Goins v. State

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Edmund Goins, Respondent,

v.

State of South Carolina, Petitioner.

Appeal From Cherokee County

 Doyet A. Early, III, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-339

Submitted May 3, 2010 – Filed June 29,
2010  

REVERSED

Attorney General Henry D. McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General
John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant
Attorney General Molly R. Crum, all of Columbia, for Petitioner.

Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM: 
This post-conviction relief (PCR) matter arises out of Respondent Edmund Goins'
conviction for assault and battery with intent to kill (ABWIK) and two convictions
of assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN), based on three
indictments for ABWIK.  This court granted the State's petition for certiorari
to address whether the PCR court erred in granting relief.  We reverse.[1] 

The State argues there is no probative evidence to support the
finding that trial counsel was ineffective based on the combination of
counsel's failure to present evidence regarding Goins' mental disorder and
limited contact with Goins before trial.  Without deciding the ultimate reach
of the cumulative error doctrine in the PCR context, we find it appropriate to
resolve this case on the lack of prejudice.  See Porter v. McCollum,
130 S.Ct. 447, 455-56 (2009) ("We do not require a defendant to show that
counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome of [the
trial], but rather that he establish a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in that outcome.") (internal quotations omitted); Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984) ("[A] court need not determine
whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. . . .  If it
is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of
sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed."); Lorenzen
v. State, 376 S.C. 521, 535, 657 S.E.2d 771, 779 (2008) (holding that where
none of the errors alleged are meritorious, the PCR court erred in finding the
cumulative effect of the alleged errors established a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel).

At the PCR hearing, Goins asserted that he was bipolar and that
trial counsel should have investigated Goins' diagnosis and requested a
competency evaluation.  While Goins also testified at his criminal trial that
he was bipolar and manic depressive, we note Goins did not put forth any
evidence that he was either insane at the time of the assaults or incompetent
at the time of trial.  See Jeter v. State, 308 S.C. 230, 233, 417
S.E.2d 594, 596 (1992) (affirming the denial of PCR where the petitioner failed
to present live medical testimony at the PCR hearing to show "a reasonable
probability that he was either insane at the time of the [incident] or
incompetent at the time of [trial].") (internal quotation omitted); Daniel
v. State, 282 S.C. 155, 158-59, 317 S.E.2d 746, 748 (1984) (reversing the
grant of relief where there is no evidence showing that the failure of counsel
to investigate the defendant's mental condition was prejudicial). 

Moreover, as to the relief granted on the ABWIK conviction, we
find that the PCR court erred as a matter of law in determining that Goins was
prejudiced by the failure to introduce the evidence at issue.  The PCR judge
based his analysis upon the fact that a jury could interpret the applicant's
conduct as impulsive and dangerous, but not with malice aforethought; thus, the
court opined the jury could return a verdict of ABHAN, as opposed to the
greater offense of ABWIK.  This partial responsibility analysis is tantamount
to a recognition of the defense of diminished capacity, which we do not
recognize in this state.  See Gill v. State, 346 S.C. 209, 220,
552 S.E.2d 26, 32 (2001) (upholding the trial court's refusal to charge
diminished capacity where Gill argued his borderline intellectual capacity
affected his ability to achieve the requisite mens rea for the crime
charged because South Carolina does not recognize the diminished capacity
defense); State v. Santiago, 370 S.C. 153, 162, 634 S.E.2d 23, 28 (Ct.
App. 2006) (finding the trial judge properly excluded testimony that Santiago's
Asperger's disorder caused him to fear for his life because South Carolina does
not recognize the diminished capacity defense).  Thus, while acknowledging
Goins testified at his criminal trial about his bipolar mental condition and
his manic depression, we find Goins failed to establish a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.  See Porter,
130 S.Ct. at 455-56.

As to
the two ABHAN convictions, the PCR court erred in granting relief on Goins' two
convictions for the lesser included offenses of ABHAN based on cumulative error,
as there is no probative evidence of prejudice in the record to support those
findings.  See Hutto v. State, 387 S.C. 244, 244, 692 S.E.2d 196,
197 (2010) (stating a PCR court's ruling should be upheld on appeal only if it
is supported by any evidence of probative value in the record); Lorenzen,
376 S.C. at 535, 657 S.E.2d at 779. 

Based
on the foregoing, the grant of post-conviction relief is

REVERSED.

FEW, C.J., THOMAS, and PIEPER, JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this
case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.