Lisa Styles v. Southeastern Grocers

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Lisa Styles, Respondent-Appellant,

v.

Southeastern Grocers, Inc. and BI-LO, LLC, Appellants-
Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2020-000818

Appeal from Anderson County
R. Scott Sprouse, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-319
Heard April 13, 2023 – Filed September 27, 2023

AFFIRMED

Andrew J. McCumber, of Slotchiver & Slotchiver, LLP,
of Mount Pleasant, and David Shankman, of Shankman
Leone, PA, of Tampa, FL, for Appellants-Respondents.

Brian P. Murphy, of Stephenson & Murphy, LLC, of
Greenville, for Respondent-Appellant.
PER CURIAM: In this false imprisonment action, Southeastern Grocers, LLC, and
BI-LO, LLC, appeal a jury verdict in favor of Lisa Styles (Styles). BI-LO1 argues
that (1) the circuit court erred in not granting its motion for JNOV on Styles's claim
of false imprisonment; (2) certain evidentiary rulings by the circuit court were
flawed; and (3) the circuit court should have granted its motion for a JNOV or a new
trial on damages. We affirm.2
On May 23, 2018, Styles—the customer service manager at the Pendleton BI-
LO—was summoned to the store office for a meeting with two visiting BI-LO
officials: Ronnie Duncan, who worked in loss prevention, and Ken Miller, a human
resources representative. Styles quickly developed a troubling feeling about the
meeting. After a quick greeting, according to Styles, "they told me they were
investigating me taking product." Styles—in a written statement she later said was
obtained under duress—admitted she had done so. Styles signed the statement and
was subsequently terminated.3 On the way home, Styles pulled her car to the side of
the road and vomited. She later experienced a "flare-up" of a latent infection.

The next day, Styles went to the local police department to insist on her
innocence. Styles told Police Chief Doyle Burdette that the items she took from the
store were actually donations to a local charity. As proof, Styles forwarded an email
to the chief in which Marla Cobb, a program director for Anderson Interfaith
Ministries (AIM), expressed gratitude for "you guys . . . taking this on." After an
investigation, Chief Burdette took his report to a judge. The judge declined to issue
an arrest warrant for Styles.

Styles then filed this action. Her complaint included causes of action for abuse
of process, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, interference with contract
(against the store's manager, Michael Brickman), and fraud. Soon after, she dropped
all the claims against the individual defendants, including the contractual claim
against Brickman.

At trial, Styles testified that she had complained to a district manager about
clashes with Brickman and collected statements from other employees and submitted
them to a corporate official in Jacksonville. Customers also complained.

1
For ease of reference, we will refer to the two companies collectively as BI-LO,
even when Southeastern Grocers is the entity technically involved at a given point.
2
Because we affirm, we do not reach Styles's conditional cross-appeal.
3
Styles also admitted the theft to a police officer.
Styles testified that discussions among the management team at the store led
to a joint decision to donate Easter baskets to AIM. According to Styles, she got
further approval from Brickman to donate some women's hygiene products to AIM.
Styles said she gave Brickman a list of the items she had donated. She conceded that
she did not make a personal copy of the list, "[b]ut I sure wish I would have."

Not long after the donations, Styles noticed Brickman spending time in the
store's office reviewing footage from the store's security cameras. On April 14, she
reached out to Brickman by text to find out if she had reason to worry. She wrote:
"[S]everal comments have gotten back to me. Do I need to know something? Several
people have told me you have been watching me on camera. I'm fine with you
watching me on camera[;] I am not aware I'm doing something wrong. If I am[,] I
would appreciate you telling me." Brickman never responded to the text.

By then, according to the testimony of Brickman and Duncan, Brickman had
already texted Duncan to alert him to two potential incidents of theft on March 24.
Brickman testified at trial that he had happened upon the footage of Styles's alleged
thefts while looking into some issues the store was having with cleaning. Duncan's
own review of the security footage appeared to show Styles purchasing some items,
then picking up additional items that she had placed in other parts of the store before
leaving.

Testimony about the subsequent meeting of Styles, Duncan, and Miller varied.
According to Styles, she explained to Duncan and Miller that the goods were donated
to charity. She told them she believed that the investigation was related to her
complaints about Brickman. She "asked to leave that room several times," but
Duncan told Styles she could not. When she took a cigarette break, Miller escorted
her. She was told that to leave the room, she would have to write a statement
confessing that she stole the items.
For his part, Miller denied that Styles requested being allowed to leave.
According to Miller's testimony, Styles was not told that she had to give a statement
before she could leave. Furthermore, Miller said he did not formally escort Styles
on her break but went along as "the human resources people person." On cross-
examination, Miller said that by the time of the meeting, he was aware that there
were "concerns" about Brickman's "management style." Miller said he was not
aware of the details. However, Miller knew Styles had complained; Brickman had
told him. Miller terminated Styles that day.
Duncan, recalling the meeting during his testimony, said Styles almost
immediately brought up the fact that she had donated the items to AIM. However,
he remembered thinking that the items "had not been scanned out" by Styles, as was
typically done with inventory leaving the store for any purpose—even to get thrown
away. Significantly, according to Duncan, Styles said the donations were not
approved. He quoted Styles as saying: "Mike [Brickman] said that he would not
approve it, that -- that he already had someone else for that month to donate to."4
According to Duncan, she added: "Well, we've been doing this over, you know, the
last couple of years, and I decided that I was going to assist AIM, you know, without
permission."5 Duncan said Styles also admitted taking some of the product for her
personal use. Like Miller, Duncan testified that Styles was not prevented from
leaving. Duncan said he did not know that Styles had separately complained about
Brickman.

At the end of all testimony, BI-LO renewed previous motions for directed
verdicts. Styles voluntarily dismissed the abuse of process claim. The circuit court
granted a directed verdict on the malicious prosecution claim. After closing
statements and jury instructions, the jury found for Styles on false imprisonment and
awarded her $100,000 in compensatory damages; it found for BI-LO on the fraud
claim. The jury awarded Styles $10,000 in punitive damages. Later, in a Form 4
order with some reasoning attached, the circuit court denied all post-trial motions,
including those relevant to this appeal, which followed.

Our supreme court instructs that appellate courts reviewing JNOV rulings
"must apply the same standard as the trial court by viewing the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." RFT
Mgmt. Co. v. Tinsley & Adams L.L.P., 399 S.C. 322, 331–32, 732 S.E.2d 166, 171
(2012). In turn, the circuit court "must deny a motion for a directed verdict or JNOV
if the evidence yields more than one reasonable inference or its inference is in doubt.
Moreover, '[a] motion for JNOV may be granted only if no reasonable jury could
have reached the challenged verdict.'" Id. at 332, 732 S.E.2d at 171 (citation
omitted) (quoting Gastineau v. Murphy, 331 S.C. 565, 568, 503 S.E.2d
712, 713 (1998)).

4
Duncan also testified that "the way the donations were done" by Styles would
have violated company policy even if Brickman had approved them.
5
Cobb, AIM's program director, testified that "BI-LO had assisted us previously
the year before with some Easter basket donations."
As for a circuit court's evidentiary determinations, "this [c]ourt will not disturb
a [circuit] court's evidentiary rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion. The [circuit
court's] decision will not be reversed on appeal unless it appears he clearly abused
his discretion and the objecting party was prejudiced by the decision." Seabrook
Island Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Berger, 365 S.C. 234, 242, 616 S.E.2d
431, 435 (Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted).6

I. JNOV ON FALSE IMPRISONMENT

BI-LO argues that the circuit court should have granted JNOV on Styles's
false imprisonment claim because she was not restrained and that its employees had
probable cause to detain her. We hold that the circuit court did not err.

Recently, our supreme court reiterated the elements of false imprisonment
under South Carolina law. "To prevail on a claim for false imprisonment, the
plaintiff must establish: (1) the defendant restrained the plaintiff, (2) the restraint
was intentional, and (3) the restraint was unlawful." Huffman v. Sunshine Recycling,
LLC, 426 S.C. 262, 271, 826 S.E.2d 609, 614 (2019) (quoting Law v.
S.C. Dep't of Corr., 368 S.C. 424, 440, 629 S.E.2d 642, 651 (2006)). Here, we
place the first two elements under the combined rubric of "intentional restraint"
because we do not understand BI-LO to be challenging whether any restraint was
intentional.

Styles clearly presented enough evidence on intentional restraint to send the
case to the jury. The standard for "restraint" in South Carolina does not require as
much imposition on the plaintiff as the word conjures in isolation.
The tort of false imprisonment may be committed by
words alone, or by acts alone or by both, and by merely
operating on the will of the individual, or by personal

6
Styles raises a preservation challenge to virtually every argument advanced by BI-
LO in this appeal. At best, these arguments represent the kind of hyper-
technical application of preservation rules that our jurisprudence warns against. See
Herron v. Century BMW, 395 S.C. 461, 470, 719 S.E.2d 640, 644 (2011)
(recognizing "the need to approach issue preservation rules with a practical eye and
not in a rigid, hyper-technical manner"); State v. Bowers, 428 S.C. 21, 29, 832 S.E.2d
623, 627 (Ct. App. 2019) ("[I]ssue preservation is not a 'gotcha' game. Instead of
being hyper-technical, we approach preservation with a practical eye." (citation
omitted)), aff'd, 436 S.C. 640, 875 S.E.2d 608 (2022). At worst, some are meritless.
As a result, we do not address them.
violence, or by both. It is not necessary that the individual
be confined within a certain area, or that he be assaulted,
or even touched.
Gathers v. Harris Teeter Supermarket, Inc., 282 S.C. 220, 230–31, 317 S.E.2d 748,
755 (Ct. App. 1984).

In its brief, BI-LO raises several reasons to find that Styles was not restrained
by Duncan and Miller. BI-LO contends that Styles could not have been falsely
imprisoned because she voluntarily entered the office; she was on-duty at the time
of the meeting; she was not subject to any physical impositions; she could reach the
door if necessary; she was not threatened; and she remained long after, allegedly,
she first felt that she was in some form of employment danger.

Were that the only evidence introduced at trial, BI-LO might prevail in this
appeal. However, there was also contradictory evidence put before the jury.
"Self-serving" or not, Styles testified that she was told she could not leave the room
until she produced a statement and that she was required to be escorted during the
break in her detention. Either BI-LO or Styles is right about what occurred inside
the office of the Pendleton store that afternoon, and the other is wrong. Determining
which one of those stories is correct is why we have juries. See Sauers v. Poulin
Bros. Homes, Inc., 328 S.C. 601, 605, 493 S.E.2d 503, 505 (Ct. App. 1997) ("When
considering the motions [for a directed verdict or JNOV], neither this [c]ourt nor the
trial court has authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve conflicts in the
testimony and evidence.").

Like the circuit court, our considerations in this case involve not whether
Styles met her burden of proof, but whether Styles introduced enough evidence to
create a factual dispute on this question. She did.

Any intentional restraint of Styles by BI-LO employees, though, would be
allowed if they were legally entitled to do so. With regard to this aspect of false
imprisonment, the parties spend a great deal of time arguing about whether BI- LO's
employees had probable cause to detain Styles. However, we are not entirely bound
by the discussions of BI-LO and Styles. See Rule 220(c), SCACR ("The appellate
court may affirm any ruling, order, decision or judgment upon any ground(s)
appearing in the Record on Appeal."). Instead, we will focus on the applicability of
statutory and common law provisions allowing a shopkeeper or merchant to detain
an employee or customer to prevent theft (Shopkeeper's Statute). As a result, we
affirm.
There is some question about whether the Shopkeeper's Statute applies in this
case, or at least was applied on the record in front of us. There are several instances
in the record where the doctrine is discussed, often in contradictory ways. In any
event, whether the Shopkeeper's Statute was applicable or not, the result is the same.

In any action brought by reason of having been delayed by
a merchant or merchant's employee or agent on or near the
premises of a mercantile establishment for the purpose of
investigation concerning the ownership of any
merchandise, it shall be a defense to such action if: (1) The
person was delayed in a reasonable manner and for a
reasonable time to permit such investigation, and (2)
reasonable cause existed to believe that the person delayed
had committed the crime of shoplifting.

S.C. Code Ann. § 16-13-140 (2015).

In Faulkenberry v. Spring Mills, Inc., our supreme court found that the statute
could be used to justify the detention of an employee accused by co- workers of
preparing to steal some of the mill's product. 271 S.C. 377, 378–80,
247 S.E.2d 445, 446–47 (1978). Reading the statute in concert with similar common
law doctrine, the court also held that "[s]uch actions . . . can only be justified during
the commission of the suspected wrongdoing." Id. at 380, 247 S.E.2d at 447
(emphasis added).

Even if we consider BI-LO's argument on the probable cause aspect to
implicitly reflect common law protections for retailers rather than the statute itself,
we note that modern treatises continue to hold to the view that this kind of detention
is allowed only in proximity to the commission of a crime. See RESTATEMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.06, cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 2015)
("Employers also have a privilege to restrain their employees to prevent injury to
others or theft. Such a restraint must be reasonably necessary to avert an injury
or theft that the employer has reasonable cause to believe is occurring or is
imminent, and it cannot exceed the time and manner reasonably necessary to do so."
(emphases added)); 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment § 29 (May 2023 update)
("Merchants have limited authority under the shoplifting detention statutes to detain
persons suspected of theft, triggered when a merchant's agent has reasonable
suspicion or probable cause to believe that a theft has occurred or is occurring on
or about the store premises."); 32 AM. JUR. 2d False Imprisonment § 65 (May 2023
update) ("The right to detain the person suspected of wrongdoing exists only
during commission of the offense and does not arise where the offense was
completed at a prior time. There is no privilege[] if the victim is not detained for an
investigation but is held for the purpose of compelling restitution or securing a
confession for a prior theft." (footnotes omitted)); see also State v. McAteer, 340
S.C. 644, 646, 532 S.E.2d 865, 865 (2000) (holding that "South Carolina recognizes
no common law right of a citizen to arrest, without a warrant, for a misdemeanor"
(footnote omitted)); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-13-110(B)(1) (2015) (classifying
shoplifting of merchandise worth two thousand dollars or less as a misdemeanor).7

Under either the statutory or common law considerations, the shopkeeper's
privilege does not support BI-LO's view that a finding of probable cause is
tantamount to a finding that BI-LO had legal authority to detain Styles. Here, Styles
was not detained as she was taking items from the store. She was held in the office
weeks later. This falls outside of the protection of Faulkenberry and its common law
counterparts. See Faulkenberry, 271 S.C. at 379, 247 S.E.2d at 447 ("Moreover, the
right to detain the person suspected of wrongdoing exists only during commission
of the offense, and does not arise where the offense was completed at some prior
time." (quoting 32 AM. JUR. 2d False Imprisonment
§ 74)).

Some authorities support the view that BI-LO was free to ask Styles to speak
to Duncan and Miller on pain of termination if she refused. See RESTATEMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.06, cmt. d ("[E]mployers may tell their employees that they
will be discharged if they do not submit to an investigation into possible theft or
other workplace malfeasance. Employers also may inform their employees that if
they do not cooperate with an investigation conducted in good faith, the employees
will be referred to public authorities for prosecution."). But in order for BI-LO to
avoid liability for false imprisonment, Styles needed to be offered the opportunity to
leave. See Law, 368 at 440, 629 S.E.2d at 651 ("The essence of the tort of
false imprisonment consists of depriving a person of his liberty without lawful
justification."). As explained, the jury found she was not offered the opportunity to
leave. For that reason, we affirm.

II. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
BI-LO next argues that evidence of complaints about Brickman's behavior at
the store was too prejudicial to be admitted under Rule 403, and that Chief

7
Styles's statement estimated the value of the items she took at "around $450.00,"
and she paid the company $450 to reimburse it for the allegedly stolen goods.
Burdette's testimony was impermissibly used to bolster Styles's testimony and to
confuse the issue of probable cause. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion.

Initially, we disagree with BI-LO's contention that "while Plaintiff only
brought tort claims in this action, she was allowed to turn this trial into a case about
gender discrimination, harassment[,] and retaliation." To the contrary, our review of
the record shows that the circuit court did an admirable job of preventing the trial
from turning into the "#metoo"-infused culture war that BI-LO portrays in its brief.
For example, the court excluded any evidence about the way Brickman looked at
women.

However, to the extent that the tensions between Styles and Brickman were
captured in the testimony and evidence that was admitted, there was no error. The
conflict between the two was central to Styles's theory of the case—that she was
falsely imprisoned because of Brickman's scheme to frame her for stealing
merchandise and that BI-LO employees knew or should have known this, thus
depriving them of probable cause to detain her. By attempting to minimize the
attention focused on gender while largely allowing the introduction of evidence of
bitterness between Styles and Brickman, the circuit court struck the appropriate
balance. The admitted evidence was not unduly prejudicial.

As to BI-LO's relevancy objections, we note that the strictures of Rule 401,
SCRE, are not taxing. See State v. Sweat, 362 S.C. 117, 126–27, 606 S.E.2d 508,
513 (Ct. App. 2004) ("Evidence is relevant if it tends to establish or make more or
less probable some matter in issue upon which it directly or indirectly bears, and it
is not required that the inference sought should necessarily follow from the fact
proved."); 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 294 (May 2023 update) ("Under the modern
rules of evidence, the threshold to admit relevant evidence is low[,] and even
minimally relevant evidence is admissible." (emphasis added)); id. ("To be relevant,
evidence need not bear directly on the question in issue if it is helpful to understand
the conduct of the parties or their motives or if it reasonably allows the jury to draw
an inference as to a disputed fact; the value of the evidence need only be slight."
(emphasis added)); 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 283 (May 2023 update) ("Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and similar state rules and statutes, 'relevant evidence'
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence. To be probable, evidence must be viewed in the
light of logic, experience[,] and accepted assumptions concerning human behavior."
(footnotes omitted)). Anonymous customer complaints are not the stuff that airtight
cases are made of, but they need not be in order to pass our state's test for relevance.
They made it at least somewhat more
likely that Brickman's behavior at the store was causing problems—a central theme
of Styles's case.

As to Chief Burdette's testimony, it was certainly relevant to Styles's
malicious prosecution claim, which was still alive at the time the testimony was
admitted. Further, giving the "curative instruction" proposed by BI-LO— especially
as it was described in the company's brief—would have come perilously close to a
reversible charge on the facts.8 Finally, we question whether any of Chief Burdette's
testimony was hearsay, but given that BI-LO does not specifically identify which of
Chief Burdette's statements were hearsay or how they constituted hearsay, we
decline to build BI-LO's case for it.

III. DAMAGES
BI-LO argues that it is entitled to a JNOV or a new trial on the compensatory
and punitive damage awards from the jury. We disagree.

"In a suit for false imprisonment, the basic injury is the depreciation of the
Plaintiff's liberty. Such things as humiliation, indignity, and mental suffering are
general damages that naturally and proximately result from false imprisonment."
Zimbelman v. Savage, 745 F. Supp. 2d 664, 683 (D.S.C. 2010) (citations omitted).

Additionally, in Mitchell v. Fortis Insurance Company, our supreme court
attempted to clarify the relevant considerations for South Carolina courts weighing
whether the amount of a jury's award of punitive damages is appropriate. 385 S.C.
570, 586–89, 686 S.E.2d 176, 184–86 (2009). As a result, the Mitchell court framed
its analysis in terms of reprehensibility, ratio, and comparative punitive awards—
with the factors from Gamble v. Stevenson, 305 S.C. 104, 406 S.E.2d 350 (1991),
serving to "add[] substance" to those factors. Id.

We find no support for BI-LO's attempt to calculate damages for false
imprisonment based on a minute-by-minute "rate." The damages that juries are
allowed to award for false imprisonment are not as clearly defined as medical bills
paid because of malpractice or the cost of repairs from negligent construction

8
BI-LO asserts in its brief that "the [circuit c]ourt erred by failing to provide the jury
with Defendant's proposed curative instructions to disregard [the evidence] as the
abuse of process claim was dropped by Plaintiff and a directed verdict was entered
on Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim, as well as an instruction that the jury
consider only the knowledge of the decision-maker (i.e., Duncan) at the time of the
interview."
practices. See Zimbelman, 745 F. Supp. 2d at 683 ("Such things as humiliation,
indignity, and mental suffering are general damages that naturally and proximately
result from false imprisonment."). As a result, precise numeric calculations or
formulas are not the appropriate way to consider these damages. Additionally,
BI-LO attempts to argue that the verdict improperly contains compensation for the
mental anguish caused by Styles's termination. But if both the imprisonment and the
termination caused her mental distress, Styles was still entitled to the portion of those
damages caused by the imprisonment.

Regarding punitive damages, most of the Mitchell and Gamble factors for
punitive damages cut against BI-LO. For example, the ratio of punitive damages to
actual damages in this case is 0.1:1. In terms of comparable cases, larger punitive
awards can be found in older verdicts. See, e.g., Caldwell v. K-Mart Corp., 306 S.C.
27, 33, 410 S.E.2d 21, 25 (Ct. App. 1991) (finding that award including $100,000 in
punitive damages "may have been liberal[, but] we find no basis in the record to hold
it grossly excessive").9

Furthermore, BI-LO's list of reasons for a JNOV on punitive damages often
reads like a recitation of its substantive arguments against the jury's determination
of false imprisonment. To the extent that BI-LO offers additional arguments here,
they are similarly unconvincing. For example, BI-LO argues that there is no
deterrent effect of this decision because the company will not be deterred from
investigating employee theft. The punitive damages in this case, though, are meant
to deter BI-LO from allowing its employees to weaponize those procedures against
co-workers, not to neutralize the procedures altogether.

BI-LO's arguments for a new trial suffer from many of the same shortcomings.
For example, at one point, BI-LO states: "As discussed above, Plaintiff was not able
to prove at trial that she was unlawfully restrained as required for a verdict of false
imprisonment." Because we see no error in the jury's finding of false imprisonment,
Styles proved precisely that as a legal matter.

Furthermore, we again disagree with BI-LO's contention that the circuit court
allowed the case to run off the rails and become an extension of the "#metoo"
movement. We believe the circuit court did a reasonable job of keeping hot-button
social issues out of the jury's consideration of the case.

AFFIRMED.

9
We note that the Caldwell court did not consider a due process argument on
punitive damages. See id. at 33–34, 410 S.E.2d at 25.
WILLIAMS, C.J., and GEATHERS and VERDIN, JJ., concur.