State v. Sanders

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

William Cornelius Sanders, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2021-001536

Appeal From Colleton County
Robert J. Bonds, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-141
Submitted March 1, 2024 – Filed May 1, 2024

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia for
Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, and Assistant
Attorney General Ambree Michele Muller, both of
Columbia; and Solicitor Isaac McDuffie Stone, III, of
Bluffton, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: William Cornelius Sanders appeals his convictions for attempted
murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and
his aggregate sentence of twenty-one and a half years' imprisonment. On appeal,
Sanders argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an incident that
occurred ten days before the shooting between him and the victim because it did
not meet the motive or intent exceptions of Rule 404(b) of the South Carolina
Rules of Evidence, was not admissible as part of the res gestae, and its probative
value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, pursuant to
Rule 403, South Carolina Rules of Evidence.

We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the
prior incident. See State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001). ("If
there is any evidence to support the admission of the bad act evidence, the trial
[court's] ruling will not be disturbed on appeal."). We hold there was probative
evidence to support the court's finding that the testimony was admissible under
Rule 404(b), to show Sanders's motive and intent for the attempted murder. See
Rule 404(b), SCRE ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.");
id. ("It may, however, be admissible to show motive, identity, the existence of a
common scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or intent."); State v.
Fletcher, 379 S.C. 17, 23, 664 S.E.2d 480, 483 (2008) ("To be admissible, the bad
act must logically relate to the crime with which the defendant has been charged.").
Additionally, we hold the testimony was admissible as part of the res gestae
because it was integral to the crime and an understanding of the context in which
the crime occurred. See State v. King, 334 S.C. 504, 512, 514 S.E.2d 578, 582
(1999) ("The res gestae theory recognizes evidence of other bad acts may be an
integral part of the crime with which the defendant is charged, or may be needed to
aid the fact finder in understanding the context in which the crime occurred.");
State v. Dennis, 402 S.C. 627, 635-36, 742 S.E.2d 21, 26 (Ct. App. 2013) ("One of
the accepted bases for the admissibility of evidence of other crimes arises when
such evidence furnishes part of the context of the crime or is necessary to a full
presentation of the case. . . . And where evidence is admissible to provide this full
presentation of the offense, (t)here is no reason to fragmentize the event under
inquiry by suppressing parts of the res gestae." (alteration in original) (quoting
United States v. Masters, 622 F.2d 83, 86 (4th Cir. 1980))). Finally, we hold the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the probative value of the
evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice when
the testimony of the prior incident provided the jury with highly probative context
for the shooting, and the trial court took steps to minimize prejudice, such as
excluding the charge and the no-contact order that resulted from the prior incident.
See Rule 403, SCRE ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
. . . ."); Wilson, 345 S.C. at 7, 545 S.E.2d at 830 ("Evidence is unfairly prejudicial
if it has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis, such as an
emotional one.").

AFFIRMED. 1

WILLIAMS, C.J., KONDUROS, J., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.