Colleton River Plantation Club, Inc. v. Holmes

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals

Colleton River Plantation Club, Inc., Appellant,

v.

Jennifer L. Holmes, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2018-000826

Appeal From Beaufort County
Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge

Unpublished Opinion No. 2021-UP-128
Heard December 8, 2020 – Filed April 28, 2021

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Stephen Harrison Williams and Barry L. Johnson, both of
Johnson and Davis, P.A., of Bluffton, for Appellant.

Terry A. Finger, of Finger, Melnick & Brooks, P.A., of
Hilton Head Island, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM: Colleton River Plantation Club (Colleton River) appeals the
circuit court's order dismissing its claim against Jennifer Holmes for unpaid dues
and fees, arguing the circuit court erred in finding it lacked personal and in rem
jurisdiction. We reverse and remand.
"The question of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is one which
must be resolved upon the facts of each particular case." Cockrell v. Hillerich &
Bradsby Co., 363 S.C. 485, 491, 611 S.E.2d 505, 508 (2005). "Personal
jurisdiction is exercised as 'general jurisdiction' or 'specific jurisdiction.'"
Coggeshall v. Reprod. Endocrine Assocs. of Charlotte, 376 S.C. 12, 16, 655 S.E.2d
476, 478 (2007). "Specific jurisdiction is the State's right to exercise personal
jurisdiction because the cause of action arises specifically from a defendant's
contacts with the forum . . . ." Id. Specific jurisdiction is determined under South
Carolina's long-arm statute, which recognizes, "A court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent as to a cause of action
arising from the person's: . . . (5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real
property in this State." S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-803(A)(5) (Supp. 2020). South
Carolina's long-arm statute, "which affords broad power to exercise personal
jurisdiction over causes of action arising from tortious injuries in South Carolina,
has been construed to extend to the outer limits of the due process clause."
Moosally v. W.W. Norton & Co., 358 S.C. 320, 329, 594 S.E.2d 878, 883 (Ct. App.
2004).

Despite Holmes's eventual filing of a deed transferring the Colleton River Property
to the estate of Charles Holmes (Ex-Husband), the circuit court erred in finding it
lacked personal jurisdiction over Holmes because Holmes retained a legal
ownership interest in the Property during the timespan for which Colleton River
sought payment. Although Holmes's "Dissolution Settlement Agreement," (the
Agreement) approved by the Indiana court on August 1, 2012, required that she
execute a quitclaim deed to Ex-Husband conveying her ownership rights in the
Property, there is no evidence she executed the deed as ordered prior to incurring
the dues and fees that Colleton River brought suit to recover. In her motion to
dismiss, Holmes claimed Ex-Husband refused to record the deed, but she makes no
other assertion regarding an attempted execution of the deed. By contrast, the
2017 deed Holmes eventually recorded supports our finding that she earlier failed
to execute the quitclaim deed required by the Agreement because such deed would
have been effective once recorded and delivered. See First Union Nat. Bank of
S.C. v. Shealy, 325 S.C. 351, 355, 479 S.E.2d 846, 848 (Ct. App. 1996) ("It is a
well established rule of law that a deed is not legally effective until it has been
delivered. There is no prescribed method for an effective delivery of a deed;
manual transfer of the instrument into the hands of the grantee is neither required
to effectuate a valid delivery, nor is such transfer dispositive of the issue."
(citations omitted)).
In 2017, Holmes would have lacked any legal interest in the Property to transfer to
Ex-Husband's estate had she previously complied with the Dissolution Settlement
Agreement. Because the evidence establishes Holmes still had an ownership
interest in the Property during the period for which Colleton River seeks payment
of the outstanding dues and fees, the circuit court had personal jurisdiction over her
pursuant to the long-arm statute. See § 36-2-803(A)(5) ("A court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent as to a cause of
action arising from the person's: . . . (5) having an interest in, using, or possessing
real property in this State.").

The circuit court further erred in finding it lacked in rem jurisdiction. The United
States Supreme Court has explained,

Founded on physical power, the in rem jurisdiction of a
state court is limited by the extent of its power and by the
coordinate authority of sister States. The basis of the
jurisdiction is the presence of the subject property within
the territorial jurisdiction of the forum State. Tangible
property poses no problem for the application of this rule,
but the situs of intangibles is often a matter of
controversy.

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246–47 (1958) (citations omitted). Because the
subject Property for which the unpaid dues and fees are owed is located in
Beaufort County, South Carolina, the circuit court erred in finding it lacked in rem
jurisdiction.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.