State v. Medlin

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Randall Wade Medlin, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2022-001116

Appeal From Laurens County
Frank R. Addy, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-134
Submitted March 1, 2024 – Filed May 1, 2024

AFFIRMED

Elizabeth Anne Franklin-Best, of Elizabeth
Franklin-Best, P.C., of Columbia; and Susan Ranee
Saunders, of Motley Rice, LLC, of Mount Pleasant, both
for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing,
both of Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo,
of Greenwood, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Randall Wade Medlin appeals his conviction for third-degree
criminal sexual conduct with a minor (CSCM) and sentence of fifteen years'
imprisonment suspended upon the service of six years' imprisonment and four
years' probation. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred by (1) denying his
motion to sever the charges against him; (2) delivering an unconstitutionally
coercive Allen 1 charge to the jury; and (3) denying his motion for a directed
verdict. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

1. We hold the trial court properly denied Medlin's motion to sever the charges
against him because the charges arose out of the same chain of circumstances,
were proved by the same evidence, were of the same general nature, and Medlin
was not prejudiced by joinder of the charges. See State v. Halcomb, 382 S.C. 432,
438, 676 S.E.2d 149, 152 (Ct. App. 2009) ("In criminal cases, the appellate court
sits to review errors of law only."); State v. Tucker, 324 S.C. 155, 164, 478 S.E.2d
260, 265 (1996) ("A motion for severance is addressed to the trial court and should
not be disturbed unless an abuse of discretion is shown."); id. ("Charges can be
joined in the same indictment and tried together where they (1) arise out of a single
chain of circumstances, (2) are proved by the same evidence, (3) are of the same
general nature, and (4) no real right of the defendant has been prejudiced."); S.C.
Code Ann. § 16-3-655(C) (2015) (stating a person is guilty of third-degree CSCM
if "the actor is over fourteen years of age and the actor willfully and lewdly
commits or attempts to commit a lewd or lascivious act upon or with the body, or
its parts, of a child under sixteen years of age, with the intent of arousing,
appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of [themselves] or
[a] child").

2. We hold the trial court's Allen charge was not unconstitutionally coercive
because the trial court addressed both minority and majority jurors, directed the
jury to not reveal its numerical division during the initial jury charge, instructed the
jurors to not give up their "firmly held beliefs merely to be in agreement" with the
other jurors, and explained it could declare a mistrial if the jury could not agree on
a verdict. Further, although the record on appeal does not indicate how much time
passed between the Allen charge and the jury's verdict, the verdict was likely
delivered no more than five hours after the charge. See Workman v. State, 412
S.C. 128, 130, 771 S.E.2d 636, 638 (2015) ("Whether an Allen charge is
unconstitutionally coercive must be judged in its 'context and under all the
circumstances.'" (quoting Tucker v. Catoe, 346 S.C. 483, 490-91, 552 S.E.2d 712,
716 (2001))); Tucker, 346 S.C. at 490-95, 552 S.E.2d at 716-18 (explaining the

1
Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
factors a court uses to analyze whether an Allen charge is coercive are (1) whether
the charge spoke specifically to minority jurors; (2) whether the trial court included
in his charge any language such as "You have got to reach a decision in this case";
(3) whether there was an inquiry into the jury's numerical division; and (4) the
timing of the returned verdict after the Allen charge).

3. We hold the trial court did not err in denying Medlin's motion for a directed
verdict because, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, direct and
substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tended to prove Medlin's guilt. See
State v. Butler, 407 S.C. 376, 381, 755 S.E.2d 457, 460 (2014) ("On appeal from
the denial of a directed verdict, [an appellate court] views the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State."); State v. Rogers,
405 S.C. 554, 563, 748 S.E.2d 265, 270 (Ct. App. 2013) ("If there is any direct
evidence, or if there is substantial circumstantial evidence, that reasonably tends to
prove the defendant's guilt, we must find the trial court properly submitted the case
to the jury.").

AFFIRMED. 2

WILLIAMS, C.J., KONDUROS, J., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.