Keith Edward Smith v. James R. Metts

THIS
OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE.  IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Court of Appeals

Keith Edward
Smith, Appellant,

v.

James R. Metts,
"Sheriff" Lexington County, Respondent.

Appeal From Lexington County

Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2010-UP-111

Submitted February 1, 2010 – Filed
February 8, 2010   

AFFIRMED

Keith Edward Smith, pro se, for Appellant.

Andrew F. Lindemann and Daniel C. Plyler, both of Columbia, for
Respondent.

PER CURIAM:  Keith Smith appeals the
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Sheriff James R. Metts. 
Smith seeks to recover various items of property seized during the Lexington
County Sheriff Department's (the Department) investigation concerning Smith's
criminal activity. We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities.

1. As to whether the plea court lacked jurisdiction to accept and sign
Smith's forfeiture consent order during Smith's guilty plea hearing:  S.C. Code
Ann. § 44-53-530(d) (Supp. 2008) ("Any forfeiture may be effected by
consent order approved by the court without filing or serving pleadings or
notices provided that all owners and other persons with interests in the
property . . . consent to the forfeiture."); Shelton v. Oscar Mayer
Foods Corp., 325 S.C. 248, 251, 481 S.E.2d 706, 707 (1997) ("Collateral
estoppel or issue preclusion prevents a party from relitigating in a subsequent
suit an issue actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior
action.").

2. As to whether Smith was
denied due process during the summary judgment hearing before the trial court: S.C.
Code Ann. § 44-53-530(d) (Supp. 2008) ("Any forfeiture may be effected by
consent order approved by the court without filing or serving pleadings or
notices provided that all owners and other persons with interests in the
property . . . consent to the forfeiture."); State v. Loftin, 278
S.C. 618, 620, 300 S.E.2d 480, 481 (1983) (holding the objection to the judge's
prejudice came too late when raised after the matter was decided); Chastain
v. Hiltabidle, 381 S.C. 508, 517, 673 S.E.2d 826, 831 (Ct. App. 2009)
("To demonstrate prejudice in a matter involving allegedly insufficient
notice, an appellant must establish if he or she had received appropriate
notice, he or she would have done something different, thereby affecting the
decision of the trial court and advancing his or her case."); Butler v.
Sea Pines Plantation Co., 282 S.C. 113, 122-23, 317 S.E.2d 464,
470 (Ct. App. 1984) ("Generally, where bias and prejudice of a trial
judge is claimed, the issue must be
raised when the facts first become known and, in any event, before the matter
is submitted for decision.").

3. As to whether the trial
court erred in granting Metts's motion for summary judgment: Folkens v. Hunt,
290 S.C. 194, 205, 348 S.E.2d 839, 846 (Ct. App. 1986) ("An
alternative ruling of a lower court that is not excepted to constitutes a basis
for affirming the lower court and is not reviewable on appeal.").  

AFFIRMED.

HUFF, THOMAS, and KONDUROS,
JJ., concur.

[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to
Rule 215, SCACR.