Terri L. Johnson v. State Farm

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Terri L. Johnson, Appellant,

v.

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,
Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2019-000906

Appeal From Richland County
L. Casey Manning, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-305
Submitted May 2, 2022 – Filed July 7, 2022

AFFIRMED

Howard Walton Anderson, III, of Truluck Thomason,
LLC, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Robert William Whelan and Mary Kathleen McTighe
Mellen, both of Whelan Mellen & Norris, LLC, of
Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Terri L. Johnson (Terri) appeals the circuit court's grant of
summary judgment to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State
Farm). Terri asserts the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to State
Farm on her breach of contract claim because it incorrectly found (1) her husband,
Stephen Johnson (Stephen), canceled his Scion policy before her February 19,
2014 car accident occurred and (2) she did not have an insurable interest on
February 19, 2014. Further, Terri contends the circuit court erred in granting
summary judgment to State Farm on her bad faith claim because a genuine issue of
fact existed regarding the Scion policy's cancelation date. We affirm.

1. The circuit court did not err in granting State Farm summary judgment on Terri's
breach of contract claim. The circuit court correctly determined Stephen canceled
the Scion policy prior to Terri's car accident when he called his State Farm agent
and told her to cancel the policy. See Wilbanks v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co., 277 S.C. 256, 257-59, 286 S.E.2d 127, 128-29 (1982) (finding a policy had
been canceled prior to the date of loss even though the insurer's cancelation notice
stated the policy's cancelation was effective after the date of loss because the
policy allowed either party to unilaterally cancel the policy and the insured's agent
received notice the insured wanted to cancel the policy prior to the date of loss).
Additionally, the circuit court correctly determined State Farm's withdrawal the
Scion policy's premium from the Johnsons' bank account on February 10, 2014, did
not affect the Scion policy's cancelation because State Farm later refunded the
unearned premium and the Scion policy specifically stated any delay in returning
unearned premiums would not affect the policy's cancelation. See McElmurray v.
Am. Fid. Fire Ins. Co., 236 S.C. 195, 204-05, 113 S.E.2d 528, 532-34 (1960)
(finding an insurer's failure to return unearned premiums to an insured did not
affect a policy's cancelation because the policy's terms expressly stated the return
of unearned premiums was not necessary to cancel the policy). 1

2. The circuit court did not err in granting State Farm summary judgment on Terri's
bad faith claim. The circuit court correctly determined Stephen's request to cancel
the Scion policy prior to Terri's accident made it reasonable for State Farm to
contest coverage under that policy. See Helena Chem. Co. v. Allianz Underwriters
Ins. Co., 357 S.C. 631, 645, 594 S.E.2d 455, 462 (2004) ("Under South Carolina
law, an insurer acts in bad faith when there is no reasonable basis to support the
insurer's decision. But '[i]f there is a reasonable ground for contesting a claim,
there is no bad faith.'" (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting

1
Because we find the circuit court did not err in determining the Scion policy had
been validly canceled, we do not address Terri's argument that she and Stephen
maintained insurable interests on February 19, 2014. See Futch v. McAllister
Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999)
(noting appellate courts need not address remaining issues when disposition of an
issue is dispositive).
Crossley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 307 S.C. 354, 360, 415 S.E.2d 393,
397 (1992))).

AFFIRMED. 2

WILLIAMS, C.J., and KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.

2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.