SCDSS v. Brooks

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,

v.

Diane Brooks and Ray Warren, Defendants,

and

Ashley Nicole Rayl Bright and James Monroe Bright, III,
Respondents,

v.

Paula Diane Brooks, Ray Warren, and South Carolina
Department of Social Services, Defendants,

Of whom Paula Diane Brooks is the Appellant.

In the interest of minors under the age of eighteen.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000872

Appeal From Greenville County
Rochelle Y. Conits, Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-188
Submitted May 20, 2024 – Filed May 20, 2024
AFFIRMED

Melinda Inman Butler, of The Butler Law Firm, of
Union, for Appellant.

James Fletcher Thompson, of Thompson Dove Law
Group LLC, of Spartanburg, for Respondents Ashley
Nicole Rayl Bright and James Monroe Bright, III.

Rebecca Rush Wray, of South Carolina Department of
Social Services, of Greenville, for Respondent South
Carolina Department of Social Services.

Don J. Stevenson, of Don J. Stevenson, Attorney at Law,
of Greenville, for the Guardians ad Litem.

PER CURIAM: Paula Diane Brooks (Mother) appeals an order of the family
court terminating her parental rights to her two minor children (collectively,
Children). On appeal, Mother argues the family court erred in (1) removing Ray
Warren (Father) from the courtroom after a motion to sequester witnesses; (2)
finding clear and convincing evidence showed that Mother willfully failed to
support Children; and (3) finding that termination of parental rights (TPR) was in
Children's best interests. We affirm.

1. We hold the issue of Father's removal from the courtroom is not preserved for
this court's review. It appears the ruling was made off the record during a pretrial
conference, and the record does not contain any objection from Mother regarding
the motion to sequester. See State v. Johnson, 363 S.C. 53, 58, 609 S.E.2d 520,
523 (2005) ("To preserve an issue for review there must be a contemporaneous
objection that is ruled upon by the [family] court."); York v. Conway Ford, Inc.,
325 S.C. 170, 173, 480 S.E.2d 726, 728 (1997) ("An objection made during an
off-the-record conference which is not made part of the record does not preserve
the question for review.").

2. We hold clear and convincing evidence supported termination of Mother's
parental rights on the grounds that (1) Mother failed to remedy the conditions that
caused Children's removal and (2) because of the severity and repetition of abuse,
her home could not be made safe within twelve months.1 See Simmons v.
Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011) ("In appeals from the
family court, this [c]ourt reviews factual and legal issues de novo."); S.C. Code
Ann. § 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2023) (stating the family court may order TPR upon
finding a statutory ground for TPR is met and TPR is in the child's best interest);
S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Parker, 336 S.C. 248, 254, 519 S.E.2d 351, 354 (Ct.
App. 1999) (noting the grounds for TPR must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence).

As to Mother's failure to remedy the conditions that caused Children's removal, we
note that the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) initially
obtained an ex parte order placing Children into emergency protective custody
based on, among other things, concerns about Mother's capacity to parent and the
conditions in the home, including a strong smell of cigarette smoke. Mother's
treatment plan specifically required her to provide a home environment free of
first-, second-, and thirdhand cigarette smoke, and Children's primary physician
and pulmonologist both testified smoke exposure was potentially life-threatening
for Children. Nonetheless, Mother and Grandmother—Mother's primary helper
who also lived in the home—steadfastly refused to quit smoking. Both the DSS
caseworker and the guardian ad litem (GAL) testified the home smelled strongly of
cigarette smoke, and Mother's own pictures of the home showed ashtrays and
lighters in the home, even after the start of the TPR hearing. We agree with the
family court's finding that Mother's assertion that the family would shower and
change clothes after smoking—up to forty times per day—was not credible.
Additionally, although Mother completed parenting classes, she told the doctor
conducting her psychological evaluation that the classes were "stupid," and the
DSS caseworker and the GAL testified Mother had not made any behavioral
changes. See § 63-7-2570(2) (stating the family court may order TPR if a child
"has been out of the [parent's] home for a period of six months following the
adoption of a placement plan . . . and the parent has not remedied the conditions
which caused the removal"); Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Pritchett, 296 S.C. 517, 520,
374 S.E.2d 500, 501 (Ct. App. 1988) ("[T]he statute allows for termination of

1
Although Mother listed only the ground of failure to support in her statement of
issues on appeal, her brief contained argument as to all four grounds found by the
family court. "Ordinarily, no point will be considered which is not set forth in the
statement of the issues on appeal." Rule 208(b)(1)(B), SCACR. However,
because "procedural rules are subservient to the court's duty to zealously guard the
rights of minors," we reviewed all four grounds found by the family court. Joiner
ex rel. Rivas v. Rivas, 342 S.C. 102, 107, 536 S.E.2d 372, 374 (2000).
parental rights where the parent has not remedied the conditions causing
removal."); id. (explaining an attempt to remedy alone is insufficient to preserve
parental rights; rather, "[t]he attempt must have, in fact, remedied the conditions").

As to the family court's finding that due to the severity and repetition of abuse and
neglect, Mother's home could not be made safe within twelve months, we note that
Children had been diagnosed with chronic lung disease, and, as discussed above,
Mother and Grandmother—her primary helper—continued to smoke cigarettes
despite knowing the danger for Children. Additionally, Children were medically
fragile with myriad other diagnoses that required frequent, ongoing specialized
care. Mother did not attend any of Children's doctor's appointments or surgeries,
and she has a history of medical neglect of her older children. See § 63-7-2570(1)
(explaining a statutory ground for TPR is met when a child was harmed while
residing in the parent's home "and because of the severity or repetition of the abuse
or neglect, it is not reasonably likely that the home can be made safe within twelve
months"); id. ("In determining the likelihood that the home can be made safe, the
parent's previous abuse or neglect of the child or another child may be
considered."). Accordingly, we affirm the family court's findings as to these
statutory grounds for TPR.2

3. We hold termination of Mother's parental rights was in Children's best
interests.3 See § 63-7-2570 (Supp. 2023) (stating the family court may order TPR
upon finding a statutory ground for TPR is met and TPR is in the child's best
interest). The DSS caseworker and the GAL agreed Mother's home remained unfit
and dangerous for Children to live in and Mother was unable to demonstrate

2
Because we find the family court properly granted TPR on two grounds, we
decline to address the remaining grounds. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v.
Headden, 354 S.C. 602, 613, 582 S.E.2d 419, 425 (2003) (declining to address a
statutory ground for TPR after concluding clear and convincing evidence
supported another statutory ground).
3
Although Mother included the question of Children's best interests in her issue
statement, she did not address it in the body of her brief. Ordinarily, this would
constitute abandonment of the issue; however, pursuant to this court's broad scope
of review in matters involving the rights of children, we have nonetheless
considered it. See Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 21, 640 S.E.2d 486, 497 (Ct. App.
2006) (holding an issue listed in appellant's statement of issues on appeal but not
addressed in the brief was abandoned); Joiner ex rel. Rivas, 342 S.C. at 107, 536
S.E.2d at 374 ("[P]rocedural rules are subservient to the court's duty to zealously
guard the rights of minors.").
sufficient understanding of Children's medical issues and an ability to
appropriately care for them. Further, an attachment expert testified Children were
securely attached and bonded to the foster parents—who wished to adopt them—
and would suffer harm if separated from them. The GAL testified the foster
parents had gone "above and beyond" in their care for Children, and Children were
doing well in their home. See S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Smith, 343 S.C. 129, 133,
538 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Ct. App. 2000) ("In a [TPR] case, the best interests of the
children are the paramount consideration."); S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Sarah W.,
402 S.C. 324, 343, 741 S.E.2d 739, 749-50 (2013) ("Appellate courts must
consider the child's perspective, and not the parent's, as the primary concern when
determining whether TPR is appropriate."). Therefore, we affirm the family court's
finding that TPR was in Children's best interests.

AFFIRMED.4

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and VERDIN, JJ., concur.

4
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.