SCDSS v. Carrie P.

CourtListener 10153637Scctapp14 sept. 2010

Texte intégral

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina
Department of Social Services, Respondent,

v.

Carrie P.,
Scott P., and David P., Defendants,

Of whom Carrie
P. is the Appellant.

In the interest of three minor children under the age of 18.

Appeal From Oconee County

Timothy M. Cain, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.   2010-UP-400

Submitted September 1, 2010 - Filed
September 14, 2010

AFFIRMED

Kirby Rakes Mitchell, of Greenville, for
Appellant.

Kimberly Renae Welchel, of Walhalla, for
Respondent.

John Frederic Prescott, Jr., of Walhalla,
for Guardian ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: Carrie P. (Mother) appeals from the
family court's order terminating her parental rights to her minor children
(Children).  Mother argues the family court erred in terminating her parental rights pursuant to sections
63-7-2570(2) (failure to remedy the conditions that caused removal) and (8) (in
foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months) of the South
Carolina Code (2010).  Mother also appeals the family court's finding termination of parental rights
(TPR) was in Children's best interests.  Additionally, Mother argues the family
court erred in terminating her parental rights because the guardian ad litem (the
Guardian) did not conduct an independent assessment.   We disagree. 

1. We affirm the
family court's finding Children resided in foster care, under the
responsibility of the state, for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-2570 (2010)
(stating the family court may order TPR upon finding one or more of the eleven
statutory grounds is satisfied and also finding TPR is in the best interest of
the child); § 63-7-2570(8) (explaining one statutory ground for TPR is met when
"[t]he child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the State
for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months"); Charleston County
Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Jackson, 368 S.C. 87, 101-02, 627 S.E.2d 765, 773
(Ct. App. 2006) (noting the purpose of this statutory ground "is to ensure
that children do not languish in foster care when termination of parental
rights would be in their best interests").

2. We affirm the family
court's finding Mother did not remedy the condition causing removal.  See § 63-7-2570(2) (stating one statutory ground for TPR is met when the child has
been removed and "has been out of the home for a period of six months . .
. and the parent has not remedied the conditions which caused the removal."); Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Phillips, 365 S.C. 572, 579, 618 S.E.2d 922,
925 (Ct. App. 2005) ("[T]he statute allows for termination of
parental rights where the parent has not remedied the conditions causing
removal. This does not suggest that an attempt to remedy alone is adequate to
preserve parental rights. Otherwise, the statute would be couched in such terms.
The attempt must have, in fact, remedied the conditions."). 

3. Despite Mother's
arguments to the contrary, we find the Department of Social Services (DSS)
proved by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental
rights was in the best interests of Children.  See S.C.
Code Ann. § 63-7-2620 (2010) (explaining when the child's interests and the
parental rights conflict, the child's interests shall prevail); Charleston
County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. King, 369 S.C. 96, 105, 631 S.E.2d 239, 244
(2006) ("When reviewing the family court decision, appellate courts may
make their own conclusions of whether DSS proved by clear and convincing
evidence that parental rights should be terminated."); Jackson, 368
S.C. at 95, 627 S.E.2d at 770 (stating despite the appellate court's broad
scope of review, it should not necessarily disregard the findings of the family
court, which was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses and to assign weight to their testimony); Id. ("In a TPR
case, the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration.").

4. We also find
clear and convincing evidence the Guardian represented Children's best
interest.  See S.C. Code Ann. §
63-11-510 (2010) (stating the responsibilities and duties of a guardian include (1)
representing a child's best interest; (2) advocating for
the welfare and rights of a child in an abuse or neglect proceeding; (3)
conducting an independent assessment of the facts, the needs of the child, and
the available resources within the family and community to meet those needs; (4)
maintaining a case record; (5)
providing the family court with a written report; (6)
monitoring compliance with family court orders and make motions to enforce the
orders if necessary; and (7)
protecting and promoting the best interests of the child); S.C. Code Ann. §
63-11-530 (2010) (explaining a guardian is authorized to conduct an independent
assessment of the facts, visit and observe a child, interview those involved in
the case, and make recommendations to the family court concerning a child's
welfare). 

AFFIRMED.[1]

FEW, C.J., WILLIAMS and
KONDUROS, JJ., concur. 

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.

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