James Earl Tegeler v. Charlotte Collier

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

James Earl Tegeler, Appellant,

v.

Charlotte Collier, Hannah Elizabeth Collier, Linda Smith
and Northgate Baptist Church, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2020-001525

Appeal From Greenville County
Alex Kinlaw, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-325
Heard June 06, 2023 – Filed October 04, 2023

AFFIRMED

Deborah Dickson Davis, of Dickson Davis Law Firm,
LLC, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Daniel Roper Hughes, of Duggan & Hughes, LLC, of
Greer, for Respondents Hannah Elizabeth Collier and
Linda Smith.

Jeanmarie Tankersley, of Clawson & Staubes, LLC, of
Greenville, for Respondent Charlotte Collier.
Steven Michael Nail, of Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak &
Stewart, PC, and Charles Edgar McDonald, III, both of
Greenville, for Respondent Northgate Baptist Church.

PER CURIAM: James Earl Tegeler claims Northgate Baptist Church (Church)
improperly terminated his employment as music director due to the allegedly
defamatory reports of Hannah Collier (Daughter), Charlotte Collier (Mother), and
Linda Smith (Grandmother) (collectively, Respondents). He argues the circuit court
erred in (1) dismissing his claims and/or granting judgment to Respondents;
(2) denying him the opportunity to amend his complaint; and (3) denying his Rule
60(b), SCRCP motion. We affirm.

In June 2016, the Church hired Tegeler to oversee its music program, including the
Church worship team. In June 2017, Tegeler met Daughter at a Church member's
birthday party. Daughter turned eighteen in July and joined the worship team in
August. Thereafter, Tegeler, a widower in his fifties, entered into what he describes
as a "father figure," "big brother," or "mentor relationship" with Daughter.

On March 11, 2018, Tegeler hosted a birthday party for his son and invited Daughter
and her family. While at dinner, Daughter had her phone out at the table; this
irritated Tegeler, who thought it was rude. When he "attempted to redirect" her
behavior, Daughter became upset. This interaction, in addition to others, seemed
strange to Daughter's family.

The following day, Daughter and Mother reported to the Church's senior pastor, Dr.
Barry Jimmerson, that Tegeler had an inappropriate relationship with Daughter.
Although Daughter specifically told Dr. Jimmerson that the relationship was neither
sexual nor romantic, Tegeler claims Dr. Jimmerson misinterpreted Daughter's
allegations "as being sexual or romantic in nature."

During a Church staff meeting the day after Mother and Daughter met with Dr.
Jimmerson, Tegeler reported to the Church that his relationship with Daughter had
deteriorated, and he showed staff members a text message from Daughter that he
believed demonstrated their mentoring relationship. After hearing Tegeler's report
and reviewing the "mentoring" message, Dr. Jimmerson and Laurel Shaler, who
chaired the Church personnel committee, met with Tegeler to discuss his interactions
with Daughter. Tegeler claims he "shared a text message" from Daughter
"expressing daughterly affection and respect toward [Tegeler] as a mentor" and Dr.
Jimmerson told him he did not believe the text message or relationship "warranted
the allegations that [Tegeler] had inappropriate relations with [Daughter]."1

Tegeler further alleges that Shaler believed the text message was inappropriate and
that she initiated an "unauthorized investigation." During this inquiry, Shaler
discovered Tegeler had concerning communications with other young women at the
Church. Shaler was concerned by Daughter's text message and because Tegeler
"texted a young girl during a service" and "asked a young girl on vacation." Shaler
reported her concerns to the personnel committee, and the committee voted
unanimously to terminate Tegeler's employment with the Church.

On April 10, 2018, Tegeler went to the Church conference room for what he believed
would be a regularly scheduled staff meeting. However, only Dr. Jimmerson
(Tegeler's supervisor), Shaler, and Warren Peden, a Church lay leader, were present.
Tegeler claims that when he entered the conference room and closed the door, it
automatically locked behind him. Dr. Jimmerson and Peden accused Tegeler of
having an inappropriate relationship with Daughter, and Shaler informed him of the
personnel committee's unanimous vote to terminate his employment. Shaler then
presented Tegeler with a Separation Agreement and Release of Claims (the
Agreement), in which the Church offered to pay Tegeler $2,600 in exchange for a
release of any claims he might have against the Church.

Tegeler contends he asked to leave the meeting and for additional time to review the
proposal but claims Shaler told him he could not leave until he signed. He further
alleges that Peden told him that if he did not sign the Agreement, the Church would
bring him before the congregation, present the allegations, and allow the
congregation to determine whether Tegeler should be fired. Although Tegeler
negotiated a higher severance payment of $5,200, signed the Agreement, and has yet
to return the funds, he now claims he signed the Agreement only because he felt
threatened.

Tegeler subsequently filed this action against Daughter, Mother, Grandmother, and
the Church. Against the Church, Tegeler brought claims for false imprisonment;
defamation; fraud in the inducement; negligent misrepresentation; negligent hiring,

1
At oral argument, Tegeler's counsel acknowledged that Mother and Daughter
reported only one concern to Dr. Jimmerson: that the relationship was "inappropriate."
Only Tegeler has referenced "inappropriate relations"; his attorney conceded that this
was an error in the complaint's terminology.
supervision, and retention of employees; intentional infliction of emotional distress;
negligent infliction of emotional distress; wrongful termination; and civil conspiracy.
Against Daughter, Mother, and Grandmother, Tegeler brought claims for defamation;
intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional distress;
and civil conspiracy. Tegeler's complaint is quite factually detailed, and he claims he
has suffered monetary damages and emotional distress.

The Church moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, arguing Tegeler
released any claims against the Church when he signed the Agreement; the Church
attached the Agreement as an exhibit to its motion. Mother answered, moved to
dismiss, and filed a Rule 12(c), SCRCP motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Daughter and Grandmother answered jointly, moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6)
and 12(c), and asserted several affirmative defenses.

Prior to the circuit court's hearing, Respondents filed supporting memoranda. Tegeler
responded with his own opposition memo and attached several exhibits, including
affidavits and copies of text and Snapchat messages between Tegeler and Daughter.
Respondents then filed their own excerpts from Tegeler and Daughter's messaging.
No party objected to the circuit court's consideration of these submissions in the
context of the Rule 12(b) and Rule 12(c) motions.

At the motions hearing, Tegeler's counsel went into great factual detail when
explaining the background of the case and referenced the messages between Tegeler
and Daughter. By Form 4 orders entered that same day, the circuit court granted
Grandmother and Daughter's Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c) motions, Mother's Rule 12(c)
motion, and the Church's Rule 12(b)(6) motion; the circuit court's formal orders
followed on September 8, 2020.

I. Judgment on the Pleadings and Failure to State a Claim

"Whether reviewing a grant of summary judgment or a judgment on the pleadings,
we apply the same legal standards as the trial court." Ziegler v. Dorchester County,
426 S.C. 615, 619, 828 S.E.2d 218, 220 (2019). "A judgment on the pleadings shall
be granted 'where there is no issue of fact raised by the complaint that would entitle
the plaintiff to judgment if resolved in plaintiff's favor.'" Home Builders Ass'n of
S.C. v. Sch. Dist. No. 2 of Dorchester Cnty., 405 S.C. 458, 460, 748 S.E.2d 230, 231
(2013) (quoting Sapp v. Ford Motor Co., 386 S.C. 143, 146, 687 S.E.2d 47, 49
(2009)).
After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not
to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to
and not excluded by the Court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

Rule 12(c), SCRCP.

A. Defamation

To prove defamation, the plaintiff must show: "(1) a false
and defamatory statement was made; (2) the unprivileged
publication of the statement to a third party; (3) the
publisher was at fault; and (4) either the statement was
actionable irrespective of harm or the publication of the
statement caused special harm."

Kennedy v. Richland Cnty. Sch. Dist. Two, 428 S.C. 98, 114, 833 S.E.2d 414, 423
(Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Williams v. Lancaster Cnty. Sch. Dist., 369 S.C. 293, 302–
03, 631 S.E.2d 286, 292 (Ct. App. 2006)).

Here, judgment on the pleadings was appropriate because Tegeler's detailed
complaint does not raise an issue of fact that could possibly entitle him to relief. In
his own complaint, Tegeler claims he was Daughter's mentor and she was a
vulnerable young woman from "a broken home." He admitted to giving her financial
gifts and inviting her on trips with his family. He also acknowledged discussing
highly personal matters with Daughter, though he insists these discussions took place
in the context of his "mentoring."

More significantly, Tegeler admits that Daughter and Mother told Dr. Jimmerson the
relationship was not romantic or sexual and that Dr. Jimmerson told him he did not
believe the relationship was romantic or sexual. Thus, even when we view all
allegations in the light most favorable to Tegeler (as we must), this admission
warrants judgment on the pleadings as to Mother and Daughter.
Other than vague, hearsay references to an "inappropriate relationship," Tegeler fails
to identify in his complaint any specific defamatory statement by Grandmother. See
McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 404 S.C. 186, 195, 743 S.E.2d 843, 848 (Ct. App.
2013) (holding the circuit court properly dismissed a defamation action because
"McNeil did not allege any of SCDC's statements were unprivileged, and she did not
set forth with any specificity what the alleged false statements were. She also did not
allege any of the statements were published to a third party or that SCDC made the
alleged statements. Additionally, she did not assert to whom SCDC made the alleged
statements."). Accordingly, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, the allegations in Tegeler's complaint do not entitle him to relief.

However, even if Tegeler's complaint could somehow survive a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, summary judgment in favor of Respondents would be proper based
on the exhibits Tegeler himself submitted to the circuit court. Tegeler, Daughter, and
Grandmother all filed exhibits prior to the circuit court's August 18, 2020 hearing.
On August 17 at 10:48 a.m., Daughter and Grandmother filed a memorandum in
support of their motions. On August 17 at 3:54 p.m., Tegeler filed a memorandum
opposing Respondents' motions and attached voluminous exhibits, including many
concerning messages between Tegeler and Daughter. At 4:42 p.m., Daughter filed
her own affidavit and exhibits, which included additional text and Snapchat
messages between the two. At the circuit court's hearing the next day, no party
objected to the consideration of these filings. Thus, we find the parties consented to
the consideration of these additional matters.

Considering the text and Snapchat messages in the record, there cannot possibly be a
genuine dispute as to the truthfulness of any statement that Tegeler's relationship
with Daughter was inappropriate. The messages reveal Tegeler called Daughter his
"princess," his "sweetie pie," and his "cutie pie." Among other unsuitable statements
that we decline to detail here, Tegeler told Daughter he fell asleep thinking about her.
The messages also showed Tegeler gave Daughter financial gifts and made
comments that she found confusing in the context of a mentoring relationship
between a worship leader in his fifties and an eighteen-year-old female member of
his worship team.2
2
As our rulings here are dispositive, we decline to address Respondents' additional
sustaining grounds, including the argument that Mother and Daughter's statements to
Dr. Jimmerson were conditionally or qualifiedly privileged. See Murray v. Holnam,
Inc., 344 S.C. 129, 139–40, 542 S.E.2d 743, 748 (Ct. App. 2001) ("In a defamation
action, the defendant may assert the affirmative defense of conditional or qualified
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, a plaintiff must show (1) the defendant
intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional
distress, or was certain or substantially certain that such
distress would result from his conduct; (2) the conduct
was so extreme and outrageous as to exceed all possible
bounds of decency and must be regarded as atrocious and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the
actions of defendant caused the plaintiff's emotional
distress; and (4) the emotional distress suffered by the
plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be
expected to endure it.

Bergstrom v. Palmetto Health All., 358 S.C. 388, 401, 596 S.E.2d 42, 48 (2004).

Tegeler's complaint wholly fails to state a proper claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Mother and Daughter's reporting of the inappropriate relationship
to their pastor and Tegeler's supervisor, Dr. Jimmerson, was not "so extreme and
outrageous as to exceed all possible bounds of decency" that it "must be regarded as
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." See id. at 401, 596
S.E.2d at 48–49. The circuit court properly dismissed this claim against
Grandmother and the Church as well.

C. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

South Carolina caselaw recognizes negligent infliction of emotional distress in
limited circumstances. See, e.g., Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co., 286 S.C. 579,
582–83, 336 S.E.2d 465, 467 (1985) (recognizing negligent infliction of emotional
distress in the "bystander" context); Boan v. Blackwell, 343 S.C. 498, 502, 541
S.E.2d 242, 244–45 (2001) (stating a plaintiff may recover for mental anguish that
accompanies a physical injury); Strickland v. Madden, 323 S.C. 63, 67, 448 S.E.2d
581, 584 (Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing potential recovery for negligent infliction

privilege.") (quoting Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 334 S.C. 469,
514 S.E.2d 126 (1999))); Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C.
598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (noting a reviewing court need not address
remaining issues when disposition of a prior issue is dispositive).
of emotional distress when emotional trauma proximately causes a plaintiff's injury).
Tegeler did not claim he witnessed a death or serious injury nor does he claim he
experienced physical injury as a result of emotional trauma. For these and other
reasons, the circuit court properly found Tegeler's complaint failed to state a claim
that might entitle him to relief.

II. Release of Claims Against the Church

"A release is a contract and contract principles of law should be used to determine
what the parties intended." Ecclesiastes Prod. Ministries v. Outparcel Assocs., 374
S.C. 483, 497, 649 S.E.2d 494, 501 (Ct. App. 2007). "In construing a contract, the
primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties." Id.
"If a contract's language is plain, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable
interpretation, no construction is required and its language determines the
instrument's force and effect." Id. at 499, 649 S.E.2d at 502.

"Duress is a condition of mind produced by improper external pressure or influence
that practically destroys the free agency of a party and causes him to do an act or
form a contract not of his own volition." Willms Trucking Co. v. JW Const. Co. Inc.,
314 S.C. 170, 178, 442 S.E.2d 197, 202 (Ct. App. 1994). "The central question
when determining whether a contract was executed under duress is whether,
considering all the surrounding circumstances, one party to the transaction was
prevented from exercising his free will by threats or the wrongful conduct of
another." Gainey v. Gainey, 382 S.C. 414, 428, 675 S.E.2d 792, 799 (Ct. App. 2009).

In order to establish a claim for fraud in the inducement
to enter a contract, a party must establish the following
by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a representation;
(2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) either knowledge of
its falsity or a reckless disregard of its truth or falsity; (5)
intent that the representation be acted upon; (6) the
hearer's ignorance of its falsity; (7) the hearer's reliance
on its truth; (8) the hearer's right to rely thereon; and (9)
the hearer's consequent and proximate injury.

Turner v. Milliman, 392 S.C. 116, 122, 708 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2011).

In dismissing Tegeler's claims against the Church, the circuit court noted the Church
attached a copy of the Agreement with its motion, Tegeler did not object to
the court's consideration of the Agreement, and Tegeler based some of his own
arguments on the Agreement's language. Therefore, the circuit court found it could
consider the Church's motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, and
noted that under either standard, Tegeler's claims failed. We find the circuit court
properly analyzed the Church's motion as one for summary judgment after all of the
parties attached exhibits to their filings, relied on the filings at the motions hearing,
and did not object to the court's consideration of the filings.

The evidence in the record establishes Tegeler negotiated an increase in the
severance pay he received in conjunction with signing the Agreement because the
original amount is crossed out and a larger amount is written in its place. At the
circuit court's hearing and at oral argument before this court, Tegeler admitted he did
not return the severance pay to the Church; it seems he views this payment as a
partial payment for his alleged damages.

Further, although Tegeler claims he was under duress because he found Peden—a
lay leader in the Church—threatening, the record establishes otherwise. Tegeler
texted Peden on April 11, 2018, demanding an apology after Peden reported his
termination at choir practice. Tegeler wrote, "Bottom line is, you said yesterday no
details will be given out and what you said was too much information. You need to
apologize for saying things you said yesterday you would not say. This is
unacceptable. . . . I am disappointed in you as a leader in the church." We find this
text message—along with Tegeler's negotiation of a higher severance figure and
retaining of the funds—disposes of any claim that he felt "threatened" or acted under
duress in negotiating the Agreement.

Additionally, the circuit court properly found the Agreement's language bars any
recovery against the Church. The Agreement states, in pertinent part:

In exchange for the Company's agreement to provide the
above payment, Employee agrees not to make any claims
or demands or to commence any lawsuits against the
Company on any matters arising from or related in any
way to the Employee's employment with or termination
from the Company.

This includes, but is not limited to, a release of any and
all rights arising under any state or federal constitution,
statute, law, rule, regulation, or common law principle of
tort, contract, or equity.
In further consideration of the foregoing, receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged, Employee. . . forever discharges
Company, and its predecessors, insurers, indemnitors,
purchasers, successors and assigns, from all manner of
actions, causes of action, suits, debts, accounts,
judgments, claims and demands whatsoever, in law
and/or in equity arising out of or in any way related to
Employee's hiring, employment, wages, commissions,
bonuses, benefits, compensation, request for or to return
from leave of absence, demotion, resignation, discharge,
termination, severance or termination benefits, and/or
terms and conditions of employment; any and all causes
of action for harassment, retaliation, breach of contract,
breach of implied contract, tortious interference with
contract, wrongful transfer or demotion, wrongful
termination, fraud, negligence, libel or slander,
intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress,
breach of confidentiality, invasion of privacy, or any
other rights, claims, or causes of action arising under any
state or federal constitution, statute, law, rule, regulation,
or common law principle of tort, contract, or equity.

....

The Intent of this Agreement is to fully and finally
resolve all claims and possible claims against the
Company that are waivable whether legal or equitable.
However, it is understood that the Employee is not
releasing or waiving any rights or claims which may arise
after this Agreement is executed, any claims for the sole
purpose of enforcing Employee's rights under this
Agreement, or any claims which by law cannot be
waived. . . .

Tegeler claims some of Peden's statements occurred after the execution of the
Agreement and, thus, are not barred. However, these allegedly defamatory
statements—even if we assume for procedural purposes that they occurred as
Tegeler claims3—were made by a Church lay leader who is not a Church employee
and not a party to this action.

III. Opportunity to Amend

Citing Skydive Myrtle Beach, Inc. v. Horry County, 426 S.C. 175, 179, 826 S.E.2d
585, 587 (2019), Tegeler argues the circuit court should have given him the
opportunity to amend his complaint instead of dismissing it or granting judgment on
the pleadings. In Skydive, our supreme court explained, "When a trial court finds a
complaint fails 'to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action' under Rule
12(b)(6), the court should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint
pursuant to Rule 15(a) before filing the final order of dismissal." Id. Here, the
circuit court properly found any amendment of this complaint would be futile due to
Tegeler's own detailed allegations and the contents of his text and Snapchat
messages with Daughter.4 See id. at 182, 826 S.E.2d at 589 ("In rare cases . . . a trial
court may deny a motion to amend if the amendment would be clearly futile.").

IV. Rule 60(b), SCRCP

Tegeler next argues the circuit court erred in failing to set aside its judgment under
Rule 60(b) because Mother's counsel called him a "predator" at the circuit court
hearing. We disagree.

3
When Tegeler sent Peden the text message expressing his disappointment regarding
Peden's report to the choir, Peden responded that Tegeler's information was incorrect.
He further noted, "I have what I said recorded on my phone."
4
Tegeler did submit an affidavit from a fellow church member who claimed her
friend Judy (she did not reveal Judy's last name) told her that Grandmother had
accused Tegeler of having an inappropriate relationship with Daughter. But Tegeler
did not submit an affidavit from Judy or anyone else with firsthand knowledge of
any defamatory comments Grandmother allegedly made. In any event, we agree with
the circuit court that "after reviewing these affidavits in addition to the numerous fact
specific allegations of the Complaint, it is clear that any amendment to this
Complaint would be futile." See also Kennedy, 428 S.C. at 130, 833 S.E.2d at 431
("Truth of a statement is a defense to defamation.").
Tegeler seeks relief under Rule 60(b)(3), which provides, "On motion and upon such
terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct
of an adverse party." However, the circuit court addressed Tegeler's filing as a Rule
59(e) motion to alter or amend because Tegeler filed it within ten days of entry of the
orders; additionally, there simply are no arguable 60(b) grounds here. Even if a Rule
60(b) motion were procedurally appropriate, Tegeler's argument that the judgment
should be set aside due to misconduct lacks merit because the transcript establishes
that Mother's counsel did not call Tegeler "a predator." She did reference the
"predatory behavior" suggested by the contents of several of Tegeler's text messages
with Daughter, but this description was neither actionable nor in any way
inappropriate in the context of the matters argued at the hearing. It certainly did not
constitute misconduct or fraud, nor was it a misrepresentation.

For the reasons set forth above, the orders of the circuit court are

AFFIRMED.

THOMAS, MCDONALD, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.