State v. Kearse

THIS OPINION
HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN
ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Cedric Kearse, Appellant.

Appeal From Orangeburg County

Kristi Lea Harrington, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No.  2010-UP-329

Submitted June 1, 2010 – Filed June 28,
2010

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Lanelle Cantey Durant, of Columbia, for
Appellant.

Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney
General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott,
and Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., all of Columbia; Solicitor
David M. Pascoe, Jr., of Summerville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Cedric Kearse appeals his conviction for
trafficking in cocaine–second offense, possession with the intent to distribute
crack cocaine–second offense, and failure to stop for a blue light.  He argues
the plea court erred in: (1) denying his motion to relieve counsel; and (2)
accepting his guilty plea because it was not knowingly and voluntarily entered
into.  We affirm.[1]          

1. 
As to whether the plea court erred in denying Kearse's motion to relieve
counsel:  The plea court conducted a sufficient inquiry into the basis of
Kearse's complaints against plea counsel.  Although Kearse believed he did not
have adequate time to speak with plea counsel and felt pressed to proceed to trial,
none of his objections prevented him from communicating with his attorney or
precluded plea counsel from adequately defending him.  The plea court also
inquired regarding plea counsel's preparations for trial, and determined plea
counsel was prepared to go forward with the case.  Accordingly, the plea court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Kearse's motion to relieve counsel.  See State v. Childers, 373 S.C. 367, 372, 645 S.E.2d 233, 235 (2007) ("A
motion to relieve counsel is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge and
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion."); State v. Sims,
304 S.C. 409, 414, 405 S.E.2d 377, 380 (1991) (holding an appellate court may
consider several factors in determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion in a motion for substitution of counsel: timeliness of the motion,
adequacy of the trial judge's inquiry into the defendant's complaint, and
whether the attorney-client conflict was so great that it resulted in a total
lack of communication, thereby preventing an adequate defense).     

2. 
As to whether the plea court erred in accepting his guilty plea because it was
not knowingly and voluntarily entered into:  This issue is not preserved for
our review because Kearse failed to object during the guilty plea.  See State
v. McKinney, 278 S.C. 107, 108, 292 S.E.2d 598, 599 (1982) (holding the
voluntariness of a guilty plea must be raised by objection to the trial court
in order to be preserved for appeal).

AFFIRMED.

FEW, C.J., THOMAS, and PIEPER, JJ., concur.

[1]  We decide this case without oral argument
pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.