TD Bank, N.A. v. Roller

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

TD Bank, N.A., Successor by merger to Carolina First
Bank, Respondent,

v.

Wilbert Roller, Jr., Betty V. Roller, and James Williams,
Defendants,

Of Whom Wilbert Roller, Jr. and Betty V. Roller are the
Appellants.

Appellate Case No. 2019-000047

Appeal From Beaufort County
Marvin H. Dukes, III, Master-in-Equity

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-443
Heard October 14, 2021 – Filed December 15, 2021

AFFIRMED

Thomas R. Goldstein, of Belk Cobb Infinger &
Goldstein, PA, of Charleston, for Appellants.

Matthew Tillman, of Womble Bond Dickinson (US)
LLP, of Charleston, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Wilbert Roller, Jr. and Betty V. Roller appeal the circuit court's
denial of their motion to set aside a deficiency judgment against them. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Johnson v. S.C.
Dep't of Prob., Parole, & Pardon Servs., 372 S.C. 279, 284, 641 S.E.2d 895, 897
(2007) ("[S]ubject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's constitutional or statutory
power to adjudicate a case."); id. ("Stated somewhat differently, 'subject matter
jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class
to which the proceedings in question belong.'" (quoting State v. Gentry, 363 S.C.
93, 100, 610 S.E.2d 494, 498 (2005))); Bardoon Props., NV v. Eidolon Corp., 326
S.C. 166, 169, 485 S.E.2d 371, 373 (1997) ("[T]he wealth of authority is to the
effect that the issue of a party's status as real party in interest does not involve
subject matter jurisdiction."); State v. Johnson, 298 S.C. 496, 498, 381 S.E.2d 732,
733 (1989) (stating express consent to a ruling waives the right to raise the issue on
appeal); Richland County v. Lowman, 307 S.C. 422, 424, 415 S.E.2d 433, 434 (Ct.
App. 1992) (finding a landowner waived the right to a jury trial by signing a
consent order of reference); Barrett & Co. v. Still, 102 S.C. 19, 52, 86 S.E. 204,
206 (1915) ("Where a person is in possession of a note it is prima facie evidence of
ownership, and the burden is on the maker to show to the contrary, or that it has
been paid."); S.C. Code Ann. § 29-3-680(A) (2007) ("In any real estate foreclosure
proceeding a defendant against whom a personal judgment is taken or asked,
whether he has theretofore appeared in the action or not, may within thirty days
after the sale of the mortgaged property apply by verified petition to the clerk of
court in which the decree or order of sale was taken for an order of appraisal.");
S.C. Code Ann. § 29-3-720 (2007) ("The board of appraisers as so constituted shall
proceed to view and value the mortgaged property and all or a majority thereof
shall make a sworn return within thirty days from their appointment of the true
value of the property as of the date of sale, taking into consideration sale value,
cost and replacement value of improvements, income production and all other
proper elements which, in their discretion, enter into the determination of true
value."); S.C. Code Ann. § 29-3-750 (2007) ("The petitioner or the judgment
creditor may appeal from the return of the appraisers upon notice stating the
ground of such appeal served upon the other party within ten days after notice of
the filing of the return . . . ."); Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d
731, 733 (1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal, but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial
judge to be preserved for appellate review."); Blanton v. Stathos, 351 S.C. 534,
542, 570 S.E.2d 565, 569 (Ct. App. 2002) ("Procedural due process requires
notice, the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way, and judicial
review. Procedural due process contemplates notice, a reasonable opportunity to
be heard, and a fair hearing before a legally constituted impartial tribunal. The
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." (citations omitted)); S.C. Code
Ann. § 29-3-720 (instructing the board of appraisers to ascertain "the true value of
the property as of the date of sale" (emphasis added)); 16C C.J.S. Constitutional
Law § 1659 (2015) (surmising "due process is not denied by the exclusion of
irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent evidence").

AFFIRMED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and HEWITT, JJ., concur.