Dunson v. Alex Lee. Inc.

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Prince J. Dunson,
Employee, Respondent,

v.

Alex Lee, Inc.,
Employer, & American Zurich Insurance Company, Carrier, Appellants.

Appeal From Florence County

Appellate Panel

Unpublished Opinion No.  2011-UP-038

Submitted January 1, 2011 – Filed February
1, 2011 

AFFIRMED       

Adrianne LaVonne Turner, of Columbia, for
Appellants.

Stephen J. Wukela, of Florence, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Alex
Lee, Inc. and American Zurich Insurance Company (collectively, "Lee")
appeal a decision by the Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation
Commission (the Appellate Panel) granting Prince J. Dunson total temporary
disability benefits under the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.  Lee argues
the Appellate Panel erred in finding Dunson's injury compensable because the
injury did not arise out of Dunson's employment with Lee.  We affirm.[1]

Lee argues Dunson's injury
resulted from an idiopathic fall caused by a pre-existing breakdown in his
knee, and Dunson provided only speculative and thus insubstantial evidence he
tripped over rubber patches in Lee's parking lot.  We disagree.  An appellate court can reverse the Appellate Panel's
decision if it is clearly erroneous.  Pierre v. Seaside Farms, Inc., 386
S.C. 534, 540, 689 S.E.2d 615, 618 (2010) (citations omitted); see also S.C.
Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5)(d)-(e) (Supp. 2009).  A decision is not clearly
erroneous if it is supported by substantial evidence, and "[s]ubstantial
evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, but evidence which, considering
the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the
agency reached."  Tennant v. Beaufort Cnty. Sch. Dist., 381 S.C.
617, 620, 674 S.E.2d 488, 490 (2009) (citation omitted).  "Of
course, the necessary requirements for compensation
may be established by circumstantial evidence."  Bagwell v. Ernest
Burwell, Inc., 227 S.C. 444, 450, 88 S.E.2d 611, 613 (1955) (citation
omitted). 

"A claimant
may recover workers' compensation benefits if he sustains an 'injury by
accident arising out of and in the course of employment.'"  Pierre,
386 S.C. at 541, 689 S.E.2d at 618 (quoting
S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-160(A) (Supp. 2009)).  "An
accident arises out of the employment when the accident happens because of the
employment, as when the employment is a contributing proximate cause."  Id. (citation omitted).  An accident does not arise out of employment "[w]here
an employee suffers an idiopathic fall" or where "some internal
breakdown of the body" causes a fall.  Crosby v. Wal-Mart Store, Inc.,
330 S.C. 489, 493, 499 S.E.2d 253, 256 (Ct. App. 1998).

Here, Dunson provided substantial evidence his injury arose
out of his employment.  Dunson fractured his kneecap because he fell to the
ground while walking from his company truck across the company parking lot to
an area where hand trucks were kept.  He provided direct and circumstantial
evidence he injured his knee while tripping over the rubber patches in the
truck parking lot.  Although Dunson initially did not know why he fell, he
subsequently discovered two rubber pothole patches on the ground in his path to
the hand trucks and believed he tripped over those patches.  Moreover, he told a
responding insurance adjuster that his knee did not give way, and medical
testimony established the character of Dunson's injury did not suggest the fall
resulted from a pre-existing breakdown of the knee.  Consequently,
Dunson provided substantial evidence the injury was neither idiopathic nor
caused by a pre-existing weakness in his knee, and therefore, the Appellate
Panel's decision was not speculative.  Accordingly, the Appellate Panel
properly awarded Dunson total temporary disability benefits.

AFFIRMED.

HUFF and
LOCKEMY, JJ., and GOOLSBY, A.J., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.