David Wilson v. Carolina Custom Converting, LLC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

David Wilson, individually and on behalf of Carolina
Custom Converting, LLC, Plaintiff,

v.

John Gandis, Andrea Comeau-Shirley, ZOi Films, LLC,
and Carolina Custom Converting, LLC, Defendants,

v.

Carolina Custom Converting, LLC, Counterclaim
Plaintiff,

v.

David Wilson, Steve Norvell, Neologic Distribution Inc.,
and Fresh Water Systems, Inc., Counterclaim
Defendants,

of which Carolina Custom Converting, LLC, John
Gandis, and Andrea Comeau-Shirley are the Appellants
and David Wilson is the Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2020-001587

Appeal From Greenville County
Charles B. Simmons, Jr., Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2024-UP-037
Heard December 5, 2023 – Filed January 31, 2024
AFFIRMED

D. Randle Moody, II and Laura Ashley Ahrens, both of
Jackson Lewis P.C., of Greenville, for Appellants John
Gandis and Andrea Comeau-Shirley.

Burl Franklin Williams, of Burl F. Williams, P.A., of
Greenville, for Appellant Carolina Custom Converting,
LLC.

W. Andrew Arnold, of Law Office of W. Andrew
Arnold, P.C., of Greenville, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: In this civil matter, John Gandis, Andrea Comeau-Shirley
(Shirley), and Carolina Custom Converting, LLC (CCC) (collectively, Appellants)
appeal the master-in-equity's order granting David Wilson post-judgment interest.
We affirm. 1

1
In their brief, Appellants first argue the master erred in granting Wilson
post-judgment interest on the Buyout Order because Appellants posted a
supersedeas bond, which they contend stayed the accrual of interest. Appellants
did not make this assertion until they filed a supplemental Rule 59(e), SCRCP,
motion, which was untimely. The master issued his order on May 4, 2021, and
Appellants timely filed a 59(e) motion on May 14, 2021. Thereafter, Appellants
filed a supplemental 59(e) motion, including the argument at issue, on
June 10, 2021, which was two days after the master held a hearing on the May 14
motion. Appellants did not make this argument at the hearing. Thus, Appellants
failed to safeguard this argument for appeal, and this court is foreclosed from
considering it further. See Rule 59(e), SCRCP ("A motion to alter or amend the
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after receipt of written notice of
the entry of the order." (emphasis added)); Stevens & Wilkinson of S.C., Inc. v. City
of Columbia, 409 S.C. 563, 567, 762 S.E.2d 693, 695 (2014) ("[A] party cannot
use a Rule 59(e) motion to advance an issue the party could have raised to the
circuit court prior to judgment, but did not."); Spreeuw v. Barker, 385 S.C. 45, 69,
682 S.E.2d 843, 855 (Ct. App. 2009) (determining that an appellant failed to
We hold the master did not err in awarding Wilson post-judgment interest on the
Buyout Order. See Mathis v. Brown & Brown of S.C., Inc., 389 S.C. 299, 307, 698
S.E.2d 773, 777 (2010) ("In an action at law tried without a jury, the [master's]
findings have the force and effect of a jury verdict upon the issues and are
conclusive on appeal when supported by competent evidence."); id. ("Accordingly,
this Court's scope of review is limited to determining whether the findings are
supported by competent evidence and correcting errors of law."). In his order
awarding Wilson post-judgment interest, the master found section 34-31-20(B) of
the South Carolina Code (2020) and Calhoun v. Calhoun, 339 S.C. 96, 529 S.E.2d
14 (2000), entitled Wilson to interest accruing on the Buyout Order in the amount
of $208,930.15. The master reached this determination by calculating the interest
rate from the issuance of the Buyout Order, January 9, 2015, to the date of
payment by CCC, November 2, 2020. Pursuant to the plain language of the
statute, Wilson is entitled to interest accruing from his money judgment. See
§ 34-31-20(B) ("A money decree or judgment of a court enrolled or entered must
draw interest according to law." (emphasis added)); see also Hunting v. Elders, 359
S.C. 217, 229, 597 S.E.2d 803, 809 (Ct. App. 2004) ("[A] claimant is entitled to
interest from the date of the rendition of the verdict, or post-judgment interest, as a
matter of course." (alteration in original) (quoting Calhoun, 339 S.C. at 102, 529
S.E.2d at 18 (emphases added))).

Although Appellants assert the supreme court created a new judgment by
modifying the Buyout Order and allegedly vacating any previously accrued
interest, they fail to put forth authority supporting such a proposition. To the
contrary, Calhoun clearly states "when a money judgment is finalized, whether in a
lower court or in an appellate court, the interest on that amount, whether it has
been modified upward or downward or remains the same, runs from the date of the
original judgment." 339 S.C. at 104, 529 S.E.2d at 19 (emphases added). Here,
the judgment amount remained the same, but the supreme court modified the
primary responsible party, naming CCC as the primary party responsible for the
buyout of Wilson's interest and naming Gandis and Shirley as contingent
responsible parties. Although this differs factually from Calhoun in that there was
a modification to the primary judgment debtor rather than the judgment amount,
we find Calhoun instructive in the instant case. See 339 S.C. at 104, 529 S.E.2d at
18–19 (holding appellant was entitled to post-judgment interest on the amount
modified by this court but accruing from the date of the original judgment of the

preserve an issue for appellate review when he did not raise the issue at trial and
raised it for the first time in post-trial motions).
family court). Further, the supreme court provided no directives indicating an
intention to "vacate" or "abrogate" the circuit court's holdings or any accrued
interest as alleged by Appellants. Therefore, these arguments lack merit. As to
Appellants' contention that the master improperly reversed pierced the corporate
veil, the master merely ruled in accordance with the supreme court's opinion and
applied its modification to the supplemental proceedings.

Alternatively, Appellants assert that should Wilson be entitled to post-judgment
interest, he is only entitled to interest from the issuance of the supreme court's
opinion on June 26, 2020, through the date of payment on November 2, 2020. This
argument is unpreserved for appellate review as this is the first time Appellants
make this assertion. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731,
733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be
preserved for appellate review."). In their Rule 59(e) motion and at the
corresponding hearing, Appellants argued that any accrual of post-judgment
interest on the Buyout Order should cease on the date of the issuance of the
remittitur on the supreme court's opinion–June 26, 2020; however, they never
made any contentions as to accrued interest on the supreme court's opinion.
Appellants instead relied on the assertion that no interest accrued because they
complied with the opinion and paid Wilson "within a reasonable time." These
arguments are not equivalent. Thus, this issue is not properly before this court.

Accordingly, the order of the master is

AFFIRMED.

WILLIAMS, C.J., and HEWITT and VERDIN, JJ., concur.