Dana L. Dixon v. SCDMH

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Dana L. Dixon, Appellant,

v.

S.C. Department of Mental Health, Employer, and State
Accident Fund, Carrier, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000121

Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-396
Submitted October 1, 2022 – Filed November 2, 2022

AFFIRMED

Dana L. Dixon, pro se.

M. Stephen Stubley, of Speed, Seta, Martin, Trivett &
Stubley, LLC, of Columbia, for Respondents.

PER CURIAM: Dana L. Dixon appeals an order from the Appellate Panel of the
South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (the Appellate Panel) finding
she failed to establish she sustained a compensable injury to her right shoulder.
Dixon argues twenty-eight issues on appeal. We affirm.
We hold substantial evidence supports the Appellate Panel's finding that Dixon
failed to meet her burden of proving she sustained a compensable injury to her
right shoulder as a result of her January 31, 2017 work accident. See Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. S.C. Second Injury Fund, 363 S.C. 612, 619, 611 S.E.2d 297, 300 (Ct.
App. 2005) ("The South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA)
establishes the standard for judicial review of decisions of the workers'
compensation commission."); Bursey v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Env't Control, 360
S.C. 135, 141, 600 S.E.2d 80, 84 (Ct. App. 2004) ("A court can reverse an agency's
findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions only if they are . . . 'clearly erroneous
in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
record . . . .'" (quoting Waters v. S.C. Land Res. Conservation Comm'n, 321 S.C.
219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996))); Murphy v. Owens Corning, 393 S.C. 77,
86, 710 S.E.2d 454, 458 (Ct. App. 2011) ("We review the Commission's factual
findings of whether a claimant is entitled to compensation for aggravation of a
pre-existing condition under the substantial evidence standard of review."); Shealy
v. Aiken Cnty., 341 S.C. 448, 455, 535 S.E.2d 438, 442 (2000) ("Substantial
evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence nor evidence viewed from one side, but
such evidence, when the whole record is considered, as would allow reasonable
minds to reach the conclusion the [Appellate Panel] reached."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 42-9-35(A) (2015) ("The employee shall establish by a preponderance of the
evidence, including medical evidence, that: (1) the subsequent injury aggravated
the preexisting condition or permanent physical impairment; or (2) the preexisting
condition or the permanent physical impairment aggravates the subsequent
injury."); S.C. Code Ann. § 42-9-35(C) (2015) (defining "medical evidence" as
"expert opinion or testimony stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,
documents, records, or other material that is offered by a licensed health care
provider").

To the extent Dixon makes allegations regarding the way her claim was handled,
how her complaints of pain were recorded in the medical records, her diagnoses,
the medical treatment she received, forms she completed after the injury, her
previous attorney, the definition of "arm," subpoenas for medical records, her
doctor allegedly "popping a pill," and her return to work status after the injury
occurred, we find these arguments not preserved because the Appellate Panel did
not rule on them. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733
(1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,
but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for
appellate review.").
AFFIRMED. 1

KONDUROS, HEWITT, and VINSON, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.