Paul v. SCDOT

THIS OPINION HAS NO
PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY
PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Ronald I. Paul, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina
Department of Transportation; Paul D. de Holczer, Individually and as a
Partner of the Law Firm of Moses Koon & Brackett, PC; G.L. Buckles, as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Keith J. Buckles and G.L. Buckles;
Michael H. Quinn, Individually and as Senior Lawyer of Quinn Law Firm, LLC;
J. Charles Ormond, Jr., Individually, and as a partner of the Law Firm of
Holler, Dennis, Corbett, Ormond, Plante & Garner, Respondents.

Appeal From Richland County

Joseph M. Strickland, Special Circuit
Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-504

Submitted November 1, 2010 – Filed
November 19, 2010   

AFFIRMED

Ronald I. Paul, pro se, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

B. Michael Brackett, J. Charles Ormond,
Jr., Mark Weston Hardee, Michael H. Quinn, Sr., and Natalie J. Moore, all of
Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Ronald I. Paul appeals the order of the
circuit court granting the Respondents' motion to dismiss arguing the circuit
court erred in (1) finding the statute of limitations barred his cause of
action for civil conspiracy; (2) finding his complaint failed to state a cause
of action for civil conspiracy; (3) finding he was attempting to litigate
claims previously litigated in a previous suit between the same parties; (4)
failing to consider his motion to strike; and (5) not considering his motion
for summary judgment.  We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:   

1. As to whether the circuit
court erred in determining the statute of limitations barred Paul's claim for
civil conspiracy: S.C. Code Ann. § 15-3-530 (5) (2005) (providing the statute
of limitations for an action sounding in tort is three years); Gibson v.
Bank of Am. N.A., 383 S.C. 399, 406, 680 S.E.2d 778, 782 (Ct.
App. 2009) ("The standard as to when the limitations period begins to run
is objective rather than subjective. Therefore, the limitations period 'begins
to run when a person could or should
have known, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, that
a cause of action might exist in his or her favor, rather than when a person
obtains actual knowledge of either the potential claim or of the facts giving
rise thereto.'" (emphasis omitted)).

2. As to the remaining
issues: Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR ("The Court of Appeals need not address a
point which is manifestly without merit.").

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., HUFF, J., and
CURETON, A.J., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.