Christian Wienands v. South Wind Ranch

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Christian Wienands, Charlotte Muxlow, and Gregory
Muxlow, Appellants,

v.

South Wind Ranch, Ronald Hakala, and Ashley Black,
Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2023-000081

Appeal From Greenville County
J. Derham Cole, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-130
Submitted April 10, 2024 – Filed April 24, 2024

AFFIRMED

Helena LeeAnn Jedziniak and Joshua Thomas Hawkins,
both of Hawkins & Jedziniak, LLC, of Greenville, for
Appellants.

Kenneth Jay Anthony, of Anthony Law, LLC, of
Greenville, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Christian Wienands, Charlotte Muxlow (Charlotte), and Gregory
Muxlow (Gregory) (collectively, Appellants) appeal the circuit court's order
granting summary judgment to South Wind Ranch, Ronald Hakala—one of the
owners of South Wind Ranch—and Ashley Black (collectively, Respondents). On
appeal, Appellants argue the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment on
their four causes of action and the summary judgment ruling violated their right to
a jury trial under the South Carolina and United States Constitutions. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold the circuit court did not err by granting Respondents' motion for summary
judgment. See Lanham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of S.C., Inc., 349 S.C. 356,
361, 563 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2002) ("An appellate court reviews a grant of summary
judgment under the same standard applied by the [circuit] court pursuant to Rule
56, SCRCP."); Kitchen Planners, LLC v. Friedman, 440 S.C. 456, 463, 892 S.E.2d
297, 301 (2023) (clarifying the proper standard of decision under Rule 56(c),
SCRCP, "is the 'genuine issue of material fact' standard set forth in the text of the
Rule"); Osborne v. Adams, 346 S.C. 4, 7, 550 S.E.2d 319, 321 (2001) ("On appeal
from an order granting summary judgment, the appellate court will review all
ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising in and from the evidence in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party below."); Rule 56(e), SCRCP ("When a
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.").

In 2019, Wienands, as Gregory and Charlotte's representative,1 signed a contract
with South Wind Ranch, and Charlotte signed a contract with Ashley Black. The
contracts were made in contemplation of Gregory and Charlotte's upcoming
November 2020 wedding; the first contract pertained to the reservation of a venue
for the wedding, and the second contract pertained to the retention of Black's
services as a wedding planner. Deposits were paid by Appellants under both
contracts. Subsequently, the COVID-19 pandemic occurred, and Charlotte
informed Respondents that the November 2020 wedding would need to be
rescheduled. The parties communicated about reserving a 2021 date, with credit
given for monies already paid; ultimately, however, a new date was not chosen and
Appellants sought a refund of the deposits paid under the two contracts.
Respondents refused, and Appellants filed a lawsuit. In their complaint,
Appellants asserted claims for common law negligence and recklessness, a

1
Christan Wienands is Charlotte's father.
violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), 2 breach of
contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, and quantum meruit.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellants, Appellants have
failed to show there is a genuine issue of material fact. The South Wind Ranch
Contract provides, "All deposits are non-refundable (except Security Deposit) &
any balance due must be paid 30 days prior to the scheduled event or the event
may not be held." Similarly, the Ashley Black Contract provides, "If event is
canceled, no portion of the fees paid to Consultant will be returned." Appellants
do not contest the contracts were binding. Appellants allege actions or inactions
by Respondents related to rescheduling a new date in 2021, in part, give rise to
their claims; however, neither contract required Respondents to reschedule. We
find the contracts preclude each of Appellants' causes of action. Thus, summary
judgment was proper. See Butler v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., 433 S.C.
360, 366-67, 858 S.E.2d 407, 410 (2021) ("The cardinal rule of contract
interpretation is to ascertain and give legal effect to the parties' intentions as
determined by the contract language." (quoting Schulmeyer v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., 353 S.C. 491, 495, 579 S.E.2d 132, 134 (2003))); McGill v. Moore, 381
S.C. 179, 185, 672 S.E.2d 571, 574 (2009) ("Where the contract's language is clear
and unambiguous, the language alone determines the contract's force and effect.");
id. ("It is a question of law for the court whether the language of a contract is
ambiguous."); Burnett v. Fam. Kingdom, Inc., 387 S.C. 183, 189, 691 S.E.2d 170,
173 (Ct. App. 2010) ("In order to succeed in a negligence cause of action, the
plaintiff must establish (1) the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; (2)
the defendant breached the duty by a negligent act or omission; (3) the defendant's
breach was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury; and (4) the
plaintiff suffered an injury or damages."); Health Promotion Specialists, LLC v.
S.C. Bd. of Dentistry, 403 S.C. 623, 638, 743 S.E.2d 808, 816 (2013) ("To recover
in an action under the UTPA, the plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant engaged in
an unfair or deceptive act in the conduct of trade or commerce; (2) the unfair or
deceptive act affected [the] public interest; and (3) the plaintiff suffered monetary
or property loss as a result of the defendant's unfair or deceptive act(s)." (quoting
Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 23, 640 S.E.2d 486, 498 (Ct. App. 2006))); Hotel &
Motel Holdings, LLC v. BJC Enterprises, LLC, 414 S.C. 635, 654, 780 S.E.2d 263,
273-74 (Ct. App. 2015) ("In order to maintain a claim for breach of contract
accompanied by fraudulent act, a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) a breach
of contract; (2) fraudulent intent relating to the breaching of the contract, not
merely to its making; and (3) a fraudulent act accompanying the breach.");

2
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10 to -180 (1985 & Supp. 2023).
Williams Carpet Contractors, Inc. v. Skelly, 400 S.C. 320, 325, 734 S.E.2d 177,
180 (Ct. App. 2012) ("To prevail on a quantum meruit claim, a plaintiff must
establish (1) he conferred a benefit upon the defendant; (2) the defendant realized
that benefit; and (3) retention of the benefit by the defendant under the
circumstances make it inequitable for the defendant to retain it without paying its
value."). Based on this court's holding that summary judgment was proper,
Appellants' arguments regarding their entitlement to a jury trial are without merit. 3

AFFIRMED. 4

WILLIAMS, C.J., and THOMAS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.

3
To the extent Appellants argue the circuit court erred by not granting leave to
amend the complaint to add a breach of contract claim, this issue is not preserved
for appellate review because Appellants first raise this issue on appeal to this court.
See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998) ("It is
axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have
been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate
review."). The only argument presented to the circuit court related to amending the
complaint involved adding additional defendants, which was not argued to this
court on appeal.
4
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.