Diana Bright v. Craig Bright

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Diana Bright, Respondent,

v.

Craig Jeremy Bright, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2021-001318

Appeal From Beaufort County
Gerald C. Smoak, Jr., Family Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-037
Submitted January 1, 2023 – Filed February 1, 2023

AFFIRMED

Jason Scott Luck, of Luck VI Ltd. Co. d/b/a Jason Scott
Luck, Attorney at Law, of Bennettsville, for Appellant.

Bess Jones DuRant, of Sowell & DuRant, LLC, of
Columbia, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Craig Jeremy Bright (Husband) appeals a family court order
confirming an arbitration award, arguing the family court lacked jurisdiction to
confirm the award because (1) a motion to modify or vacate the award was
pending before the arbitrator and (2) the arbitration affected children's issues,
which by law are exempt from arbitration. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.

1. Although Husband moved before the arbitrator to modify or vacate the award in
a timely manner and this motion was arguably still pending when Respondent
Diana Bright (Wife) applied for confirmation of the award, we hold the family
court correctly exercised jurisdiction in confirming the award and in adjudicating
Husband's motion to have the award remanded to the arbitrator or vacated. See
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-180 (2005) ("The making of an [arbitration] agreement
. . . confers jurisdiction on the court to enforce the agreement under this chapter
and to enter judgment on an award thereunder."); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-120
(2005) (providing that if "imposed grounds are urged for vacating or modifying or
correcting the award" in a timely manner, "the court shall proceed as provided in
[sections] 15-48-130 and 15-48-140 [of the South Carolina Code (2005)]"
(emphasis added)); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-130(a) (2005) (stating an arbitration
award can be vacated only under limited circumstances that do not include "the
fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of
law or equity"); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-48-140(a) (2005) (allowing the court to
modify or correct an arbitration award only in the event of (1) "an evident
miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the description of any person,
thing or property referred to in the award"; (2) an award on a matter not submitted
to the arbitrator that may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision
regarding properly submitted issues; and (3) imperfections in the award as a matter
of form "not affecting the merits of the controversy"); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 15-48-140(b) (2005) (allowing the court, when granting an application for
confirmation of an award, "to modify and correct the award so as to effect its
intent . . . .").

2. Husband also argues the family court should have granted his motion to remand
the award to the arbitrator for modification of the award or, in the alternative, to
either vacate the award and conduct a de novo hearing or vacate the award
altogether. We disagree. Husband's challenges to the arbitration award concerned
the evidence on which the arbitrator relied, her decision to divide the assets at issue
in kind, and her allocation of these assets between the parties. None of his
complaints concerned circumstances that would warrant vacating the award under
section 15-48-130 or modifying or correcting it pursuant to section 15-48-140.
Therefore, we hold the family court correctly denied Husband's motion. See
Kosciusko v. Parham, 428 S.C. 481, 503, 836 S.E.2d 362, 374 (Ct. App. 2019)
("[A]ll of the grounds for vacating an arbitration award under section 15-48-130
involve the fairness of the arbitration proceedings themselves, not the merits of the
award.").

3. Husband further argues that even though the arbitrator, in apportioning the
marital property, exceeded her jurisdiction because the award would indirectly
affect the parties' minor children. We disagree. Husband expressed only a vague
hope that the appreciation of a particular marital asset that was awarded to Wife
would benefit the parties' children if it had been awarded to him; however, there
was no evidence the children would receive such a benefit while they were still
minors. See Singh v. Singh, 434 S.C. 223, 232, 863 S.E.2d 330, 334 (2021)
("Parents may not attempt to circumvent children's rights to the protection of the
State by agreeing to binding arbitration with no right of judicial review." (emphasis
added)).

AFFIRMED. 1

GEATHERS, MCDONALD, and HILL, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.