State v. Reville

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

The State, Respondent,

v.

Louis Neal Reville, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2019-000957

Appeal From Charleston County
R. Markley Dennis, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-393
Submitted October 1, 2021 – Filed November 3, 2021

AFFIRMED

Tommy Arthur Thomas, of Irmo, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior
Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing,
both of Columbia; and Solicitor David M. Pascoe, Jr., of
Orangeburg, all for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Louis Neal Reville appeals his cumulative sentencing of fifty
years' imprisonment following his guilty pleas to twenty-two offenses including
one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor, seven
counts of second-degree CSC with a minor, seven counts of lewd act upon a child,
three counts of criminal solicitation of a minor, and four counts of disseminating
obscene material to a minor. On appeal, Reville argues the plea court abused its
discretion in imposing the cumulative fifty-year sentence. Because the plea court
imposed Reville's sentence within the statutory range and the sentence is supported
by the facts of this case, the plea court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly,
we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: In re
M.B.H., 387 S.C. 323, 326, 692 S.E.2d 541, 542 (2010) ("A [plea court] has broad
discretion in sentencing within statutory limits."); id. (holding a sentence will not
be overturned absent an abuse of discretion and explaining an abuse of discretion
occurs "when the ruling is based on an error of law or a factual conclusion without
evidentiary support"); State v. Barton, 325 S.C. 522, 531, 481 S.E.2d 439, 444 (Ct.
App. 1997) ("Absent partiality, prejudice, oppression, or corrupt motive, this
[c]ourt lacks jurisdiction to disturb a sentence that is within the limit prescribed by
statute."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-655(D)(1) (Supp. 2012) ("A person convicted of
[first-degree CSC with a minor] is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be
imprisoned for a mandatory minimum of twenty-five years, no part of which may
be suspended nor probation granted, or must be imprisoned for life."); S.C. Code
Ann. § 16-3-655(D)(3) (Supp. 2012) ("A person convicted of [second-degree CSC
with a minor] is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be imprisoned for
not more than twenty years in the discretion of the court."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 16-15-345 (Supp. 2012) (mandating a person convicted of disseminating obscene
material to a person under the age of eighteen "must be imprisoned for not more
than ten years"); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-342(E) (Supp. 2012) ("A person who
[commits criminal solicitation of a minor] is guilty of a felony and, upon
conviction, must be fined not more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned for not
more than ten years, or both."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-15-140 (2003) (mandating a
person convicted of committing or attempting a lewd act upon a child under the
age of sixteen "must be fined in the discretion of the court or imprisoned not more
than fifteen years, or both").

AFFIRMED.1

KONDUROS, HILL, and HEWITT, JJ., concur.

1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.