Stroud v. THI of South Carolina at Greenville

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Debbie Stroud, Guardian ad Litem for James C. Stroud,
Respondent,

v.

THI of South Carolina at Greenville, LLC d/b/a
Magnolia Manor-Greenville, THI of Baltimore, Inc., and
THI of South Carolina, LLC, Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2022-000398

Appeal From Greenville County
Alex Kinlaw, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-084
Submitted March 13, 2024 – Filed March 20, 2024

AFFIRMED

Stephen Lynwood Brown, Russell Grainger Hines,
Donald Jay Davis, Jr., Matthew Oliver Riddle, all of
Clement Rivers, LLP, of Charleston, for Appellants.

Charles Daniel Pruitt, of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: THI of South Carolina at Greenville, LLC d/b/a Magnolia
Manor-Greenville (the Facility), THI of Baltimore, Inc., and THI of South
Carolina, LLC, (collectively, Appellants), appeal the circuit court's order denying
the Facility's motion to stay the action and compel to arbitration the claims of
James C. Stroud (James). On appeal, Appellants argue the circuit court erred by
denying the Facility's motion to compel arbitration and in turn, the Appellants'
motions to stay.1 We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.

We hold the circuit court did not err by denying the Facility's motion to compel
arbitration because the power of attorney document expressly reserved the power
to waive a jury trial to James, thus restricting Debbie Stroud (Debbie) from
entering into arbitration agreements on James's behalf. Thus, the arbitration
agreement Debbie signed as power of attorney for James is not valid or
enforceable. See Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 596, 553 S.E.2d
110, 118 (2001) ("The question of the arbitrability of a claim is an issue for judicial
determination, unless the parties provide otherwise."); New Hope Missionary
Baptist Church v. Paragon Builders, 379 S.C. 620, 625, 667 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Ct. App.
2008) ("Appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is subject to de
novo review."); Stokes v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 351 S.C. 606, 609-10, 571 S.E.2d
711, 713 (Ct. App. 2002) ("However, the circuit court's factual findings will not be
overruled if there is any evidence reasonably supporting them."). Although the
power of attorney document contemplates granting Debbie the right to arbitrate in
various subsections of the document, Article VII is titled "Restriction on Powers"
and it provides, "Notwithstanding any provision herein to the contrary . . ." and
then lists six sections of prohibited actions, actions to avoid, and reserved rights.
See Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Grp., 508 U.S. 10, 18, 113 S. Ct. 1898, 1903, 123 L.
Ed. 2d 572 (1993) ("[T]he use of such a 'notwithstanding' clause clearly signals the
drafter's intention that the provisions of the 'notwithstanding' section override
conflicting provisions of any other section."). Specifically, Article VII, Section 6
provides: "Reservation of Right to Trial By Jury. I reserve unto myself and do not
grant unto my Attorney in Fact the power to waive my right to jury trial and enter
into Arbitration Agreements. I do not favor Arbitration, and for that reason I do
not grant unto my Attorney in Fact the power to enter Arbitration Agreements."
Based on the foregoing, Debbie did not have the authority under the powers
granted to her in the power of attorney document to bind James to arbitration. We
further hold the Facility did not provide any evidence outside of the power of

1
THI of Baltimore, Inc. and THI of South Carolina, LLC separately filed motions
to stay pending arbitration.
attorney in support of its argument that James provided Debbie with authority to
bind him to arbitration.2

Second, we hold the circuit court did not err by denying the Facility's request to
conduct limited discovery to address gaps in the evidentiary record bearing on the
Arbitration Agreement's enforceability under an agency theory. See Est. of
Solesbee by Bayne v. Fundamental Clinical & Operational Servs., LLC, 438 S.C.
638, 651, 885 S.E.2d 144, 150 (Ct. App. 2023), cert. pending (finding "the court
did not err in denying its request for further discovery when it would not have
changed the result.").

AFFIRMED.3

GEATHERS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

2
Based on the foregoing, we also hold the circuit court did not err by failing to
grant Appellants' motions to stay. Moreover, because we find the Arbitration
Agreement not valid or enforceable, we decline to reach the Facility's remaining
arguments. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598,
613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an appellate court need not address
remaining issues when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).
3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.