Couram v. Tidwell

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Glenda Couram, Appellant,

v.

Sherwood Tidwell, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2017-002145

Appeal From Richland County
Jocelyn Newman, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-367
Submitted September 1, 2021 – Filed October 27, 2021

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Glenda Couram, pro se, of Lexington, Appellant.

Timothy Alan Domin, of Clawson and Staubes, of
Charleston, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Glenda Couram was injured in a multivehicle accident when
Sherwood Tidwell's truck hit the back of a vehicle, pushing it into the rear of
Couram's car. Tidwell was cited for driving too fast for conditions in violation of
section 56-5-1520 of the South Carolina Code (2018). Couram filed this lawsuit
seeking actual damages for her injuries and punitive damages. Couram appeals
several issues including the issue of punitive damages.1 The circuit court granted
Tidwell's directed verdict motion as to punitive damages. We reverse and remand.

Couram appeared pro se at trial. She testifed on her own behalf regarding the
accident and her injuries therefrom. Couram also called Tidwell to testify in her
case-in-chief. He essentially reiterated Couram's testimony as to the circumstances
of the accident. In questioning Tidwell, Couram stated "I know it was a[n]
accident. And I know what happened was unintentional. And I -- and it was an
accident, just simple as [that]. But unfortunately, accident[s] can cause injury
sometimes."

At the conclusion of Couram's case, Tidwell moved for a directed verdict as to her
claim for punitive damages. Tidwell argued Couram had presented no evidence of
willful, wanton, or reckless conduct. In response, Couram argued the violation of a
statute, in this case, Tidwell being cited for driving too fast for conditions,
constituted evidence sufficient to send the issue to the jury. The circuit court
indicated a violation of the statute did not create a punitive case per se and that
Couram's testimony and characterization of the accident as accidental and
unintentional precluded her request for punitive damages. Therefore, the court
granted Tidwell's directed verdict motion as to punitive damages. Tidwell
presented his case, and the jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of Couram
for $1,000 in actual damages. This appeal followed.

"In reviewing a ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, this [c]ourt must view the
evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion."2 Fairchild v. S.C. Dep't of Transp.,

1
Because our disposition of the punitive damages issue is dispositive, we decline
to address the remaining issues. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown,
Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (finding it unnecessary to
address other issues when prior issue is dispositive).
2
Couram's issue on appeal states the circuit court erred in refusing to charge the
jury on punitive damages. While this statement is somewhat ambiguous and could
be interpreted as relating to jury instructions, it is clear from the circumstances and
her argument that Couram is appealing the circuit court's grant of directed verdict
on punitive damages. Therefore, that is the appropriate standard of review. See
Mishoe v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 186 S.C. 402, 412, 197 S.E. 97, 101 (1938)
(noting the appellate "court looks to the substance and not to the shadows" in
evaluating points raised on appeal).
398 S.C. 90, 99, 727 S.E.2d 407, 411 (2012). "A case should be submitted to the
jury when the evidence is susceptible of more than one reasonable inference."
Id. "It is not the duty of the trial court to weigh the testimony in ruling on a motion
for a directed verdict." Id.

"Punitive damages are recoverable where there is evidence the defendant's conduct
was reckless, willful, or wanton." Id. at 99, 727 S.E.2d at 411-12. "Recklessness
is the doing of a negligent act knowingly; it is a conscious failure to exercise due
care, and the element distinguishing actionable negligence from a willful tort is
inadvertence." Id. at 99, 727 S.E.2d at 412.

In Fairchild, our supreme court affirmed the court of appeals' determination that
the circuit court had erred in granting the defendant's directed verdict motion as to
punitive damages. Id. at 111, 727 S.E.2d at 418. In doing so, the supreme court
quoted with approval the court of appeals' opinion, stating:

Citing long-standing South Carolina precedent, the Court
of Appeals held the violation of a statute constitutes
negligence per se, and negligence per se is some
evidence of recklessness and willfulness that requires
submission of the issue of punitive damages to the jury.
The Court of Appeals cited this Court's decision in Wise
v. Broadway, 315 S.C. 273, 433 S.E.2d 857 (1993) as
well as additional authorities to this effect:

Wise v. Broadway, 315 S.C. 273, 276, 433
S.E.2d 857, 859 (1993) ("The causative
violation of a statute constitutes negligence
per se and is evidence of recklessness and
willfulness, requiring the submission of the
issue of punitive damages to the
jury."); Rhodes v. Lawrence, 279 S.C. 96,
97-98, 302 S.E.2d 343, 344 (1983) ("In
these circumstances, a jury question as to
punitive damages was clearly presented
given the well settled rule that a showing of
statutory violation can be evidence of
recklessness and willfulness."); Austin v.
Specialty Transp. Servs., Inc., 358 S.C. 298,
314, 594 S.E.2d 867, 875 (Ct. App. 2004)
("A factual question as to punitive damages
is presented when there is evidence of a
statutory violation.").

The Court of Appeals noted "[t]hese cases limit their
holdings to creating a jury question only and not
recklessness per se."

Id. at 97-98, 727 S.E.2d at 411 (quoting Fairchild v. S.C. Dep't of Transp.,
385 S.C. 344, 354, 583 S.E.2d 818, 823 (Ct. App. 2009)).

In the instant case, Tidwell was charged with a statutory violation. While that fact
did not automatically entitle Couram to punitive damages, it did constitute
negligence per se, making the issue of punitive damages a question for the jury.3
The circuit court erroneously concluded the violation of the statute did not provide
sufficient evidence of recklessness to survive Tidwell's directed verdict motion.
Additionally, as stated, punitive damages are not necessarily dependent on
intentional conduct but are appropriate when the defendant's conduct was reckless.
When Couram stated she did not believe Tidwell hit her intentionally—that the
collision was an accident—her statements were not an admission or concession
that he was not reckless or consciously failed to exercise due care. She was simply
indicating the resulting injury to her was inadvertent. Therefore, the circuit court
erred in finding Couram's statements precluded her from recovering punitive
damages. Accordingly, the circuit court's granting of Tidwell's motion for directed
verdict on punitive damages is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial.
See Rhodes v. Lawrence, 279 S.C. 96, 98, 302 S.E.2d 343, 344 (1983) (reversing
the circuit court's grant of directed verdict on punitive damages and remanding for
a new trial).

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 4

KONDUROS, HILL, and HEWITT, J.J., concur.

3
There must also be some evidence that the statutory violation contributed to the
plaintiff's injury. See Cartee v. Lesley, 290 S.C. 333, 337-38, 350 S.E.2d 388, 390
(1986) ("There must be some inference of a causal link between the statutory
violation and the injury to warrant submitting the issue of punitive damages to the
jury.").
4
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.