Lonnie Hamilton, III v. 301 Auto Parts, LLC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Lonnie Hamilton, III, and Zoe'Lia L. Culbreath,
Appellants,

v.

301 Auto Parts, LLC, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000805

Appeal From Charleston County
Frank R. Addy, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-234
Heard June 4, 2024 – Filed July 3, 2024

AFFIRMED

Thomas S. Tisdale, Jr., of Law Offices of Thomas S.
Tisdale, LLC, of Charleston, for Appellants.

Peter Gunnar Nistad, of The Seibels Law Firm, of
Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Lonnie Hamilton, III, and Zoe'Lia L. Culbreath (collectively,
Appellants) filed a complaint against 301 Auto Parts, LLC, (301 Auto Parts) for (1)
negligence, (2) gross negligence, (3) breach of warranty, and (4) violations of the
South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (SCUTPA). 1 Appellants allege the
second engine they purchased from 301 Auto Parts caused their Kia to catch fire.
Appellants appeal the circuit court's order granting 301 Auto Parts' motion for
summary judgment. We affirm.

1. Appellants argue the circuit court erred by finding they required expert
testimony to support their claims. We disagree. "The general rule in South
Carolina is that where a subject is beyond the common knowledge of the jury,
expert testimony is required." Babb v. Lee Cnty. Landfill SC, LLC, 405 S.C. 129,
153, 747 S.E.2d 468, 481 (2013). "Conversely, where a lay person can
comprehend and determine an issue without the assistance of an expert, expert
testimony is not required." Id. "Deciding what is within the knowledge of a lay
jury and what requires expert testimony depends on the particular facts of the case,
including the complexity and technical nature of the evidence to be presented and
the trial judge's understanding of a lay person's knowledge." Id. at 154, 747 S.E.2d
at 481. "Ultimately, due to the fact-specific nature of the determination, it is a
question that must be left within the discretion of the trial judge." Id. This case
deals with the cause of a fire in an engine compartment. Due to the complexity of
the evidence presented, including recalls related to specific Kia engine parts, an
expert was needed to demonstrate the engine sold by 301 Auto Parts was defective
or caused the fire.

2. Appellants argue they provided sufficient evidence to sustain causes of action
for (1) negligence and gross negligence, (2) SCUTPA, and (3) breach of warranty.
We disagree. "The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of clearly
establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Bennett v. Inv'rs Title
Ins. Co., 370 S.C. 578, 588, 635 S.E.2d 649, 654 (Ct. App. 2006). "The moving
party may discharge the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact by pointing out the absence of evidence to support the nonmoving
party's case." Id. "Once the party moving for summary judgment meets the initial
burden of showing an absence of evidentiary support for the opponent's case, the
opponent cannot simply rest on mere allegations or denials contained in the
pleadings. Id. at 589, 635 S.E.2d at 654. "The nonmoving party must come
forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. Here,
each cause of action required proof of causation. See McKnight v. S.C. Dep't of
Corr., 385 S.C. 380, 386, 684 S.E.2d 566, 569 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Negligence is not
actionable unless it is a proximate cause of the injuries, and it may be deemed a

1
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10 to -180 (1985 & Supp. 2023).
proximate cause only when without such negligence the injury would not have
occurred or could have been avoided." (quoting Hanselmann v. McCardle, 275
S.C. 46, 48-49, 267 S.E.2d 531, 533 (1980))); Brunson v. La.-Pac. Corp., 266
F.R.D. 112, 119 (D.S.C. 2010) ("To recover for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability, a plaintiff must prove (1) a merchant sold goods; (2) the goods
were not 'merchantable' at the time of sale; (3) the plaintiff or his property were
injured by such goods; (4) the defect or other condition amounting to a breach of
the implied warranty of merchantability proximately caused the injury; and (5) the
plaintiff so injured gave timely notice to the seller."); Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1,
23, 640 S.E.2d 486, 498 (Ct. App. 2006) ("To recover in an action under the
[SC]UTPA, the plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant engaged in an unfair or
deceptive act in the conduct of trade or commerce; (2) the unfair or deceptive act
affected public interest; and (3) the plaintiff suffered monetary or property loss as a
result of the defendant's unfair or deceptive act(s)."). In opposing summary
judgment Appellants relied upon the following facts: (1) the first engine sold by
301 Auto Parts caught fire in the same manner as the second engine,2 (2) 301 Auto
Part's owner testified that 301 Auto Parts only ran engines to see if they cranked
prior to selling the engines, and (3) Kia recalls. However, Appellants provided no
direct or circumstantial evidence that the second engine 301 Auto Parts sold to
them caused the fire in their Kia. Accordingly, we hold Appellants failed to come
forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.

AFFIRMED.

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and VERDIN, JJ., concur.

2
Appellants misstate this fact. During a deposition, Lonnie Hamilton testified that
the first engine "had white smoke coming out of its tail pipe." Kareem Moultrie,
who installed the first and second engines, contacted 301 Auto Parts about the
problem and it advised him to run certain tests on the engine. The next day,
Kareem told Hamilton that "the engine blew" and was no longer functional.