. Dep't of
Transp. v. Faulkenberry, 337 S.C. 140, 146, 522 S.E.2d 822, 825 (Ct. App.
1999).  "An order is not final until it is entered by the clerk of court;
and until the order or judgment is entered by the clerk of the court, the judge
retains control of the case."  Upchurch v. Upchurch, 367 S.C. 16,
22, 624 S.E.2d 643, 646 (2006).  Here, the order was final because: (1) it
resolved all the rights of Husband and Ashley Tefft (Wife) for purposes of both
their separation and reconciliation; and (2) the clerk of court entered the
order into the record.  Additionally, we note insofar as Husband is attempting
to challenge the underlying validity of the reconciliation agreement, he is
bound by the terms of the reconciliation agreement because he freely and
voluntarily entered into the agreement.  See Moseley v. Mosier,
279 S.C. 348, 353, 306 S.E.2d 624, 627 (1983) ("The parties may
specifically agree . . . to any terms they wish as long as the court deems the
contract to have been entered fairly, voluntarily and reasonably. With the
court's approval, the terms become a part of the decree and are binding on
the parties and the court." (emphasis added)).  Lastly, we note
Husband did not appeal the family court's order approving the reconciliation
agreement.  See Ware v. Ware, 390 S.C. 493, 499, 702 S.E.2d 390,
393 (Ct. App. 2010) (finding an unappealed ruling, right or wrong, is the law
of the case).         

2. We hold any
error on behalf of the family court in declaring its September 4, 2008 order[2] to be a final order was harmless
because Husband has not suffered any
prejudice resulting from his inability to file pleadings in Wife's second
action for divorce.  A review of the record indicates Husband is still able to
litigate and file pleadings for the issues surrounding the divorce because Wife
initiated a third action for divorce on March 6, 2009, for which Husband has
already filed an answer and several counterclaims.  Accordingly, we affirm the
family court's ruling.  See Davis
v. Davis, 372 S.C. 64, 87, 641 S.E.2d 446, 458 (Ct. App. 2006) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted) ("An error not shown to be
prejudicial does not constitute grounds for reversal."). 

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS,
GEATHERS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.

[2]  The family court's September 4, 2008 order resolved
the issues surrounding the reconciliation agreement and further stated: "[Wife]
seeks a divorce in this case and is entitled to a hearing on the merits."